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Tracing Virginia Woolf’s Philosophy 
Looked at again and again half consciously by a mind thinking of something else, any 
object mixes itself so profoundly with the stuff of thought that it loses its actual form and 
recomposes itself a little differently in an ideal shape which haunts the brain when we least 
expect it.1 
 
And as happens sometimes when the weather is very fine, the cliffs looked as if they 
were conscious of the ships, and the ships looked as if they were conscious of the cliffs, as if 
they signalled to each other some secret message of their own.2 
 
(…) what I call “my life”, it is not one life that I look back upon; I am not one person; 
I am many people; I do not altogether know who I am – Jinny, Susan, Neville, Rhoda or 
Louis: or how to distinguish my life from theirs.3 
 
Sheep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves—all are one. If discordant, producing harmony—
if not to us, to a gigantic ear attached to a gigantic head.4 
 
The four quotations from different works of Virginia Woolf capture the main topics of 
this dissertation and illustrate the wide thematic and philosophical scope of Woolf’s oeuvre. 
The first quotation illustrates Woolf’s interest in the interaction between her characters and 
the material reality around them. She raised this idea for example in her essay “Poetry, Fiction 
and the Future,” where she claims that novelists have focused so much on interpersonal 
relationships that the readers “long for some more impersonal relationship.”5 Consequently, 
writers should not forget that “a large and important part of life consists in our emotions 
toward such things as roses and nightingales.”6 Accordingly, Woolf’s texts contain long 
passages that deal with human subjects, who reflect upon their connection and fascination 
with all kinds of objects in their proximity. This aspect of Woolf’s writing may be found for 
 
1. Virginia Woolf, “Solid Objects,” in The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf, ed. 
Susan Dick (London: Harcourt, 1989), 105.  
2. Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 198.  
3. Virginia Woolf, The Waves (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 2000), 62-63.  
4. Virginia Woolf, “Between the Acts,” in The Years & Between the Acts (Ware, Wordsworth 
Classics, 2012), 388.  
5. Woolf, “Poetry, Fiction and the Future,” in Selected Essays, ed. David Bradshaw (Oxford, 
OUP, 2009), 80-81. 
6. Woolf, “Poetry,” 80-81. 
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instance in the short stories “The Mark on the Wall,” “Solid Objects,” and novels To the 
Lighthouse and The Waves. Furthermore, Woolf often indicates that this interaction between 
sentient human beings and lifeless material substance may result in the reconfiguration of this 
traditional dualism and that, in fact, the human subject is not separated from the object but 
“becomes” that object. For example, in To the Lighthouse Mrs Ramsay watches the light from 
the lighthouse “until she became the thing she looked at—that light for example”7 and in the 
short story “Solid Objects” John compulsively collects curious objects until they intermix 
with his own consciousness as indicated in the first quotation in the head of this introduction.  
The blurred distinction between the subject and object is illustrated in the second 
quotation from To the Lighthouse, where Woolf suggests that while we often think of the 
material world as of something deprived of psychical and conscious elements, in reality, there 
is not much difference between the “thing-stuff” and the “thought-stuff.”8 Woolf, like other 
philosophers of her time, rejects the scientific materialism that advocates the “irreducible 
brute matter”9 and often talks about the dissolution of solidity in her fiction, for example in 
“The Mark on the Wall,” where the narrator laments that people worship “the chest of 
drawers,” “solidity,” and “reality,”10 or in The Waves, where Bernard doubts “the fixity of 
tables.”11 To balance the prevalence of solid matter, Woolf argues in her essay “On Being Ill” 
that both mind and body represent equally important aspects of life and complement each 
other like “the sheath of a knife or the pod of a pea.”12 This suggests that Woolf’s engagement 
with materiality cannot be read either from a materialist perspective, or an idealist viewpoint, 
but rather via non-dualist theories that consider physical aspects and mental aspects as 
 
7. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 70.  
8. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003), 72. 
9. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 
1967), 17. 
10. Woolf, “The Mark on the Wall,” in Complete Shorter Fiction, 88.  
11. Woolf, The Waves, 162.  
12. Woolf, “On Being Ill,” in Selected Essays, 101. 
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simultaneously present in all kinds of matter. Consequently, it is suggested in the second 
chapter of this thesis that Woolf’s perspective of matter may be approximated to 
panpsychism, a theory of consciousness claiming that “the basic physical constituents of the 
universe have mental properties, whether or not they are parts of living organisms.”13 In 
reference to the quotation from To the Lighthouse, Woolf likewise suggests that while cliffs 
and ships are usually considered to be inanimate objects defined by their physical properties, 
they might be conscious of each other and interact with each other. Woolf attributes the same 
capacity to the lighthouse or a garden urn in To the Lighthouse, pieces of stone and china in 
“Solid Objects,” or to rooms in Orlando.  
While the first two quotations illustrate that Woolf undermines the dualisms of the 
subject and object, and mind and matter, the third quotation given above demonstrates that the 
author also attempts to bridge the abyss between separate identities of individuals, subverts 
the unitary subject of predominantly male-dominated psychoanalysis of her period and 
anticipates the notion of fragmented postmodern self. Whereas Woolf is often accused of 
focusing on subjectivism and individualism, she devises an intersubjective and constantly 
changing self. Woolf reveals this idea in her diary, where she claims that human beings are 
“somehow successive, & continuous,”14 or in The Waves, where Bernard says that he is 
“made and remade continually.”15 Moreover, an individual never exists in isolation but 
represents a part of a wider community, wherein the community and the individual are 
interdependent. Woolf develops this idea of network identity especially in her late works The 
Waves, Three Guineas, “A Sketch of the Past,” and Between the Acts, where she suggests that 
 
13. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 
436, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914. 
14. Woolf, The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Volume 3 1925-30, ed. Anne Olivier Bell (London: 
Penguin Books, 1982), 218. 
15. Woolf, The Waves, 15. 
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all individuals are ontologically related as “we are members of one another,”16 which also 
indicates that the ontological interrelation bears an ethical aspect. This “ontoethics”17 enables 
the author to attribute value to each member of the community in Between the Acts, and 
ultimately in Three Guineas, where Woolf rejects social exclusion because “a common 
interest unites us; it is one world, one life.”18  
The fourth quotation is linked to the relational ontoethics outlined above and reveals 
Woolf’s inclination to blur the distinction between the human self and the surrounding nature, 
weaken the importance of humans and disprove their right to subjugate other natural 
organisms in their surroundings. The introductory quotation indicates that humans, animals, 
and other organisms are equally important parts that create a harmonious whole, which results 
from Woolf’s emphasis on the human embeddedness in their environment. For example, 
Clarissa Dalloway is “being part of the trees at home; of the house there,”19 or Susan in The 
Waves claims that she is “rooted to the middle of the earth” and that her “body is a stalk.”20 
These quotations illustrate Woolf’s non-anthropocentric viewpoint, her tendency to erase the 
distinction between the human and the non-human, or in other words nature and culture. By 
focusing on human beings conceived as integral parts of their environment, she reconciles the 
human and nonhuman worlds which drifted apart as a consequence of modernity. In her essay 
“Flying over London,” she emphasizes that the mind is “inveterately anthropocentric,”21 
which is counterbalanced by her attempt to get rid of the human existence in the passage 
“Time Passes,” or natural interludes in The Waves, where she explores the description of 
nonhuman temporality and space. Moreover, in her essay “The Sun and the Fish” Woolf 
 
16. Woolf, Between the Acts, 396.  
17. Elizabeth Grosz, The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 1.  
18. Woolf, Three Guineas (London: The Hogarth Press, 1986), 163.  
19. Woolf, Mrs Dalloway (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 2003), 7. 
20. Woolf, The Waves, 6.  
21. Woolf, “Flying over London,” in Selected Essays, 207.  
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offers an apocalyptic vision of humanity “rushing to destruction” and “accepting its doom;”22 
in the “London Scene Essays”—“Thunder at Wembley” and “The Docks of London”—she 
deals with the human need to show off their mastery over the natural world and, at the same 
time, expresses her fascination and repulsion by the docks of London, where one can see the 
illustration of consumerism and exploitation of nature.  
The issues raised in the previous four paragraphs, related to the quotations from the 
head of this introduction, suggest that Woolf was intrigued by the idea that everything is 
interconnected at some deeper level, the ontological level, and that she rejected all kinds of 
separation and dualisms established by science and adopted by literature prior to, and also 
contemporary with, her writing. This interconnection at the fundamental level, penetration 
beneath the surface and the appearance of the physical world may be traced already in her 
first-published short story “The Mark on the Wall,” where the narrator states that she wants 
“to sink deeper and deeper, away from the surface, with its hard separate facts.”23 Therefore, 
this thesis seeks the definition of Woolf’s “personal philosophy” and suggests that it is based 
primarily on the intimate relation between the subject and object, the human being and its 
surroundings, and the idea that even physical matter, traditionally conceived as lifeless and 
inert, might have some psychical properties and agency. As a result, living organisms and 
inorganic matter are not distinct, as claimed by scientific materialism, but fundamentally 
similar in the way that they are endowed with both mental and physical properties and cannot 
be considered as merely “solid” or psychical. Furthermore, Woolf also recurrently evokes the 
idea that human beings are ontologically interconnected, for example in “A Sketch of the 
Past,” where she claims that “behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I mean all 
 
22. Woolf, “The Sun and the Fish,” in Selected Essays, 171. 
23. Woolf, “The Mark,” 85.  
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human beings—are connected with this,”24 or in The Waves and Between the Acts, where 
Woolf explores the notion of pluralistic and intersubjective identity that goes against the 
individualism and “privatism,”25 of which modernism was often accused. Finally, this thesis 
highlights that this ontological bond between both human beings and natural elements results 
in a sort of ontoethics that emphasizes difference and multiplicity within a community and 
recognizes the value of every being. Consequently, Woolf applies this value recognition to her 
essays, where she explicitly, or implicitly, criticizes anthropocentrism and reveals her proto-
ecological thinking. By the description of a possible extinction of life and criticism of 
consumerism and its negative impact on the natural world, she demonstrates that she is not an 
elitist, “human-centred” modernist, but rather a thinker who responds to the scientific and 
philosophical context of her period and the way “animals, environments and objects”26 were 
treated at that time.  
The “personal philosophy” outlined in “A Sketch of the Past” has intrigued Woolf 
scholars for decades, and particularly in the last two decades when the focus of Woolf studies 
shifted from detailed analysis of language and psychoanalytic approach to her fiction to the 
examination of materiality, ontology, and ethics.27 Scholars have discussed Woolf’s “pattern 
behind the cotton wool” from various and often opposing perspectives. For example, Mark 
Hussey devotes one chapter of his book The Singing of the Real World: The Philosophy of 
Virginia Woolf’s Fiction to Woolf’s concept of reality and claims that what we recurrently 
find in the author’s works is the sense of “gap” between the everyday reality as it appears to 
 
24. Woolf, “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, ed. Jeanne Schulkind (London: 
Harcourt, 1985), 72.  
25. Derek Ryan, “Following Snakes and Moths: Modernist Ethics and Posthumanism.” 
Twentieth Century Literature 61, no. 3 (2015): 291. 
26. Ryan, “Following Snakes,” 290.  
27. Ryan, Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory: Sex, Animal, Life (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 3.  
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us and “the yearning for transcendence of the world of time and death.”28 That is to say, 
Woolf often deals with “abstract reality” which, on the one hand, surpasses the everyday 
human experience, but on the other hand, cannot be perceived as something idealistic, mystic 
or religious, which would not correspond to Woolf’s atheistic background. However, as 
Hussey points out, Woolf did not accept the atheism and materialism of her father Leslie 
Stephen and G.E. Moore completely and searched for abstraction, or a pattern, behind the 
actual world. Hussey concludes by identifying Woolf’s abstract pattern as “psychic perception 
of pattern” behind daily life, which results from “a state of rhythmic rest”29 experienced 
mostly by female characters. Therefore, this abstract level is not connected with some 
transcendental reality, but it comes as a side effect of the sensitive apprehension of the visible 
world. The search for this transcendental philosophy, a pattern behind the everyday, and its 
definition is also the focus of Lorraine Sim’s book Virginia Woolf: The Patterns of Ordinary 
Experience, where the scholar suggests that especially in Woolf’s early fiction, we may trace 
a certain Romantic pantheism suggesting that the divine “inheres in, and emanates through, 
the visible world.”30 Moreover, Sim claims that Woolf’s abstract reality of the pattern behind 
the cotton wool of daily life is “non-material principle or essence,”31 and that it may be 
likened to Plato’s realm of transcendental forms of which the sensible world is a mere copy. 
Therefore, Sim argues that Woolf’s personal philosophy consists in the “belief in the 
existence of an objective, non-material reality that provides order and meaning to life.”32  
In contrast, Ann Banfield employs a very different perspective in her book The 
Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism and traces the 
 
28. Mark Hussey, The Singing of the Real World: The Philosophy of Virginia Woolf’s Fiction 
(Columbus: Ohio State University, 1986), 96. 
29. Hussey, 105. 
30. Lorraine Sim, Virginia Woolf: The Pattern of Ordinary Experience (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2010), 168.  
31. Sim, 168. 
32. Sim, 173.  
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influence of the Bloomsbury Group’s discussions of philosophy, and particularly Bertrand 
Russell’s philosophy on Woolf’s writing. Although there is not a direct evidence that Woolf 
ever read Russell’s philosophical works, Banfield focuses on Russell’s rejection of 
transcendentalism and idealism and ascribes the same shift to Woolf. According to her, the 
most striking parallel between the writer and her friend philosopher is the dual reality of 
objects, which are divided into sensible objects perceived by an observer, or, in other words, 
real objects, and unobservable physical objects, or unreal objects.33 Banfield demonstrates this 
distinction on the difference between “a scrubbed kitchen table” that Lily imagines after she 
learns about Mr Ramsay’s philosophical subject and “a white deal four-legged table” of Mr 
Ramsay’s imagination which represents a pure form deprived of sense-data a perceiver 
attributes to the object. Moreover, she claims that Woolf and Russell both believed in 
“atomic” vision of reality, which means that we usually see an object from our own private 
perspective and assume that the others see the same thing but, in fact, we take on only one of 
the multiple perspectives.34 This multiple reality of physical objects may be illustrated for 
example in “The Mark on the Wall,” where Woolf rejects the existence of “the standard thing, 
the real thing”35 and contrasts it with a personal perspective of the mark. Although the 
analogies drawn between Woolf and Russell in Banfield’s book are very persuasive and the 
author claims that Woolf’s 1921 encounter with Russell resulted in the historically 
particularized conjunction of literature and philosophy, the proofs that Woolf tried to apply 
Russell’s philosophy to her art are nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, Banfield’s enquiry is 
crucial in marking the shift in Woolf’s studies from the ethics and philosophy of G. E. Moore 
and the focus on personal relations towards “the aesthetic of the impersonal,”36 which means 
 
33. Ann Banfield, The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of 
Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 60. 
34. Banfield, 79.  
35. Woolf, “The Mark,” 86. 
36. Banfield, 54. 
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towards the issues of materiality and ontology. Derek Ryan’s book Virginia Woolf and the 
Materiality of Theory attempts to capture Woolf’s definition of reality and matter, arguing 
that “Woolf’s writing offers new conceptualisations of the material world where the 
immanent and intimate entanglements of human and nonhuman agencies are brought to the 
fore.”37 Ryan discusses this reconceptualization via philosophical theories that emerged 
decades after “high modernism,” for instance via poststructuralism of Deleuze and Guattari 
and new materialism as outlined by feminist thinkers such as Jane Bennett, Karen Barad, 
Donna Haraway, or Rosi Braidotti. By focusing on human interaction and entanglement with 
nonhuman objects and animals, Ryan elaborates on the impersonal line in Woolf’s writing 
explored by Banfield. In the first chapter of the book the author discusses Woolf’s personal 
philosophy based on the reading of the essay “The New Biography,” where Woolf 
distinguishes between solid facts and things, symbolised by “the granite,” and the ephemeral 
ideas and experience, illustrated by the image of “the rainbow.” In the following chapters, he 
goes on analysing how Woolf tackles this dualism and often transitions in her fiction from 
solidity to ephemerality. Moreover, Ryan emphasizes that the two terms do not represent 
oppositions, but complement each other, which creates the basis of Woolf’s treatment of 
materiality. In the same vein, J. Ashley Foster argues in her article “Writing in the Light of 
Truth: History, Ethics, and Community in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts” that Woolf’s 
longing for transcendence behind material reality might be read via the influence of 
Quakerism, where God manifests himself as light glowing through the physical world 
including human beings, which justifies the value of every being. Accordingly, Foster argues 
that Woolf often uses the images of light to talk about spirit, reality, and life described as a 
“luminous halo,” and she contrasts this spirituality of light to Woolf’s focus on material 
elements. She highlights that the spiritual aspect, and the divine light, are never separated 
 
37. Ryan, Virginia Woolf, 4.  
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from matter and that the two aspects of reality are interconnected: “This luminous halo is not 
transcendent but immanent in the material.”38 
With the awareness that Woolf read philosophical and scientific works ranging from 
Plato to the new physics and possibly even Bergson, Moore or Russell, this thesis does not 
aim to demonstrate that Woolf was directly influenced by any single philosopher whom she 
might have read. As Benjamin Hagen points out in his article “Bloomsbury and Philosophy,” 
Woolf was far from being a systematic philosopher, however, she created her works 
“philosophically,”39 with the use of concepts that she read or discussed with her friends. 
Moreover, Woolf’s use of the term “philosophy” is rather vague and differs in her essays and 
other works, therefore, if we want to devise its definition, it must be regarded as her 
perspective of life, reality, and one’s relation to other human and nonhuman beings.  
This dissertation elaborates on the above-mentioned attempts to capture the main 
premises of Virginia Woolf’s “philosophy” as directly outlined in “A Sketch of the Past” but 
dispersed throughout her works, which gives evidence of Woolf’s interest in the nature of 
reality, and the knowledge of the material world. It shares with the previous attempts the 
assumption that Woolf acknowledges the equal importance of mental and material aspects of 
reality and that she is deeply interested in the way these two aspects interact and interrelate. 
Moreover, as it is sketched in the following section describing each of the following chapters, 
it is to be suggested that whereas Woolf is commonly thought a modernist writer and thinker, 
she anticipates many issues discussed later in the discourse of postmodern and 
poststructuralist philosophy and literature. This anticipation lies predominantly in Woolf’s 
rejection of dualistic perspective or binary oppositions of subject/object, material/spiritual, 
 
38. Ashley J. Foster, “Writing in the Light of Truth”: History, Ethics, and Community in 
Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts,” Woolf Studies Annual 22 (2016): 54. 
39. Benjamin Hagen, “Bloomsbury and Philosophy,” in The Handbook to the Bloomsbury 
Group, ed. Derek Ryan and Stephen Ross (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 139. 
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human/nonhuman, nature/culture, or individual/community. Woolf writes in her essay 
“Character in Fiction” that “about December 1910 human character changed,” and she 
describes this change as a complete turnaround in both private and public spheres of “religion, 
conduct, politics, and literature.”40 It is possible to add to these changes also the shift in one’s 
perception of reality and their relation to the surrounding nature, which is based precisely on 
the blurring of the boundaries between above listed dualisms. Rachel Crossland interestingly 
discusses the dualistic climate of the beginning of the 20th century in her book Modernist 
Physics, where she points out that various scientific disciplines and popular science of that 
time struggled with “dualistic models,” for example evolutionary biology or physics, which 
was revolutionized by the Einstein’s and de Broglie’s discoveries of wave-particle duality of 
light.41 Moreover, Crossland refers to scholars who argue that dualisms were also central to 
the Victorian culture42 and she demonstrates that various kinds of dichotomies are to be found 
in Woolf’s autobiographical writing and fiction. In contrast to reinforcing the dualistic aspects 
in Woolf’s fiction, Crossland argues that Woolf, similarly to other nondualist scientists and 
philosophers such as Einstein, Bohr or Bergson,43 envisages a project that intertwines 
dualisms and replaces the dualistic models with “complementary models.”44 She illustrates 
this very aptly on Woolf’s use of conjunctions “and” and “or” that dominate titles of Woolf’s 
short stories and novels, for example Monday or Tuesday or Night and Day, and suggests that 
although Woolf often starts with exclusive “or” in relation to certain thematic or conceptual 
aspects, she mostly concludes with inclusive “and.”45  
 
40. Woolf, “Character in Fiction,” in Selected Essays, 38.  
41. Rachel Crossland, Modernist Physics: Waves, Particles, and Relativities in the Writings of 
Virginia Woolf and D.H. Lawrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 35. 
42. Crossland, 37.  
43. Crossland, 37. 
44. Crossland, 39. 
45. Crossland, 40. 
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This thesis follows the same footsteps and suggests that Woolf’s effort to reconcile the 
binary oppositions, which is an integral part of her “personal philosophy,” or “creative 
ontology,”46 might be likened to the main premises of process-oriented philosophy, especially 
Alfred North Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism,”47 which rejects “the bifurcation of 
nature” into the aforementioned oppositions.  Although Whitehead represents another 
“Cambridge philosopher,” who, by means of collaboration with his student Bertrand Russell, 
might have influenced Woolf, this thesis provides not only a “paratactic coordination”48 of 
Woolf’s and Whitehead’s thought, but it attempts to discover and examine understudied 
parallels between Woolf’s and Whitehead’s conceptions of reality and criticism of all forms 
of the bifurcation of nature. Whereas Whitehead primarily defines this bifurcation as 
epistemological problem of the distinction between the nature composed of “entities such as 
electrons which are the study of speculative physics” and the apparent nature produced as “the 
byplay of mind,”49 he examines several other dualisms throughout his philosophical work, for 
example the distinction between substance and experience, the subject and object, the animate 
and the inanimate, the organism and its environment, or ultimately an organism and the 
community of its fellow beings. Precisely these themes are the points of intersection between 
Woolf’s personal philosophy and process thought. In this light, the thesis proposes that if we 
want to pigeonhole Woolf as a philosopher, its closest correlative would be a process-oriented 
thinker. For this reason, it is quite surprising that there are only a few papers which analyse 
the potential that process philosophy offers in relation to Woolf’s writing. This might be 
partly explained by the neglect of Whiteheadian thought in the mid and second half of the 20th 
century and “the Whiteheadian turn” appearing in philosophy and science only in the last few 
 
46. Hagen, 146.  
47. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 7. 
48. Hagen, 137.  
49. Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 21.  
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decades, and partly by the fact that Woolf’s ontology has been extensively discussed in 
relation to Deleuze’s poststructuralist thought, new materialism, or object-oriented ontology 
—theories that more or less directly elaborate on Whitehead’s cosmology. 
 The parallels between Deleuze’s poststructuralist philosophy and Woolf’s fiction have 
been analysed by Derek Ryan in his already mentioned book Virginia Woolf and the 
Materiality of Theory, where the author discusses Woolf’s writing in relation to Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s concept of rhizomatic structure or becoming-animal, and by Laci Mattison, who 
has published many articles on Deleuzian reading of modernism and importantly also the 
article “Woolf’s Un/folding(s): The Artist and The Event of the Neo-Baroque,” where she 
mentions Deleuze’s notion of the fold inspired by Whitehead. Mattison highlights that objects 
in Woolf’s fiction may often be called “events” because they enter various relations with their 
environment, which is one of the topics discussed later in this thesis. Although this article 
opens up a new way of reading Woolf’s fiction via the “aesthetics of event,”50 it tends to 
identify Deleuze’s ontology with that of Whitehead, which is, of course, justifiable to some 
extent, but as some scholars point out, Deleuze freely modified Whitehead’s thought to his 
own image and we cannot think of these two philosophies as entirely equivalent.51  For this 
reason, this thesis focuses primarily on the ontology, or cosmology, outlined by Alfred North 
 
50. Laci Mattison, “Woolf’s Un/folding(s): The Artist and The Event of the Neo-Baroque” in 
Contradictory Woolf: Selected Papers from the Twenty-First Annual International 
Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Derek Ryan and Stella Bolaki (Clemson, Clemson 
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51. Michael Halewood in his article “On Whitehead and Deleuze: The Process of 
Materiality,” published in Configurations 13, no. 1 (2005): 57-76, acknowledges the parallels 
between Deleuze’s and Whitehead’s ideas of materiality and points out that both Whitehead 
and Deleuze envisaged a nonessentialist ontology and saw nature as the realm of interrelated 
experiences of subjects. He adds that while Whitehead also prioritizes becoming over being, 
however, unlike Deleuze he is more successful in “advocating a notion of physicality” (61). 
Didier Debaise in his book Speculative Empiricism: Revisiting Whitehead (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2017) points out weaknesses of Deleuze’s appropriation of 
Whitehead’s thought, for example his perception of Whitehead’s philosophy as philosophy of 
events (54) based on the idea that an actual entity is an event. In fact, what Deleuze sees as an 
event is Whitehead’s society (55).   
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Whitehead because he is not only the inspiration for Deleuze’s own ontology of becoming but 
above all Woolf’s contemporary. In the introduction of his above-mentioned book Derek 
Ryan argues that he wants to discuss Woolf’s writing via Deleuze’s perspective because the 
philosopher “in one way or another” influenced the theories of new materialism as proposed 
by Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, or Jane Bennett, and that the “Deleuzian” reading of Woolf 
may “open up new perspectives and conceptual paradigms”52 and re-establish the importance 
of theory while analysing Woolf’s texts. Moreover, the Deleuzian poststructuralist lens enable 
Ryan to link Woolf’s writing with contemporary theories that focus on “the material 
entanglements of humans with nonhuman objects”53 and demonstrate that Woolf still has a 
say in today’s post-humanist debates.  
While this dissertation analyses Woolf’s texts from a similar perspective to that of 
Ryan, it also aims to bridge the temporal gap between Woolf and Deleuze’s poststructuralist 
thought by supporting its arguments with the process thought of Whitehead. The philosopher 
was not only a predecessor of and inspiration for Deleuze’s thought but also Woolf’s 
contemporary, which suggests what both the writer and the philosopher were, in fact, ahead of 
their own time and anticipated our current discussions of materiality. Claiming that all the 
above-mentioned new materialists at least partly elaborate on Deleuze’s ideas, Ryan neglects 
Whitehead’s direct influence on some of these thinkers. For example, Donna J. Haraway 
mentions Whitehead’s concept of concrescence in the first chapter of her book When Species 
Meet to exemplify the natural connection between human/nonhuman individuals, their 
ancestors, and contemporaries. Whitehead is mentioned also in other chapters of the book and 
especially in relation to Haraway’s concept of “worlding” inspired by Isabelle Stengers and 
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her elaboration on Whitehead’s philosophy.54 In her article “Diffractive Propositions: Reading 
Alfred North Whitehead with Donna Haraway and Karen Barad” Melanie Seghal suggests 
that Karen Barad’s focus on quantum physics and her idea of “ontological entanglements” is 
strikingly similar to Whitehead’s interrelated actual entities and societies.55 Deleuze himself 
refers directly to Whitehead in his book The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, where he speaks 
about Whitehead as one of the successors of the philosophical school of “events.”56 Therefore, 
these parallels indicate that whereas Woolf’s fiction is often read in line with the postmodern 
and poststructuralist theories of materiality in order to be related to contemporary discussions 
about materiality, nature and culture dualism or posthumanism, it may be read alongside 
Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism,” which prefigures the main issues discussed by 
Deleuze and his successors new materialists. As a result, this thesis aims to complement 
various readings of Virginia Woolf’s fiction via the Deleuzian lens with the original 
Whiteheadian perspective from which these readings often originate.  
Moreover, with its focus on Whitehead the thesis also attempts to bring the 
philosopher, who had been neglected for a few decades because of his focus on all-
encompassing cosmology, into current discussions and demonstrate that his philosophy 
enables us to read literature in a new light and renders it pertinent to our current critical 
climate. The striking parallels between Woolf’s fiction and Whitehead’s ideas also illustrate 
that Whitehead’s process thought does not represent an abstract philosophy but that it may 
enlighten our conceptualisation of the everyday and material objects, connections between 
things and human beings, interpersonal relations, and last but not least the nonhuman and 
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criticism of anthropocentrism. Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence that Woolf ever read 
Whitehead’s works, but she must have known him via her friends Bertrand Russell and 
Ottoline Morell.57 In her autobiographical memoir “Old Bloomsbury” Woolf mentions her 
attendance at the 1912 ball that celebrated the end of the Second Post-Impressionist 
Exhibition organized in London’s Crosby Hall, where she was dressed very colourfully like a 
“negro woman” from Gaugin’s paintings, which scandalized Mrs Whitehead, the wife of 
Alfred North Whitehead.58 At that time, Whitehead was known mainly as a co-author of 1910 
Principia Mathematica, rather than as a philosopher. Therefore, the direct influence of his 
philosophy on Woolf cannot be justified. In this light, this thesis suggests that analogies 
between Woolf’s and Whitehead’s “philosophies” result from the fact that they were 
contemporaries and that they were interested in similar issues, probably due to the changing 
social and scientific discourse of their time. In this respect, the thesis discusses the parallels 
between Woolf’s and Whitehead’s thought via the prism of zeitgeist model, which is based on 
shared interests of various disciplines at a particular period, rather than direct influence 
model,59 which would claim that Woolf knew Whitehead, and therefore must have read some 
of his philosophical works and applied his ideas to her fiction. Thus, this thesis analyses the 
analogies between Woolf’s literary viewpoint and Whitehead’s philosophical perspective in 
accordance with Gillian Beer’s idea from her book Open Fields, where the literary critic 
suggests that diverse scientific and artistic disciplines “share the moment’s discourse.”60 As a 
result, this thesis provides another description of Woolf’s “personal philosophy,” broadens the 
 
57. Holly Henry suggests in her book Virginia Woolf and the Discourse of Science: The 
Aesthetics of Astronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), on page 68, that the 
Woolfs met Whitehead in Morrell’s Garsington House. 
58. Virginia Woolf, “Old Bloomsbury,” In Moments of Being, ed. Jeanne Schulkind (London: 
Harcourt, 1985), 200-201.  
59. Crossland, 4-5. 
60. Gillian Beer. Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1996), 171. 
17 
 
scale of philosophical analyses of Woolf’s opus and suggests that Woolf might have been 
influenced by Whitehead to the same extent as by Russell, Einstein, or Bergson because all 
these outstanding figures of the early 20th century created the above-mentioned discourse of 
their period. In this way, this thesis contributes to the array of approaches that a scholar may 





Virginia Woolf as a Process Thinker 
Virginia Woolf shows her interest in the nature of reality and fascination with the 
world around her throughout her fiction. She might have taken this interest after her father 
Leslie Stephen, famous historian, critic, and philosopher, who was inspired by Darwin’s 
evolution theory, adopted agnosticism and wrote several influential essays on the nature of 
reality, epistemology, and faith, for example “What is Materialism?” where he argues that 
scientists are good at describing material substance, but they do not know how to include 
immaterial notions such as feelings or experience in their descriptions. Moreover, he claims in 
the essay, “emotions are just as real as the stone,”61 by which he condemns scientific 
materialism that tends to discard experience as a mere secondary product of our brain 
processes. Similarly, Virginia Woolf fought against the dominance of matter and set herself a 
goal to “saturate every atom” with experience and life and “eliminate all waste, deadness, 
superfluity”62 from her fiction. However, this does not mean that Woolf rejects the notion of 
material substance, which is illustrated for example in her essay “On Being Ill,” where she 
acknowledges the equal importance of both bodily and mental processes. The material and the 
mental, or experiential, always complement each other in Woolf’s fiction “like the sheath of a 
knife or the pod of a pea.”63 The questioning of purely material reality is a recurrent theme in 
Woolf’s works, for example in The Waves, where Bernard feels a table and asks “Are you 
hard?”64 or in the short story “The Mark on the Wall,” where the narrator wants to “sink 
deeper and deeper, away from the surface, with its hard separate facts.”65 In the same story 
Woolf also doubts the existence of “the real thing” or “the standard thing”66 that is 
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unchangeable and the same for everyone. In her diary Woolf asks whether life is something 
“very solid or very shifting”67 and admits her uncertainty and anxiety about this contradiction. 
Similarly, Alfred North Whitehead rejects scientific materialism, which prevailed in the then 
science, and argues in his book Science and the Modern World that although experience may 
seem “dim and fragmentary,” it “sounds the utmost depths of reality.”68 For this reason, 
Whitehead devises an ontology based on atomic actual entities, defined in his opus magnum 
Process and Reality as “drops of experience, complex and interdependent,”69 whereof the 
whole world is made up. For Whitehead these actual entities represent the “final real things”70 
and this thesis suggests that they may also be seen as the pattern lying beneath the surface of 
“hard separate facts” mentioned by Woolf in “The Mark on the Wall.”71 The fact that 
Whitehead’s “atoms” are of experiential nature is strikingly similar to Woolf’s idea from her 
essay “Modern Fiction,” where she suggests that modern writers should “record the atoms as 
they fall upon the mind in order in which they fall.”72 Woolf also speaks about “innumerable 
atoms” of impressions that are processed by a mind during a single day.73  
Whitehead’s actual entities come to existence by the process of concrescence, or 
becoming, and they assemble into larger macro-scale objects which he calls societies. 
Although these societies are relatively stable objects we encounter in everyday life, for 
example a tree, a table, or a lighthouse, their internal configurations are parts of a constant 
flux of change as the individual actual entities repeatedly emerge and perish. In a similar way, 
objects in Woolf’s fiction are described as solid and at the same time continually changing 
entities. This may be illustrated in “Solid Objects,” where Woolf emphasizes the solidity of 
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pieces of different materials collected by John and points out that these objects may lose their 
actual form and recompose in a slightly different shape,74 which means that they also affect 
their environment differently. Likewise, the lighthouse in the eponymous novel is depicted as 
a solid landmark whereupon all the characters fix their eyes, however, it is described 
differently in each passage and Woolf even argues, from the perspective of James, that 
“nothing was simply one thing” as “the other was also the Lighthouse.”75  
The first chapter of this thesis analyses the similarities between Woolf’s and 
Whitehead’s conception of “things” and highlights their dislike of this designation. Moreover, 
the chapter discusses Whitehead’s attempt to blur the distinction between the categories of the 
subject and the object via his concept of prehension based on the idea that each actual entity is 
at the same time a subject, which feels and interacts with other entities, and an object, which 
is “prehended” by other entities and may become a part of their process of concrescence, or in 
other words, becoming. This idea may be applied to Woolf’s description of human interaction 
with the surrounding world, which is often described as transgressing the boundary between 
the subject and object. For example, this applies to John’s interaction with the collected 
objects that intermingle with his thoughts and become active subjects or to To the Lighthouse, 
where Lily wants to become “one with the object one adored” or Mrs Ramsay renounces her 
own subjectivity and slips into the objective position of the light she is looking at. Therefore, 
Woolf adopts Whitehead’s belief that “no individual subject can have independent reality”76 
as it is co-created by the aspects of other subjects that act the part of objects. The first chapter 
also discusses the merging of the subject and object in relation to Woolf’s short story “A 
Simple Melody” and “The Fascination by the Pool” and suggests that the distinction between 
the two aforementioned categories is entirely abandoned. Moreover, this topic is elaborated 
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on in the third chapter, which deals primarily with the interconnection of human subjects and 
the natural environment whereof they are parts.  
Another idea that Woolf shares with Whitehead is her recurrent description of live or 
animate matter. It is demonstrated in To the Lighthouse, particularly in its central passage 
“Time Passes,” where the objects such as the lighthouse, Lily’s canvas, cliffs, or garden urns 
are often described as having a degree of sentience and they react to or originate changes in 
their environment. In Whitehead’s terminology, these objects are subjects of feeling that can 
influence their process of becoming and impose their agency on their environment, as they are 
endowed with “lure for feeling.” While Whitehead attributes consciousness only to animals 
and humans, which are “centres of feeling and of experience,”77 inanimate objects are capable 
of feeling and affecting each other at least at the physical level. In Science and the Modern 
World Whitehead acknowledges that conscious and experiential elements penetrate the whole 
universe: “. . . we should conceive mental operations as among the factors which make up the 
constitution of nature.”78 This represents Whitehead’s main argument against the Cartesian 
dualism and its incoherence.  
For the same reason, Whitehead may be labelled a panpsychist, in other words 
someone who believes that “the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental 
properties, whether or not they are parts of living organisms.”79 As it is suggested in the 
second chapter of this thesis, the same label might be ascribed to Woolf, who highlights the 
importance of experience in her essays “Modern Fiction” and “On Being Ill,” where, like 
Whitehead, she criticizes her “materialist” literary predecessors and contemporaries. This 
deadness and insentience of matter is denounced in To the Lighthouse, where the lighthouse 
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“laid its caress and lingered stealthily and looked and came lovingly again,”80 or where “the 
cliffs looked as if they were conscious of the ships”81 and vice versa. Therefore, Woolf 
revives the tradition of the Romantic pantheism and her idea that everything is alive and 
enminded peaks in her short story “The Death of the Moth,” where she is fascinated with the 
presence of life and intentionality in a tiny creature, in Mrs Dalloway, where Septimus 
declares that “leaves were alive; trees were alive,”82 or in The Waves, where Louis points out 
that “All seems alive.”83 The chapter also analyses Woolf’s interest in other-than-human 
experience in her short stories “Kew Gardens” and the novella Flush, where Woolf explores 
lower degrees of consciousness attributed to animals and plants and acknowledges the value 
of each organism. This echoes Whitehead’s ideas that “human beings are merely one species 
in the throng of existences”84 and that the sense of “worth” may be attributed to each being 
regardless its benefits for its environment.85  
Whereas the first two chapters demonstrate that Woolf rejected the notion of stable 
and inert things or objects, united the categories of the subject and object and was intrigued by 
the “buzzing world” of relations and the importance of experience outlined by Whitehead’s 
philosophy or organism, the third chapter focuses on Woolf’s definition of personhood and 
interpersonal relationships. It is suggested that Woolf shares the processual view of identity, 
which means that a person is considered to be “a society” of actual entities, both of physical 
and experiential nature. Moreover, one’s soul is nothing more than “the succession of 
experience, extending from birth to the present moment,”86 which suggests that a personality 
is nothing fixed and easily pinpointed. Consequently, one’s identity is a constantly changing 
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process and although it seems relatively stable, it is comprised of subprocesses that “enjoy 
adventures of change throughout time and space.”87 Woolf’s concept of identity is strikingly 
similar to this processual perspective, which may be illustrated primarily in “A Sketch of the 
Past,” where Woolf argues that one’s identity is a “bowl that one fills and fills and fills”88 
with experience, in The Waves, where Bernard suggests that he is “made and remade 
continually,”89 or in Orlando, where the protagonist possesses several selves derived from 
various aspects of experience. The multiplication of selves is also an essential idea of Woolf’s 
essay A Room of One’s Own, where the author connects the processual perspective of 
selfhood with her feminist ideas based on non-unitary identity. In her essay “Street Haunting: 
The London Adventure” Woolf confirms this claim by highlighting that a unitary and fixed 
self is a mere social construct, as “for convenience’ sake a man must be a whole.”90 
Interestingly, Woolf also shares Whitehead’s belief that “there is no society in isolation”91 
because each actual entity and each society interacts with its environment, which contributes 
significantly to the emerging identity. In this way, Whitehead avoids the “dim division” 
between “This-My-Self,” “That Other” and “The Whole”92 and argues that there is a universal 
interconnection between all beings based on internal relations between actual occasions: “We 
are, each of us, one among others; and all of us are embraced in the unity of the whole.”93  
At the very beginning of Process and Reality Whitehead argues that “the obvious 
solidarity of the world” springs precisely from this universal relationality which suggests that 
his ontology is inextricably intertwined with ethics. This Whiteheadian “ontoethics”94 was 
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taken over by feminist process thinkers, for example Sheila Greeve Davaney, Valerie C. 
Saiving,95 or Isabelle Stengers.96 With her focus on the interpersonal relations and 
intersubjective identity in her late works, Woolf may also be considered a predecessor of 
these thinkers, who above all adopt Whitehead’s idea that a subject is intrinsically social, or 
relational, and has value for itself and for the others. Woolf envisages similar relationality in 
The Waves, where she rejects the modernist emphasis on individualism and explores 
intersubjective narrative, where individuality, “this difference we make so much of, this 
identity we so feverishly cherish, was overcome.”97 The six characters of the novel are 
symbolized by the image of “a seven-sided flower, many-petalled, red, puce, purple-shaded, 
stiff with silver-tinted leaves—a whole flower to which every eye brings its own 
contribution,”98 which suggests that separate characters co-create the reality they perceive and 
enrich each other’s identity. Woolf expresses her satisfaction that springs from making wholes 
and unifying in “A Sketch of the Past,” claiming that “behind the cotton wool is hidden a 
pattern; that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a 
work of art.”99 Like in “The Mark on the Wall,” here Woolf acknowledges the relations 
between human beings and other entities that lie under the visible reality.  
The third chapter of this thesis analyses how Woolf uses this relationality not only in 
The Waves but how this interconnectedness acquires ethical dimension in Between the Acts 
where Woolf intentionally employs very diverse characters, highlights their common ground, 
and criticizes the pretence omnipresent in the society. She points out that “we are members of 
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one another,”100 which is mentioned also in Three Guineas, where Woolf urges people to 
unite and fight against the aggressors who deny “one world, one life.”101  
The last chapter of this thesis elaborates on Woolf’s own ontoethics described above 
and suggests that the writer was equally concerned not only with one’s power exercised on 
other human beings but also with the doubt whether humans really represent a superior and 
unique species which has the right to subjugate nature. The first part of the chapter argues that 
Woolf’s characters are often described as integral parts of nature, for example Louis in The 
Waves, who says “I am the stalk. My roots go down to the depths of the world,”102 or Clarissa 
Dalloway, who is “part of the trees at home; of the house there.”103 This interconnection may 
be analysed via Whitehead’s aforementioned relationality and belief that “the body is part of 
the external world”104 and that it is impossible to clearly divide where the molecules of one’s 
body end and start intermingling with the environment. Stating that a human being is just 
“one among other natural objects,”105 Whitehead rejects the inveterate anthropocentrism 
rooted in the Western philosophy and civilization. Instead, he envisages a universe where a 
subject emerges from the environment and remains intertwined with it until it ceases to exist. 
Interestingly, Woolf talks about our “inveterately anthropocentric” mind in her essay “Flying 
Over London” and acknowledges that “Everything changes its values seen from the air.”106 
Woolf elaborates on this idea of changed perspective in her essay “The Sun and the Fish,” 
where she plays with the description of human extinction and the perishing of life on the 
planet, which she connects with the disappearance of colours during an eclipse.  
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The following part of the chapter then deals with Woolf’s nonhuman passages, the 
interludes in The Waves and “Time Passes” in To the Lighthouse, where Woolf intentionally 
foreshadows human existence, shows a world “seen without a self”107 and focuses on 
nonhuman “geological” temporality. The last part of the chapter explores Woolf’s “London 
Scene” essays, in which Woolf describes the consumerist way of life based on the exploitation 
of natural resources, which are perceived as materials that may be easily turned into 
commodities. It is suggested that short stories “The Docks of London” and “Thunder at 
Wembley” reveal Woolf’s proto-ecological thinking and her ambiguous perception of 
modernity, whose progress, and possibilities she at the same time admires and criticizes. This 
is related to Whitehead’s criticism of modern consumerist society which “directed attention to 
things as opposed to values.”108 Moreover, Woolf anticipates the currents debates on the 
Anthropocene, which attempt to highlight the impact of the human action on the natural 
environment. She is aware of human participation in the above-mentioned exploitation of 
natural resources, which is revealed in “The Docks of London,” where she points out that 
“The only thing, one comes to feel, that can change the routine of the docks is a change in 
ourselves.”109 While claiming that “one feels an important, a complex, a necessary animal,”110 
throughout the essay she describes the effects of this importance and domination and the 
tendency of humans to devoid other natural elements of their value and use them for the 
satisfaction of our consumerist needs.  
Brief summaries of this thesis’ chapters suggest that Woolf was interested in the same 
notions as process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, which probably springs from their 
need to react to the changing scientific and social context of their time. Whitehead was 
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dissatisfied with the direction of science and philosophy of the beginning of the 20th century, 
which abandoned the discussions of ontological and cosmological questions about the nature 
of the universe, the relation of the material world and the mind, and the nature of being. 
Moreover, Whitehead rejected the “substance metaphysics” which was rooted in Western 
philosophy since Aristotle and later further developed by Descartes, who acknowledged the 
separation of matter and experience. Instead of a philosophical system that bifurcates, 
Whitehead envisaged a speculative relational cosmology, which denies purely physical 
substance and imagines the universe as a megaprocess made of interconnected creative 
processes and not of fixed and permanent objects in the state of stasis. Virginia Woolf’s 
obvious interest in the aforementioned questions and her recurrent search for “the nature of 
reality” are the main aspects of her thought that enable the imposition of the processual 
worldview on her oeuvre. Raised by her father in the tradition of the British empiricism of the 
18th century, she was fascinated by the new theories focusing on psychological perception of 
reality and consciousness. Moreover, she could not reconcile with the Victorian and the early 
20th century fiction, which was primarily concerned with material aspects of reality and often 
entirely left out the mind and experience of its characters. Similarly to Whitehead, who 
acknowledges experience as the basis of his ontology, in her essay “Modern Fiction” Woolf 
argues that “life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the 
beginning of consciousness to the end”111 and likens experience to material atoms. Therefore, 
her idea of the smallest particles of experience strikingly resembles Whitehead’s atomic 
actual entities. Instead of creating “solid” and fixed characters, Woolf starts sketching “will-
o’-wisps” that “change their shapes” according to other entities in their environment which 
contribute to their becoming. Similarly, the objects in her fiction are not fixed and easily 
defined entities, they are not “standard things,” as Woolf argues in “The Mark on the Wall,” 
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and they never occur in the state of stasis and passivity, which is explored in “Solid Objects,” 
or To the Lighthouse. Moreover, both human beings and objects are never considered as 
entities separate from each other but always in their relations to one another, which should be 
the main concern of fiction, as Woolf argues in her essays “Poetry, Fiction and the Future” 
and A Room of One’s Own. This relationality also represents the “pattern” hidden behind the 
visible world about which Woolf speaks in the famous passage from “A Sketch of the Past.” 
For these reasons, the following chapters of this dissertation illustrate that Woolf inclined to 
process-oriented thought acknowledging the importance of change and movement as opposed 
to stasis and permanence, which is encapsulated in the sentence “I am rooted, but I flow”112 
from The Waves. Furthermore, it is suggested that Woolf highlights the interrelation behind 
processes of reality and rejects the bifurcation of nature, which enables her to deconstruct 
dualisms discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 1: Woolf’s Conception of Things and the Relation between Subject 
and Object 
 
Woolf’s Interest in Objects and her Reconceptualization of Matter 
As Derek Ryan points out in his book Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory, 
Woolf studies have changed their focus over the past decades and turned the attention from 
the analysis of “language and discourse” towards the interest in “materiality and ontology.”113 
This shift is undoubtedly a part of the general shift in philosophy which is no longer centred 
solely on epistemology and language but returns to “big questions” of the nature of reality, 
which means that it privileges ontology and metaphysics over epistemology. Elisabeth Grosz 
states in her book The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism that 
“ontology has been increasingly diminished as a concern for philosophical, political, and 
cultural reflection”114 and suggests that we should be interested not only in “things and their 
knowable, determinable relations”115 but also in “realities of space and time, of events and 
becomings.”116 In this light, contemporary philosophy should explore new approaches to 
materiality which do not resort to reductionism, do not separate the ideal from materiality, but 
explore the entwinement of the ideal and the material. As a result, such ontologies enable us 
to reconceptualize the material reality around us, they make us reconsider the rooted dualism 
of the animate and valuable versus the lifeless, valueless, and brute. In correspondence with 
Ryan’s claim that Woolf “theorises the creative, immanent materiality of human and inhuman 
life” and “offers new conceptualisation of the material world where the immanent and 
intimate entanglements of human and nonhuman agencies are brought to the fore,”117 this 
chapter provides a new approach to Woolf’s reconceptualization of the material and analyses 
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the author’s treatment of physical objects not through the lens of Platonism and Romanticism, 
as Lorraine Sim does in her book The Patterns of Ordinary Experience, “new materialism” of 
Bennett, Braidotti, Barad or Deleuze, like Ryan in his book Virginia Woolf and the 
Materiality of Theory, or object-oriented ontology, as Elsa Högberg in her article “Virginia 
Woolf’s Object-Oriented Ecology,”118 but via the concept of materiality developed by process 
philosophy, particularly Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism.  
Process philosophy does not conceive of physical objects as entities created out of 
extended substance with purely physical properties deprived of mental experience but as 
processes or events that are defined by their relations and effect on entities in their proximity. 
Moreover, ideality, or psychical properties, is integrated in the very core of the elementary 
particles of which physical objects are formed, therefore, process philosophy attempts to 
reconcile the dualism of the material and the mental, which has dominated the Western 
philosophy over centuries from Descartes and Kant to contemporary representatives of 
“scientific materialism” such as Daniel Dennett or Paul and Patricia Churchlands. By 
interpreting “solid objects” in Woolf’s fiction as “manifolds of process” defined “in terms of 
processual activities and stabilities”119 and by what they “do,” rather than “are,” this chapter 
suggests that Woolf also rejected the long-established dualism of the body and mind, the 
extended and the thinking, and explored the potentiality of physical objects in relation to their 
interaction with human and other-than-human subjects. The latter term of “subject” is 
particularly important because this chapter, and the following chapter focusing on the 
animated nature in Woolf’s fiction, foreground the idea that Woolf, in reference to 
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Whitehead’s actual entities that are defined as subjects of experience, subverts the distinction 
between the subject and object, overthrows this hierarchy and imagines reality composed of 
mutually affecting entities or subjects. It is important to point out that this chapter does not 
lessen the potential of new materialism for the analysis of Woolf’s approach to materiality but 
elaborates on this shift in Woolf’s studies by focusing on a less explored realm of process 
philosophy, which in many respects prepared the ground for new materialism. For example, 
Steven Shaviro’s book The Universe of Things120 explores Whiteheadian thought in relation to 
recent developments in continental philosophy termed as “speculative realism” or “new 
materialism” and contemporary philosophers such as Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, 
Ray Brassier, Levi Bryant, Timothy Morton, or Jane Bennett. Similarly, Austin J. Roberts 
suggests in his articles “Pneumatterings, The New Materialism, Whitehead, and Theology”121 
and “Intersubjectivity in the Anthropocene: Toward an Earthbound Theology”122 that 
Whitehead’s metaphysical system, or philosophy of organism, directly influenced 
contemporary representatives of new materialism such as Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, or 
Bruno Latour. As Shaviro points out, these new materialists and Whitehead share the interest 
in ontology and metaphysical speculation, their realism, the belief in the existence of matter, 
the rejection of correlationism, the belief that objects cannot exist independently of human 
mind, and the critique of anthropocentrism.123 Therefore, Whitehead’s philosophy of 
organism seems to anticipate the postmodern wave of new materialism(s), however, the 
philosopher had been pushed into the background for most of the second half of the twentieth 
century and his cosmological project and organic conception of reality start to be appreciated 
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only now when philosophy returns to the so-called “big questions.” Consequently, it may be 
concluded that whereas “Woolfians” have examined Woolf’s writing either in relation to the 
philosophical thought of Woolf’s contemporaries, or postmodern philosophers and new 
materialists, for example Bertrand Russell’s philosophical ideas analysed in detail in Ann 
Banfield’s book The Phantom Table, G. E Moore’s thought discussed in Lorraine Sim’s The 
Pattern of Ordinary Experience, Deleuze’s metaphysics of becoming and new-materialists 
concept of matter in Derek Ryan’s Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory, the potential 
of Whitehead’s thought for the analysis of Woolf’s fiction has been discussed so far only in 
Katelynn Carver’s article “Behind the Cotton Woolf: Process Philosophy in the Works of 
Virginia Woolf ”124 and very briefly also in Holly Henry’s already mentioned book Virginia 
Woolf and the Discourse of Science: The Aesthetics of Astronomy. While being Woolf’s 
contemporary, Whitehead might have influenced Woolf indirectly via his student Bertrand 
Russell, with whom the philosopher wrote their famous book Principia Mathematica. 
Moreover, in Special Relationships: Anglo-American Affinities and Antagonisms 1854-
1936,125 Kate Fullbrook discusses the friendship of Gertrude Stein and Alfred North 
Whitehead, which entails that Whitehead was not entirely unknown in the circles of the early 
20th century modernist avant-garde, therefore, it cannot be excluded that Woolf had met the 
philosopher and discussed his work with him. In this light, this chapter aims to expand the 
range of Woolf’s possible influences to Whitehead and his process-oriented metaphysics, 
which in many respects prefigures the new materialist tendencies in contemporary Woolf 
studies. Consequently, the present chapter fills the blank spaces, or supplements a logical 
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transition, between Woolf scholarship focussing on Woolf’s theory of materiality in relation 
to philosophical and scientific theories of the beginning of the 20th century and postmodern 
“new materialism,” or object-oriented ontology popular among contemporary Woolf scholars.  
Throughout her novels, essays and diaries, Woolf demonstrates her interest in 
everyday experience and ordinary objects that the humans encounter in their environment. 
Like most philosophers, Woolf asks questions such as “What is reality?” and how she might 
transcribe everyday experience of this reality in her fiction. For this reason, Benjamin Hagen 
suggests that Woolf’s fiction may be described as “philosophically literary.”126 It attempts to 
capture life, reveal some philosophical truths about it, and, at the same time, has the aesthetic 
ambition. In most of her novels and short fiction Woolf aims to describe the nature of things 
and the way the experience of them can be aesthetically processed by writing. In Jacob’s 
Room the reader learns about Jacob’s personality only from the objects that the character uses, 
creates, or gets in touch with. In To the Lighthouse Mrs Ramsay studies the question of “the 
subject and the object and the nature of reality”127 and Lily wants to be “on a level with 
ordinary experience.”128 In The Waves Bernard questions “the fixity of tables” and “the reality 
of here and now”129 and Between the Acts starts with the discussion of a cesspool, a very 
ordinary and unpoetical object. In her essay “Modern Fiction” Woolf suggests that a modern 
writer should transcribe “the trivial, fantastic, evanescent” impressions that an ordinary mind 
receives on an ordinary day.130 At the end of the essay Woolf claims that “the proper stuff of 
fiction does not exist,”131 by which she authorizes writers to explore not only issues 
traditionally considered literary and noble but also those that seem to be “low,” ordinary, and 
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commonplace. In “Poetry, Fiction and the Future” Woolf criticizes authors for exploring 
“personal relations” as the only subject of their novels and for forgetting that an “important 
part of life consists in our emotions toward such things as roses and nightingales,”132 and we 
may add that also towards things such as a table, a chair, a painting, or a book.  
Woolf’s first short-story collection published by the Hogarth Press in 1921 is called 
Monday or Tuesday, which hints at the nature of the short-stories that primarily deal with 
everyday experience, for example walking in a park or watching a mark on the wall. 
However, this poetics of everydayness penetrates the whole array of Woolf’s short fiction. 
When readers look at the contents page of The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf, 
they find out that at least a quarter of the stories bear in their titles words referring to ordinary 
material objects, for example the stories “The Mark on the Wall,” “Solid Objects,” “Nurse 
Lugton’s Curtain,” “The New Dress,” “Three Pictures” or “The Fascination of the Pool.” The 
word “fascination” in the last-mentioned short story is especially important because it reveals 
Woolf’s awe by everyday objects that permeates all her works.  
This attraction to ordinary objects is discussed particularly in Woolf’s short story 
“Solid Objects” published in 1920. The title of this short story corresponds to the central 
theme of the story—collecting pieces of solid objects. Solidity of matter is emphasized from 
the very beginning, where Woolf draws the reader’s attention to images of solid objects such 
as “body,” “spine,” “ribs,” “lump” or “solid matter.” While walking on the beach, John, one 
of the main characters of the story who works in the British parliament, accidentally comes 
across a lump of glass, which attracts his attention and forces the man to display it on his 
mantelpiece. When John picks up this piece of glass, Woolf relates that the object “pleased” 
and “puzzled” the man and that it was “so hard, so concentrated, so definite an object 
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compared with the vague sea and the hazy shore.”133 Here, Woolf proposes that solid objects 
in our surrounding represent certainties to which we can return after ruminating on abstract 
ideas, which are, in case of the two characters of the story, represented by politics. This is 
anticipated also by John’s cry “Politics be damned!” and consequent burrowing of his fingers 
into the sand. Woolf adds that as John’s fingers plunged deeper into the sand, his face, and 
particularly his look, lost the expression of “grown people” and gave way to “wonder” that we 
usually find in the eyes of young children. Since John finds pleasure in the wonder hidden in 
such an ordinary object, which Woolf at the same time describes as “almost a precious stone,” 
he starts to “haunt the places which are most prolific of broken china,”134 glass, and other 
pieces of matter. Gradually, John’s flat fills up with shards of pieces of commonplace objects 
depicted as “creatures of another worlds,” “remarkable,” and fascinating. The more objects 
John collects, the more indifferent to his duties and work-related issues he becomes. At the 
end of the story, John entirely yields to the lure of pieces of glass and china and alienates 
himself from his usual way of life. When visited by his friend Charles, who finds John and his 
flat in a depressing disorder and accuses his previously rational friend of giving his promising 
career up, John refuses to admit that his passion has got out of control.  
While Lorraine Sim interprets the story as a spiritual journey of a character who 
experiences “excitement at the mystery and strangeness of the world”135 and learns to 
reattribute “the overlooked value” to the “everyday material world,”136 Bill Brown discusses 
the story in his book Other Things in relation to his “thing theory,” claiming that things which 
no longer serve their common function may be presented to us in a new light as aesthetic 
objects. As a result, “we begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working 
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for us”137 and human relationship to objects also changes and becomes more intimate. 
Agreeing both with Sim and Brown that “Solid Objects” relates a moral story about relearning 
to appreciate the value and beauty of everyday objects, I would like to focus not so much on 
the everydayness of the objects that John collects, but on the way Woolf reconceptualizes 
them and proposes a new subject-object dynamics.138 Brown suggests at the beginning of the 
story’s analysis that “Solid Objects” is not about “the solidity of objects,” as it might seem 
from its beginning, where Woolf foregrounds solidity, but about “the fluidity of objects, about 
how they decompose and recompose themselves as the object of a new fascination.”139 My 
intention is to discuss the-above mentioned fluidity of objects in the story in conjunction with 
process-philosophy that conceives of material objects as fluidities, processes, and constantly 
re-emerging entities. In this respect, it elaborates on Barbara K. Olson’s brief discussion of 
parallels between Woolf’s fiction and Whitehead’s philosophy in her book Authorial Divinity 
in the Twentieth Century, where the author suggests that Woolf was unaware of the striking 
similarities between her writing and Whitehead’s thought, particularly their belief in 
“continuity of flux in the universe” and “secular mysticism.”140  
Nicolas Rescher explains in his book Process Metaphysics that process ontologies 
refuse to define objects in our surroundings as substantial things, but describe them as 
manifolds of process, complexes of functional unity, which are best described by their effect 
and the way they influence their environment.141 Consequently, things are presented as 
“bundles of powers,”142 or centres with their own degree of agency.143 Moreover, Rescher 
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adds that process philosophers feel the urge to perceive material objects as “no more than 
stability waves in a sea of process,”144 by which he acknowledges that things, despite their 
processual nature, are presented to us as relatively stable entities. Another important aspect of 
processual conception of nature is relationality. Processual objects never stand as separate 
individualities, but they are in constant interaction with “things” in their environment: “The 
identity of things is discrete (digital); that of processes is continuous (analogic).”145 Process 
metaphysics thus envisages a world made up of interacting entities with “open ended and 
flowing”146 identity which is shaped by the contact with other entities or processes.  
An example of such metaphysics is Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism 
that rejects “scientific materialism” which worships “senseless, valueless, purposeless” matter 
and describes a system of things, or events, that cannot be easily disentangled.147 In Process 
and Reality Whitehead introduces his speculative metaphysics by saying that his philosophy 
of organism avoids the concept of “substance-quality” of matter and replaces it with the 
concept of “dynamic process.”148 Accordingly, the philosopher envisages a concept of actual 
entities that he defines as “final real things from which the world is made up” and he 
emphasizes that there is nothing more real behind them.149 Moreover, they are “drops of 
experience, complex and interdependent,”150 which hints at their relational nature. This 
relationality is enabled by the process of prehension during which actual entities involve each 
other and create “a togetherness of actual entities” termed “nexus.”151 Therefore, actual 
entities and nexuses are “microparticles” that create our reality. In order to ensure the 
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emergence of enduring objects, these microparticles assemble and create macroscale 
togetherness, which Whitehead calls “a society.” This society-object has a peculiar character, 
which its constantly perishing actual entities pass on emerging actual entities. Consequently, 
these societies are relatively stable real things but they “enjoy adventures of change 
throughout time and space”152 as their inner constitution alters incessantly. Based on this 
categorical distinction of Whitehead’s metaphysical entities, it may be suggested that material 
objects which John collects in “Solid Objects” represent Whitehead’s stable and at the same 
time constantly changing societies. This is exemplified in the following quotation, where the 
lump of glass, which triggered John’s search for pieces of matter, is, on the one hand, a real 
object displayed on the mantelpiece and, on the other hand, a society whose composition 
changes at every instant: “Looked at again and again half consciously by a mind thinking of 
something else, any object mixes itself so profoundly with the stuff of thought that it loses its 
actual form and recomposes itself a little differently in an ideal shape which haunts the brain 
when we least expect it.”153 The object loses its solidity, its “substance-quality” of “an 
excellent paperweight”154 and rather appears to be a process subjected to change that affects 
the object in its surroundings, in this case the human mind. Therefore, the impact of the object 
on John’s mind exceeds the realm of the object’s physical properties, which suggests that the 
object itself is a centre of agency, a process that is capable of entanglement with human 
mental processes.  
Holly Henry points out in her book Virginia Woolf and the Discourse of Science that 
this new definition of objects is precisely what Woolf took from reading and discussing 
scientific discoveries of her friends and acquaintances grouped around Bertrand Russell and 
the weekly magazine The Athenaeum, which published articles on the latest discoveries in 
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literature, art, and science.155 Moreover, Henry interestingly suggests that Woolf was writing 
and publishing “Solid Objects” at the same time as Whitehead outlined a new theory of 
materiality in his book The Concept of Nature and Russell gave his popular public lectures on 
the bridging of the gap between mind and matter. Both philosophers were intrigued by the 
mutual relationship between an object and its perceiver and agreed that the visible world 
represents “a network of sense data, which are effects of both the object and a percipient 
observer.”156 Consequently, both the observer and the object enter the same, or even multiple, 
percipient events, which contradicts the traditional conception of enduring objects affected by 
the human mind and perceived “in terms of our own preimposed concepts.”157 Similarly, 
Woolf seems to criticize the anthropocentric correlationism, or, in other words, dependence of 
objects on human consciousness, and suggests that objects have their proper mode of 
existence and that they may, in turn, impose their own “power” on human subjects and affect 
them. This thing-power is foregrounded and exemplified in the story from the moment John 
picks up the first piece of glass until the very end, where the character is tormented by the lure 
of objects and his “determination to possess” them. Paradoxically, at the end of the story, it is 
not John, who owns the objects, but the pieces of matter which, or “who,” in fact, possess him 
as a human subject. The traditional power distribution of the perceiver’s influence and the 
object’s “submissiveness” is, therefore, reversed as John’s collector’s passion gets out of 
control. 
Woolf’s suggested interrelation of the object, defined by process philosophy as a 
relational process, and the human mind, also described as bundle of mental processes, 
demonstrates Whitehead’s idea that no entity exists in vacuum, but always “prehends,” or 
feels, other entities. Similarly, when the philosopher discusses societies, he insists that “there 
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is no society in isolation,” which means that “every society must be considered with regard to 
its background or a wider environment of actual entities.”158 In relation to this concept of 
interrelation of actual entities or societies, James J. Bono suggests in his article “Atomicity, 
Conformation, Enduring Objects, and ‘Things’: Science and Science Studies after the 
Whiteheadian Turn” that Whitehead makes us reconsider the traditional ontology of discrete 
and self-contained substances and replaces it with the concept of “things,” which are 
“simultaneously diffuse—imbricated in/with other things.”159 Consequently, it may be 
inferred that when Woolf lets John’s physical processes intermix with the “fluid” thing, the 
lump of glass, she, in fact, devises a relational reality similar to Whitehead’s “entangled” and 
“buzzing world of actual occasions and enduring objects.”160 With regard to this conception 
of reality based on the permeating of one thing into the other, I would like to suggest that 
“Solid Objects” is not primarily about a character who is fascinated by physical objects that 
lost their value by not being used anymore, or a character who learns to reappreciate the 
everyday objects which he perceives as aesthetic objects, but primarily about the character’s 
reconsideration of the meaning of the words “substance” or “thing.” The reader witnesses 
John’s overcoming of the gap between the human subject and the object and his gradual 
entanglement with the objects that the collects. Therefore, the human no longer stands in 
opposition to objects but establishes intimate relations with them. As it will be discussed later 
mainly in relation to the novel To the Lighthouse, this relation between a human being and an 
object is particularly important because it serves as the basis for Woolf’s reconsideration of 
the subject-object relation and rejection of this dichotomy.  
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A fascination with objects and the idea that objects are not inert substances but 
processual “agents,” which manifest their effect on other human subjects and non-human 
subjects/objects in their environment, appears also in other Woolf’s short stories and novels. 
In “A Simple Melody” Mr Carslake, the protagonist of the story who is also an admirer of 
nature and a tramp, attends a party and he feels very uncomfortable among distinguished 
upper-class people. Instead of maintaining conversation with other participants of the party, 
he is looking at a beautiful painting of a heath. Like John, the man is also fascinated by the 
picture, which triggers a vivid interaction between him and what the painting represents. He 
feels attracted to the painting and thinks about how easily things enter human thoughts: “Mr 
Carslake again looked at the picture. He was troubled by the sense of something remote. 
Indeed people did think about things, did paint things.”161  Not only does the main character 
wonder at the relation people establish with objects, but he also describes the effect a thing 
has on the human mind: “Mr Carslake, at least, thought it was very beautiful, as he stood in 
the corner where he could see it, it had the power to compose and tranquilize his mind. It 
seemed to him to bring rest of his emotions—and how scattered and jumbled they were at a 
party like this!”162 Quite interestingly, a very similar scene describing the painting’s capacity 
to calm down one’s mind appears also in To the Lighthouse, where Lily Briscoe struggles 
with the completion of Mrs Ramsay’s portrait and the painting seems to organise the artist’s 
disorderly thoughts:  
She saw her canvas as if it had floated up and placed itself white and 
uncompromising directly before her. It seemed to rebuke her with its cold stare 
for all this hurry and agitation; this folly and waste of emotion; it drastically 
recalled her and spread through her mind first a peace, as her disorderly 
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sensations (he had gone and she had been sorry for him and she had said 
nothing) trooped off the field; and then, emptiness.163  
The quotation demonstrates Lily’s ability to establish a relationship of intimacy with her 
environment, which is analysed later in this chapter. Quite interestingly, Woolf moves from 
this fascination by physical objects described in this section towards one’s descent to the level 
of ordinary experience, where a human subject no longer dominates their environment but 
represents an integral part of it, a subjectivity emerging from the external, as it is suggested in 
the last section of this chapter.  
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Rejection of Absolute Knowledge of Objects in Favour of Emotional Response 
In “The Mark on the Wall,” a short story published in 1917 by the Hogarth Press, 
Woolf attempted to describe the perception of objects around us, reformulate our conception 
of objects and suggest a new way of looking at the world. This newly gained perspective, 
however, may also take place “within the space of the domestic everyday”164 and not only in 
places the characters are unfamiliar with like in “Solid Objects.” This short story 
demonstrates Woolf’s intention, mentioned in her essay “Modern Fiction,” to “examine for a 
moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day” and transcribe “the shower of innumerable 
atoms” that fall on one’s mind during a particular period.165 The title of the collection Monday 
or Tuesday, where the story is included and which was published in 1919 by the Hogarth 
Press, suggests that the volume contains random sketches of ordinary life. These expectations 
are met at the very beginning of the story, where the protagonist remembers sitting in the 
living room and staring at the mark on the wall, but she cannot recall the exact date, which 
infers that it could have happened any day: “Perhaps it was the middle of January in the 
present year that I first looked up and saw the mark on the wall. In order to fix a date it is 
necessary to remember what one saw. . . Yes, it must have been the winter time. . .”166 The 
woman’s need to re-evoke the impressions and things related to that particular moment in 
order to fix the date when she had seen the mark for the first time, refers back to Whitehead’s 
idea that no society exists in isolation but defines itself by its background. Like John in “Solid 
Objects,” the woman fixes her eyes on the mark in fascination and cannot help thinking about 
its identity and possible origin. Her recollection of the afternoon is interrupted by a glimpse at 
the mark which changes the direction of her thoughts: “Rather to my relief the sight of the 
mark on the wall interrupted the fancy, for it is an old fancy, an automatic fancy, made as a 
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child perhaps.”167 The quotation indicates that the woman feels a childish attraction to objects 
in her surroundings, which is explained in the following quotation: “How readily our thoughts  
swarm upon a new object, lifting it a little way, as ants carry a blade of straw so feverishly, 
and then leave it. . .”168 This infers that our thoughts attach very easily to objects in their 
proximity and that this entanglement of our mental processes and the object perceived are 
unintentional. I would like to suggest that the mark, like the lump of glass in “Solid Objects,” 
desolidifies, decomposes and serves no longer as a material object but as a processual entity 
that triggers the woman’s experience and manifests its “thing-power” on the woman’s mind. 
In other words, the woman penetrates beneath the surface of the object and creates an 
experiential event, a unity with it. When Whitehead discusses events in his early work The 
Concept of Nature, at the very beginning he outlines an ontology based on the idea of nature 
conceived as “a complex of related entities,”169 and suggests that this complex is an “entity 
for thought,”170 which means that it is something to be perceived and thought about. However, 
he insists that this complex entity can never be entirely disclosed to sense-awareness. As a 
result, Whitehead claims that “unexhaustiveness is an essential character of our knowledge of 
nature,”171 from which he infers that what we can be aware of in nature is only a particular 
manifestation or an “event,”172 a complex of relations that changes incessantly.  
I would like to suggest that when the woman in Woolf’s short story perceives a mark 
on the wall, she perceives a particular instance of a natural event which is subject to change. 
This change is reflected in the woman’s diverse associations provoked by the same object, 
which means that every time she looks back at the mark and starts realizing its contours, the 
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object triggers different images in her mind. Therefore, the mark on the wall may be 
interpreted as an event that provokes “some special activity within a subject.”173 When 
Whitehead discusses experience and the subject-object relation in The Adventures of Ideas, he 
argues that the traditional distinction between the subject, conceived as the knower, and the 
object, regarded as the known, is one of the greatest philosophical misconceptions. Instead, he 
suggests that perception is not concerned with knowledge of an object but the emotion that the 
object arouses. This emotion comes from the “affective tone originating from things.”174 
Borrowing the term “concern” from Quakerism, he explains that an object is a trigger of the 
subject’s interest in the initial impulse and that the object becomes “a component in the 
experience of the subject.”175 In this vein, it may be suggested that when the woman wonders 
about “how easily our thoughts swarm upon a new object,”176 she might marvel at the 
“concern” which people automatically feel towards objects they perceive. In line with 
Whitehead’s idea that experience does not result in acquisition of knowledge, but in 
emotional response, the woman’s reaction to the mark’s “lure for feeling”177 is of emotional 
nature. She begins her train of thought rationally by describing the mark’s physical 
appearance and guessing what its origin might be, then she imagines who might have 
occupied their house before, and finally arrives at a general reflection on the meaning of life, 
which is highly agitated:  
But as for that mark, I’m not sure about it; I don’t believe it was made by a nail 
after all; it’s too big, too round, for that. I might get up, but if I got up and 
looked at it, ten to one I shouldn’t be able to say for certain; because once a 
thing’s done, no one knows how it happened. Oh! Dear me, the mystery of life! 
 
173. Whitehead, Adventures, 176.   
174. Whitehead, Adventures, 176.   
175. Whitehead, Adventures, 176.   
176. Woolf, Complete Shorter Fiction, 83.  
177. Whitehead, Process, 25.  
46 
 
The inaccuracy of thought! The ignorance of humanity! To show how very 
little control of our possessions we have—what an accidental affair this living 
is after all our civilisation—let me just count over a few of the things lost in 
our lifetime. . . 178 
The quotation not only exemplifies Woolf’s circular narrative structure of the short story, 
consisting in several trains of thought and emotional response induced by the woman’s 
recurrent look at the mark, but also introduces another key topic of the story—the 
epistemological question about the knowledge of reality. As the woman’s reflection in the 
above-quoted passage indicates, Woolf gradually suggests in “The Mark on the Wall” that the 
idea of human beings capable of getting hold of the full knowledge of objects is entirely 
wrong.  
As Lorraine Sim points out, the entire short story may be read as Woolf’s attack of 
Victorian positivism and exemplification of her belief in “a perspectival view of truth.”179 
This reading is justified by the main character’s dismissal of the possibility to reveal the true 
nature of reality and her reluctance to get up and see what the mark is. Although she would 
then be able to call the mark its proper name, she could not say anything more about it. As the 
woman explains later, she prefers letting the mark impose its power on her mind, which 
makes her penetrate beyond the surface of everyday reality composed of distinct objects: “I 
want to think quietly, calmly, spaciously, never to be interrupted, never to have to rise from 
my chair, to slip easily from one thing to another, without any sense of hostility, or obstacle. I 
want to sink deeper and deeper, away from the surface, with its hard separate facts.”180 The 
intention to “slip from one thing to another” without any interruptions refers back to 
Whitehead’s events that overlap and form an interconnected web of reality, which thwarts any 
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attempt to abstract discrete facts or objects from it. Therefore, it may be inferred from the 
quotation that the woman is not content with the knowledge of “bifurcated nature,” nature 
divided into subjects and objects, the mental and the material, but attempts to get a grasp of 
the relations between separate objects. Moreover, when Whitehead defines knowledge in 
Adventures of Ideas, he emphasizes that it is “nothing more than an additional factor in the 
subjective form of the interplay of the subject and the object.”181 This suggests that although 
Whitehead is considered to be an objective realist, due to his belief in substance independent 
of the perceiver’s mind, he emphasizes that there is nothing like absolute knowledge of 
reality. Such knowledge is impossible because perception of an object is always influenced by 
a subject’s past experience and feelings which shape his or her vision of the object. In 
addition to this, Whitehead emphasizes that his “actual entities,” are “the final real things”182 
and that there is no abstract or transcendental reality behind them. Therefore, he rejects the 
idealist viewpoint of things perceived as mere imperfect versions of true forms which exist on 
a transcendental plane. Similarly, in “The Mark on the Wall” Woolf demonstrates that she is 
an objective realist for whom the real things represent objects as they appear disclosed in 
perception. She cannot be accused of being a subjective idealist because her characters’ 
ecstatic moments of being, moments of intensified experience and hyper-perception, are often 
calmed down by a character’s fixation on real objects. This applies also to “The Mark on the 
Wall” where the woman interrupts her train of thought by refocusing on the mark, which 
makes her regain the sense of reality:  
Indeed, now that I have fixed my eyes upon it, I feel that I have grasped a 
plank in the sea; I feel a satisfying sense of reality which at once turns the two 
Archbishops and the Lord High Chancellor to the shadows of shades. Here is 
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something definite, something real. Thus, waking from a midnight dream of 
horror, one hastily turns on the lights and lies quiescent, worshipping the chest 
of drawers, worshipping solidity, worshipping reality, worshipping the 
impersonal world which is proof of existence other than ours.183 
In spite of the above-demonstrated belief in hard facts of reality, Woolf refuses to 
admit that there is a “standard thing.” Instead, there are countless subjective and situational 
versions of an object which is referred to by a single name. When Whitehead discusses 
perspective in Modes of Thought, he explains that the defective insights of philosophy or 
science, in general, often stem from its excessive reliance on language and literature. He 
suggests that words, “each with its dictionary meaning, and single sentences, each bounded by 
full stops,”184 generate an idea that an object can be abstracted from its environment and 
understood without reference to anything else. As a result, this practice permits the 
construction of reality made of separate “standard things” criticized by Woolf. This critique is 
the subject of the following quotation, where the writer urges future novelists not to be 
content with the image of “standardized” and “generalized” reality in their fiction:  
And the novelists in future will realise more and more the importance of these 
reflections [of diverse, yet interconnected interaction between people and the 
external reality], for of course there is not one reflection but an almost infinite 
number; those are the depths they will explore, those phantoms they will 
pursue, leaving the description of reality more and more out of their stories, 
taking a knowledge of it for granted, as the Greeks did and Shakespeare 
perhaps—but these generalisations are very worthless. The military sound of 
the word [most likely the word “reality”] is enough. It recalls articles, cabinet 
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ministers—a whole class of things indeed which as a child one thought the 
thing itself, the standard thing, the real thing, from which one could not depart 
save at the risk of nameless damnation.185 
It may be suggested that the whole quotation explains the rationale behind the woman’s 
unwillingness to get up, reveal the identity of the mark and classify it as one of standard 
things—a snail. Moreover, the idea of standard things is closely related to the issue of 
authority that “codifies” the identity of an object or the definition of a name. This privilege of 
naming and prescribing authority is ascribed primarily to “the masculine point of view,” in 
particular to “cabinet ministers” and “Whitaker’s Table of Precedency”: “What now takes the 
place of those things I wonder, those real standard things? Men perhaps, should you be a 
woman; the masculine point of view which governs our lives, which sets the standard, which 
establishes Whitaker’s Table of Precedency. . .”186 At the end of the story, this male authority 
is exercised by the woman’s husband, who arrives home and stops his wife’s wondering about 
the mark on the wall. He provides a rational explanation of its origin: “All the same, I don’t 
see the reason why we should have a snail on our wall.”187 The very same idea is explored 
also in To the Lighthouse, where Mr Ramsay studies the question of “subject and object and 
the nature of reality.”188 While he imagines the subject of his philosophical enquiry as a 
singular object, a kitchen table described as “a white deal four-legged table,” an ideal form of 
a table, a standard thing, Lily visualizes the same object as “a scrubbed kitchen table,” “one of 
those scrubbed board tables, grained and knotted.”189 This suggests that Woolf’s male 
characters are more likely to incline to the authority of “standard things,” whereas female 
characters usually give more subjective account of reality and do not distinguish between their 
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experience of reality and “true” reality, which is discussed in detail in the last section of this 
chapter. 
It is also worth pointing out that Woolf was not the only modernist author who 
rebelled against fixed ideas of objects and the single meaning of words and names. Gertrude 
Stein, who was familiar with William James’ and Whitehead’s thought, published her Tender 
Buttons in 1912. This poetry collection represents a prime example of literary work that 
exemplifies a language’s arbitrariness and rejects the idea that there is a discrete and 
unequivocal meaning encoded in a name. Most of the poems included in the collection bear a 
name or a noun in their title, for example “Apple,” “A Carafe,” “A Box,” or “A Red Stamp,” 
however, the poems have nothing to do with usual ideas of these objects. Instead, the objects 
mentioned in the poems’ titles have the same function as Woolf’s mark on the wall and serve 
as triggers of associations and feelings very loosely associated with the object in question. 
Like Woolf, Stein is also more interested in the relations between particular associations than 
in providing a true-to-reality account of the object. When Stein comments on her extension of 
the object’s description beyond its physical properties and name in the section “Rooms,” she 
explains that there is always some deeper meaning behind the name and that its change makes 
a difference: “Why is the name changed. The name is changed in the little space there is a 
tree, in some space there are no trees, in every space there is a hint of more, all this causes a 
decision.”190 This passage outlines Stein’s intention to liberate herself from the authority of a 
name, or a concept of the “standard thing,” and explore a free personal response to objects in 
one’s proximity, which is also the main topic of Woolf’s above-discussed short story. Both 
writers seem to be intrigued by our vision of and interaction with everyday objects in our 
proximity, which results in prose or poetry that no longer distinguishes between the subject 
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and the object but treats these categories as interchangeable. Moreover, both Woolf and Stein 
were influenced by the aesthetic theories of Post-Impressionism, particularly by Roger Fry 
and Clive Bell. In his essay “The Post-Impressionists” Fry criticizes the Impressionists for 
providing a mere copy of an impression of an inert natural scene and suggests that 
Impressionist paintings fail to capture “emotional significance which lies in things.”191 Instead 
of imitating nature, the Post-Impressionists should contemplate a scene and focus on the way 
it transmits emotions that result from a particular set of “lines and colors combined in a 
particular way, certain forms and relations of forms.”192 Therefore, the Post-Impressionist 
painters are not interested in the truthful description of what a thing or a scene is, but in what 
an observer feels while perceiving it, which is strikingly similar to Woolf’s and Stein’s 
rejection of standard things and focus on the emotional associations. Moreover, Fry accuses 
the Impressionists of advocating “a passive attitude towards the appearances of things,”193 
therefore, of depicting things as passive objects, which is countered by the Post-Impressionist 
still-lives that paradoxically engage actively the mind of the observer and, hence, become 
active subjects. Woolf’s experiment with the interchangeable nature of subjects and objects 
and her attempt to “de-subjectify” the subject is the focus of the following and last section of 
this chapter.  
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Intermingling of the Subject and the Object 
The short story “The Fascination of the Pool” written in 1929 has never received great 
critical attention, which is surprising because like “Solid Objects” or “The Mark on the Wall,” 
it is equally concerned with the issue of materiality. This story foreshadows Woolf’s 
innovative approach to the subject-object relation which levels the gap between these two 
entities and treats them as mutually interchangeable. Although the story describes a 
perception of a pool, it lacks the main character who would function as a perceiving subject. 
Instead of a subjective perceiver, Woolf opts for a generic subject “one” or “we,” which 
indicates that she reflects on perception and its functioning as a general concept: “But if one 
sat down among the rushes and watched the pool—pools have some curious fascination, one 
knows not what—the red and black letters and the white paper seemed to lie very thinly on 
the surface, while beneath went on some profound under-water life like the blooding, the 
rumination of a mind.”194 Not only does the quotation suggest that the pool is a subject of 
human “concern” or “lure” discussed in the previous section, but it also reveals that the water 
surface that we see is a mere part of the object and that we can never fully explore the pool’s 
inner life and depth under the water. This refers back to what has been indicated about 
objects’ “unexhaustivness” stemming from the incapability to fully capture it only by sense 
perception. Therefore, Woolf again hints at the impossibility of gaining knowledge of the 
object and emphasizes that it is both a trigger of experience and a sponge that absorbs the 
thought of perceivers:  
Many, many people must have come here alone, from time to time, from age to 
age, dropping their thoughts into the water, asking it some question, as one did 
oneself this summer evening. Perhaps there was the reason of its fascination—
that it held in its waters all kinds of fancies, complaints, confidences, not 
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printed or spoken aloud, but in a liquid state, floating one on the top of another, 
almost disembodied.195  
The passage exemplifies Whitehead’s idea of nature conceived as a complex of interrelated 
events or processes. It is possible to interpret people’s thoughts and mental processes that 
penetrate the water’s surface as events, which interact and interchange some of their 
constituents. Similarly, in the already-mentioned short story “A Simple Melody,” Woolf 
suggests that walkers’ thoughts and emotions somehow pervade natural entities in their 
surroundings:  
He tried to analyse this favourite theme of his—walking, different people 
walking to Norwich. He thought at once of the lark, of the sky, of the view. 
The walker’s thoughts and emotions were largely made up of these outside 
influences. Walking thoughts were half sky; if you could submit them to 
chemical analysis you would find that they had some grains of colour in them, 
some gallons or quarts or pints of air attached to them. This at once made them 
airier, more impersonal.196 
The actual occasions of the walker’s experience are integrated in the actual occasions of 
natural entities such as the sky, the air, or colour and they merge in order to create a new 
entity, which is less personal, or less subjective. However, the attenuation of identity 
mentioned in the quotation does not mean that the man or the natural events listed above 
cease to represent individual subjects. It only suggests that subjects are never entirely 
separated or deprived of their relations with other subjects, which also implies that the 
bifurcation of the subject and the object into two distinct categories is unnatural. Moreover, if 
the thoughts become “airier” and transmissible, Woolf may hint at the idea that thoughts do 
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not belong exclusively to subjectivity, but they may be conceived as something “collective” 
and shared. Therefore, Woolf here explores William James’s idea of mind-compounding and 
“superhuman intelligence” introduced in his book A Pluralistic Universe:  
Every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of something of a wider self, 
it quivers along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in 
it is continuously one with possible not yet in our present sight. And just as we 
are co-conscious with our own momentary margin, may not we ourselves form 
the margin of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious 
with the whole of us? May not you and I be confluent in a higher 
consciousness, and confluently active there, tho we know it not?197 
James points out that if various centres of experience in our body can be co-conscious and 
focus on the same thought, then, it should come as no surprise that this thought might be 
experienced also beyond the limits of our body and penetrate the field of experience of other 
subjects: “Mental facts do function both singly and together, at once, and we finite minds may 
simultaneously be co-conscious with one another in a superhuman intelligence.”198 For James, 
this co-consciousness and compounding of minds ensures the continuity of the universe and 
its fundamental principle of relationality. Therefore, it may be suggested that in line with 
James’s superhuman intelligence, which synthesizes experiential events of many co-conscious 
subjects, Woolf also believed in basic relationality between subjects, who can exchange and 
intermingle their experience.  
This exchange and merging between subjects, or subjects and objects, also takes place 
in Whitehead’s process of becoming, or “concrescence,” during which diverse data converge 
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and create an occasion of experience or “an actual entity.” Whitehead describes this highly 
creative process, which guarantees novelty in the universe, as follows:  
The novel entity is at once the togetherness of “the many” which it finds, and 
also it is one among the disjunctive “many” which it leaves; it is a novel entity, 
disjunctively among the many entities which it synthetizes. The many become 
one, and are increased by one. In their natures, entities are disjunctively 
“many” in process of passage into conjunctive unity.199 
The quotation demonstrates that each actual entity is novel and created from multiple data that 
it can select and integrate. In this way, each occasion determines its own identity through 
“prehension,” or the interaction with other actual entities. Moreover, Whitehead repeats 
throughout Process and Reality that every actual entity is also a distinct subject: “An actual 
entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences.”200 Here the 
word “subject” refers to the actuality, to a present state of an actual occasion which can feel 
other occasions and the term “superject” is used for a togetherness of these occasions. During 
the process of prehension, each occasion is a subject that prehends data, which it either 
integrates or rejects (negative prehension). When the process of concrescence of an actual 
entity is completed, the occasion physically perishes but it gains “objective immortality” as it 
serves as an object for the process of concrescence of succeeding actual occasions. 
Consequently, each actual occasion represents a subject and an object at the same time. As 
Whitehead points out in relation to this subject–object relation in Science and the Modern 
World, “the fundamental principle is that whatever merges into actuality, implants its aspects 
in every individual event.”201 This quotation suggests that everything, which in any sense 
exists, can leave a trace on other existing things or organisms. Whitehead also adds that “no 
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individual subject can have independent reality, since it is a prehension of limited aspects of 
subjects other than itself.”202  
If these ideas are applied to the above-quoted passage from “The Fascination of the 
Pool,” it may be suggested that the water in the pool receives, stores and distributes the 
“aspects of other subjects” which are represented by people’s concerns and emotions: “The 
charm of the pool was that thoughts had been left there by people who had gone away and 
without their bodies their thoughts wandered in and out freely, friendly and communicative, in 
the common pool.”203 While a subject perceives the pool, they may integrate some of these 
aspects hidden in the depth of the pool and create a new event out of them. Thus, the pool in 
the story serves as a storage of these data left behind by people who spend their time watching 
its surface. However, these aspects offer themselves not only to people, but also to fish, the 
moon and other societies in the water or in the pool’s proximity: “A fish would swim through 
them [people’s emotions], be cut by the blade of a reed; or the moon would annihilate them 
with its great white plate.”204  
The idea that people may pass some of their experience or characteristics on other 
entities is suggested by Woolf also in her novel The Waves, where she interweaves identities 
of the six characters and invents a form of collective consciousness. Woolf suggests in the 
following quotation that her characters can generate aspects or data that may serve as the basis 
for other events: “We are creators. We too have made something that will join the 
innumerable congregation of past time. We too, as we put on our hats and push open the door, 
stride not into chaos, but into a world that our own force can subjugate and make part of the 
illumined and everlasting road.”205 This quotation suggests that an occasion of experience, 
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physical or mental, continues living in Whitehead’s mode of “objective immortality” that 
enables it to be a part of future events, or in proper words societies. In this way, Woolf 
indicates that no existence, no object is ever a distinct perishable individuality, but it is always 
linked to something else and continues its existence via other living and non-living objects. 
There is also another place in the novel, where Woolf points out that reality is co-created by 
the aspects of various interacting subjects—the moment when the characters gather in a 
restaurant and co-create the event of a red carnation placed in a vase on the table:  
We have come together (from the north, from the south, from Susan’s farm, 
from Louis’s house of business) to make one thing, not enduring—for what 
endures? —but seen by many eyes simultaneously. There is a red carnation in 
that vase. A single flower as we sat waiting, but now a seven-sided flower, 
many-petalled, red, puce, purple-shaded, stiff with silver-tinted leaves—a 
whole flower to which every eye brings its own contribution.206   
Moreover, this passage at the same time hints at the processual nature of things, which are 
more conveniently described as processes or events created at every moment afresh. The 
appearance of the red carnation changes in accordance with the perception of individual 
characters and experiential aspects that they lend to the “togetherness” of the carnation. 
Moreover, Woolf again emphasizes that the characters create something “enduring” that 
acquires objective immortality and mixes later with other groupings of Whiteheadian “many” 
that become “one.”  
However, to interpret the intermingling of the aspects of subjects and objects in 
Woolf’s above-mentioned short stories and novel via Whitehead’s concrescence of actual 
entities in not unproblematic. Although perishing occasions offer themselves as data for the 
process of concrescence of other actual occasions, Whitehead emphasizes that the perishing 
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occasion may serve as data only for succeeding occasions and not for contemporary occasions 
or subjects. However, some scholars try to extend Whitehead’s doctrine of continuity 
facilitated by internal relations between actual entities also to simultaneously existing 
occasions. Whitehead’s process of concrescence generates only subjects, or objects, for 
subsequent actual entities, which ensures seeming continuity of things that consist of 
constantly emerging and perishing actual occasions. Nevertheless, Joseph A. Bracken in his 
book The One in the Many, or Jorge Nobo in his book Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension 
and Solidarity both pointed out that it is possible to extend Whitehead’s relationality and 
claim that “strictly contemporary actual entities indirectly influence one another’s 
becoming.”207 According to these Whiteheadians, an actual entity can influence another actual 
entity only within so-called “extensive continuum” —relational complex, where all the 
potentialities, perished and objectified actual entities, may interact with other entities and 
create an actuality: “An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by the various 
allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as to possess common parts, and of 
contact, and of other relationships derived from these primary relationships.”208 Therefore, an 
extensive continuum is a space of potentiality and contact, wherein various contemporary 
entities, or even whole societies (objects), exercise their influence on others and share some of 
their characteristics or data. James J. Bono describes the concept as “a matrix of potentialities 
out of which actual occasions become actual through a process of selective, or subjective, 
prehension.”209 Moreover, the concept of extensive continuum ensures general relationality 
typical of Whitehead’s cosmology, or “philosophy of organism,” which “beckons us to 
reimagine things as simultaneously diffuse—imbricated in/with other things.”210 This notion 
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of extensive continuum may be approximated to Deleuze’s “plane of immanence” described 
as a place of contact and contagion:  
The plane of immanence or consistency is abstract: it cannot be understood as a 
dimension, a flat surface, a volume, or, more generally, in spatial terms. Rather 
it is the order in which all ideas take place, the “place” where one concept can 
encounter another, enhance or diminish it, and which other concepts must 
attain in order to engage in the domain of concepts.211  
It may be suggested that Woolf also creates a similar space in “The Fascination of the 
Pool” and “A Simple Melody,” a non-physical conceptual space where various objects and 
human beings potentially interact with each other, exchange their characteristic features and 
experience and co-create new actualities. Therefore, Woolf emphasizes relations beneath 
actualities in the world and refuses a thing’s separateness and isolation from its environment. 
This is manifested not only in the above-mentioned short stories but also in “A Sketch of the 
Past,” where Woolf repeatedly foregrounds the image of the whole, for example in the 
following quotation, where she highlights that a flower is interconnected with the soil in 
which it grows: “I was looking at the flower bed by the front door; ‘That is the whole’, I said. 
I was looking at a plant with a spread of leaves; and it was suddenly plain that the flower itself 
was a part of the earth; that a ring enclosed what was the flower; and that was the real flower; 
part earth; part flower. . .”212 In this autobiographical essay she also suggests that people’s 
existence is related to other things in their environment, in a similar way to emotions 
intertwined with the pool in “The Fascination of the Pool”: “One’s life is not confined to 
one’s body and what one says and does; one is living all the time in relation to certain 
background rods and conceptions.”213 A similar idea is also introduced in The Waves, where 
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Bernard, who in many respects personifies Woolf, claims that “we are forever mixing with 
unknown entities.”214 This quotation again demonstrates that in her fiction, Woolf often 
creates a space of contact where subjects, or subjects and objects, interact and interchange 
their aspects in order to outline a relational universe. 
To conclude this analysis of Woolf’s reimagination of the concept of things and the 
relation between the subject and the object, it is necessary to highlight that Woolf seems to be 
equally interested in the nature of objects and fascinated by their ongoing interaction with 
their surroundings. As it has been demonstrated in relation to human feelings that penetrate 
the water’s surface in “The Fascination by the Pool,” or human thoughts that escape one’s 
mind and become parts of natural elements in “A Simple Melody,” Woolf explores literarily 
the potentiality of Whitehead’s extensive continuum, in which constantly perishing and 
emerging actual occasions are enriched with aspects of other simultaneously existing human 
and non-human, animate and non-animate, subjects/objects. By this means, Woolf redefines 
the traditional relation between the subject and the object, the active experiencer, and the 
passive thing, and suggests that these two categories may be considered in more equal terms 
as two interdependent and overlapping concepts. 
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The Subject Finally Becomes the Object 
In To the Lighthouse, published in 1927 and intended as Woolf’s elegy for her parents, 
the relation between the subject and the object represents one of the main themes. Although it 
is primarily a topic of Mr Ramsay’s philosophical enquiry into “subject and object and the 
nature of reality,” which is to some extent ridiculed by Woolf, it becomes the central focus of 
the novel, especially concerning its female characters’ experience of reality. Like in the 
above-discussed short stories, in this novel Woolf experiments with the concept of a thing and 
plays with the objects’ oscillation between the state of solidity and fluidity. Moreover, the 
author plays with the idea that things do not always remain the same, but continuously change 
their “configurations.” Woolf also elaborates on an object’s ability to attract the attention of 
its perceiver, which may result in the perceiver’s diminished subjectivity or de-
subjectification. 
As Ann Banfield points out in her book The Phantom Table, in To the Lighthouse 
Woolf plays with the concepts of solidity and fragility215 that is metaphorically described in 
her essay “The New Biography” as the duality of “granite” and “rainbow.” Like in “Solid 
Objects,” Woolf decides to fill the narrative of the novel with significant material objects such 
as the lighthouse, Lily’s canvas, the skull in the children’s nursery, the kitchen table, or the 
Ramsays’ summer house itself. In spite of this, she is not interested in the knowledge and 
definition of these objects, but in the exploration of their interaction with the characters’ 
minds. Consequently, most material objects in the novel do not exist as some changeless 
stable forms, which Mr Ramsay tries to capture in his philosophical enquiry, but rearrange 
their configurations and appearance according to their immediate environment and perceivers, 
with whom they interact. For example, the lighthouse is once represented as a solid landmark, 
which is described in the following quotation, and on other occasions as a fairy creature, “a 
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silvery, misty-looking tower with a yellow eye”216 : “Lighthouse, distant, austere, in the 
midst; and on the right, as far as the eye could see. Fading and falling, in soft low pleats, the 
green sand dunes with the wild flowing grasses on them, which always seemed to be running 
away into some moon country, uninhabited of men.”217 Similarly, the house represents a 
centre of stability, especially in the first part of the novel, but it starts falling apart in the 
middle section “Time Passes,” where nature takes control of the house, and it becomes an 
unreal place near the novel’s end:  
She [Cam] raised herself reluctantly and looked. But which was it? She could 
no longer make out, there on the hillside, which was their house. All looked 
distant and peaceful and strange. The shore seemed refined, far away, unreal. 
Already the distance they had sailed had put them far from it and given it the 
changed look, the composed look, of something receding in which one has no 
longer any part.218 
This quotation hints at Woolf’s interest in describing objects and places in relation to the 
changed perspective of the perceiver, here with respect to the spatial distance that Cam and 
Mr Ramsay gained while sailing to the lighthouse. The house is no longer the centre and a 
fixed landmark because it loses its clear outline and solidity, and finally becomes unreal. 
Moreover, Cam reflects on how their existence, “those paths and the lawn, thick and knotted 
with the lives they had lived” recedes and how they too become “unreal,”219 in contrast to the 
boat, the waves, and the Lighthouse that “became unmovable.”220 Regarding the changing 
characteristics of physical objects, Gillian Beer points out that the novel starts with an 
 
216. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 202.  
217. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 17.  
218. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 180-181. 
219. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 181. 
220. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 199. 
63 
 
emphasis on solid objects that are “loaded with symbolic weight.”221 This applies 
predominantly to Mr Ramsay, who tends to reflect only through abstract and symbolic ideas. 
Conversely, in the second half of the novel, Woolf emphasizes “momentariness and lightness” 
and she “empties and thins” solid substance. This move towards fleetingness of physical 
substance and perspectival perception of objects, which, like in “The Mark on the Wall” 
implies that there is not a single standard version of a thing, is emphasized by James in the 
following quotation:  
The Lighthouse was then a silvery, misty-looking tower with a yellow eye that 
opened suddenly and softly in the evening. Now—James looked at the 
Lighthouse. He could see the white-washed rocks; the tower, stark and straight; 
he could see windows in it; he could even see washing spread on the rocks to 
dry. So that was the Lighthouse, was it? 
No, the other was also the Lighthouse. For nothing was simply one thing. The 
other was the Lighthouse too. It was sometimes hardly to be seen across the 
bay. In the evening one looked up and saw the eye opening and shutting and 
the light seemed to reach in that airy sunny garden where they sat.222 
The quotation indicates that James, for whom the lighthouse represented his desire for boyish 
adventure continually thwarted by his father, realizes that nothing is solely what it seems to 
be, and that one thing shows itself in multiple ways, depending on the perceiver’s position and 
past experience. Here Woolf again hints at the main premise of process philosophy that rejects 
the conception of things as extended substance and conceives of them as “manifolds of 
process” interacting with the human mind. This suggests that physical objects are constantly 
in the process of making, changing, and perishing.  
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Similarly, Whitehead rejected the notion of extended substance with a simple location 
as one of the long-established misconceptions of the Western philosophy and science, which 
he termed “misplaced concreteness.”223 He replaced this conception of substance with his 
already-discussed actual entities and suggested that things around us are societies, or 
“enduring objects,” which temporally undergo the process of change. This is possible only if 
we admit that an enduring object is a “historic route” of successive occasions, which in 
themselves change constantly.224 Whitehead provides the example of The Castle Rock at 
Edinburgh that “exists from moment to moment” via its “historic route of antecedent 
occasions.”225 Similarly, Woolf’s lighthouse does not represent a single enduring thing, but a 
togetherness of actual occasions, which is determined by its relations with its preceding 
configurations and other enduring objects, including human beings.  
Interestingly, Woolf does not emphasize the changing nature of the material world 
only in relation to the lighthouse, but it almost seems to be a fundamental principle of both 
her fictional and “real” universe. She reveals this basis of her conception of reality in her 
essay “Montaigne,” where she admits that “movement and change are the essence of our 
being; rigidity is death.”226As it has already been pointed out, she re-evokes the contrast 
between the permanence and transitoriness of reality. For example, Lily Briscoe is aware of 
the “eternal passing and being,”227 of the fact that “human things” also “passed and 
changed,”228 which counters her search of a moment of stability and stillness. Similarly, Mrs 
Ramsay wishes to provide “a specially tender piece, of eternity” and searches for something 
“immune from change,” which would not surrender to “the flowing, the fleeting.”229 
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Moreover, Mrs Ramsay is anxious about the passage of time and she does not want her 
children to “grow a day older.”230 The novel’s gradual departure from the initial solidity and 
shift towards transient nature of reality marks Woolf’s own realisation that permanence and 
stability are nothing but an illusion. The recognition of transience as a general principle, 
which represents the key thought of process-oriented metaphysics, is undoubtedly connected 
also with Woolf’s anxiety about death and loss. In her diary, she expresses the same fear of 
the transience of life like Mrs Ramsay and accepts the fleeting nature of existence: 
Now is life very solid or very shifting? I am haunted by the two contradictions. 
This has gone on for ever: will last forever; goes down to the bottom of the 
world—this moment I stand on. Also, it is transitory, flying, diaphanous. I shall 
pass like a cloud on the waves. Perhaps it may be that though we change; one 
is flying after another, so quick, so quick, yet we are somehow successive & 
continuous—we human beings; & show the light through. But what is the 
light?231 
Not only does the quotation demonstrate the correspondence between Woolf’s 
conception of human life and the process-oriented idea that human beings are unities of 
successive physical and mental experience, but its emphasis on light foreshadows the focus of 
the rest of this chapter, the interaction of the subject and the object exemplified by Mrs. 
Ramsay’s relationship of intimacy with the light from the lighthouse. Moreover, light that 
emanates from human beings and connects them to other human beings may be linked with 
Woolf’s and Whitehead’s interest in quantum physics, and especially with the wave-particle 
duality and the discovery that “the ultimate elements of matter are in their essence 
vibratory.”232 Vibratory nature of particles such as atoms suggests that organisms made up 
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from these particles must also be “vibratory organisms,”233 meaning that these organisms 
affect their environment. Focusing on vibratory existence, Whitehead rejects the tradition of 
scientific materialism, based on externally related substances, and prepares the ground for his 
philosophy of organism, whose basic elements are “self-creating subjects which are 
profoundly interrelated.”234 The following part of this chapter aims to demonstrate that 
Virginia Woolf also rejects purely external relations between subjects, or a subject and an 
object, and emphasizes the internal bond or intimacy between constituents of reality. 
Moreover, it will be suggested that Woolf criticizes the notion of a dominant subject, or ego, 
and replaces it with a less authoritative subjectivity, or intersubjectivity, which treats other 
subjects as mutually immanent equals.235 
Mr Ramsay, whose character is partly modelled on Woolf’s father Leslie Stephen, 
represents a philosopher who studies the nature of reality, particularly, the relation between 
the subject and object and tries to establish whether a thing exists even when it is not 
perceived. In fact, he explores the British empiricists’, especially Hume’s and Berkeley’s 
concern with “the survival of the object without a perceiver” and “scepticism about 
substance.”236 Hume is repeatedly mentioned throughout the novel, for example when the 
reader learns that Mr Ramsay is supposed to give a lecture on Locke, Hume, and Berkeley for 
students in Cardiff, or when he reflects on the philosopher’s unfortunate fall into a bog. This 
philosophical undertone of the novel has already been analysed by Gillian Beer in her essay 
“Hume, Stephen, and Elegy,” where Beer analyses the connection between the philosophical 
thought of David Hume and Mr Ramsay, or in The Phantom Table where Ann Banfield 
focuses on the paradigmatic object of the table, which symbolizes both Mr. Ramsay’s and 
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Woolf’s own rumination about the nature of substance. In contrast to these detailed analyses, I 
would like to focus on Woolf’s description of Mr. Ramsay as the embodiment of a 
philosopher who maintains the traditional distinction between the subject and the object and 
reinforces what Alfred North Whitehead termed “bifurcation of nature.” Moreover, I aim to 
suggest that Mrs Ramsay and Lily Briscoe, on the contrary, subvert this bifurcation and 
establish a more harmonious relationship with the external world, which may result in them 
becoming the objects of the external world, or their own subjectivity emerging from the 
objective. 
Despite his study of Hume, who prioritizes the role of sense-perception in our 
knowledge of reality, Mr Ramsay seems to be indifferent to the workings of his sense-
perception and immediate experience of his surroundings and prefers to focus on abstract 
ideas such as “a white-deal four-legged table.”237 However, when Lily learns that the man 
studies “subject and object and the nature of reality,”238 she imagines a particular “scrubbed 
kitchen table” with all its marks made by the repeated use: “. . .a phantom kitchen table, one 
of those scrubbed board tables, grained and knotted, whose virtue seems to have been laid by 
the years of muscular integrity, which stuck there, its four legs in air.”239 Whereas Lily sees 
the actuality of the universe, a particular table with its own primary and secondary qualities, 
which are also modified by the artist’s own perspective and past experience, Mr Ramsay 
observes an abstraction, an ideal form which does not possess any particular qualities. These 
are meant to be supplemented during the process of perception. This illustrates that Mr 
Ramsay represents a philosopher who, on the one hand, studies the nature of the universe and 
the nature of the everyday, but, on the other hand, is entirely disconnected from actual 
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realities of his surroundings and seems to embrace the idea of psychically supplemented 
secondary qualities.  
In The Concept of Nature Whitehead rejects “any theory of psychic additions to the 
object known in perception”240 and argues that all “ingredients” already exist in nature prior 
to being perceived. Thus, Lily’s holistic vision of the table corresponds more to the real 
appearance image of the object than Mr Ramsay’s ready-to-be-completed abstraction. 
Moreover, this belief in particularities also justifies the existence of objects that are not 
perceived. By the aforementioned rejection of additional secondary qualities of visible 
objects, Whitehead protests against science that divides nature into two categories, first “the 
nature apprehended in awareness” and “the nature which is the cause of awareness”241:  
The nature which is the fact apprehended in awareness holds within it the 
greenness of the trees, the song of birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of 
the chairs, and the feel of the velvet. The nature which is the cause of 
awareness is the conjectured system of molecules and electrons which so 
affects the mind to produce the awareness of the apparent nature.242 
The quotation ridicules the long-established irrational division into two kinds of nature and 
emphasizes that there is only one nature at once conceived as what we are aware of in 
perception and as an agent which “imposes itself on us.”243 
Whitehead’s new concept of nature, which he later called “philosophy of organism,” is 
based on the idea that there is an ongoing interaction between us and the natural world, which 
exercises certain power on our mental and bodily processes. As a result, the philosopher 
rejects purely subjectivist doctrines that see the natural world as a mere construct of our 
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minds, which leads to our domination of the external world, and adopts an objectivist stance 
by claiming that “the things experienced and the cognisant subject enter into the common 
world on equal terms.”244 This is explained in the following quotation, where he diminishes 
the distance between us, subjects of perception, and the surrounding nature: “It appears from 
this interrogation that we are within the world of colours, sound, and other sense-objects, 
related in space and time to enduring objects such as stones, trees, and human bodies. We 
seem to ourselves elements of this world in the same sense as are other things which we 
perceive.”245 The quotation demonstrates that there is no distinct boundary between “us” and 
“nature,” which implies that there is also no clear-cut division between the categories of the 
subject and the object as these are “relative terms.”246  
Whereas Whitehead deconstructs this dualism, in To the Lighthouse Mr Ramsay 
continuously sustains it by his preoccupation with abstract and wholly potential images of the 
real world. Mr Ramsay alienates himself from the ordinary experience and cannot see 
Whitehead’s “buzzing world” of vibratory relations. This is illustrated in the following 
quotation, where Mrs Ramsay reflects on her husband’s inability to establish intimate 
relationships with his surroundings:  
Indeed he seemed to her sometimes made differently from other people, born 
blind, deaf, and dumb, to the ordinary things, but to the extraordinary things, 
with an eye like an eagle’s. His understanding often astonished her. But did he 
notice the flowers? No. Did he notice the view? No. Did he even notice his 
own daughter’s beauty, or whether there was pudding on his plate or roast 
beef?247 
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This quotation illustrates that Mr Ramsay represents a stereotype of a philosopher who prefers 
indulging in the study of abstract phenomena, neglects the real nature and bifurcates reality 
into subjects and objects, or “us” and “nature.” Mrs Ramsay continues the critique of her 
husband and adds that “he never looked at things,”248 because he never admired surrounding 
nature about which he barely realizes that it is there. Moreover, as Beer suggests, the whole 
novel is highly symbolic249 and Mr Ramsay’s constant search for the symbol instead of the 
actual, for example when he uses his philosophical work as an instrument to reach 
immortality, or when he insists on the voyage to the lighthouse because it represents his 
deceased wife’s wish, shows his continuous advocation of the human centrality since the 
symbol “gives primacy to the human.”250 Mr Ramsay’s strong sense of being a patriarchal 
subject, which tends to dominate and patronize female characters of the novel, also generates 
the distance between him and the outer nature. Therefore, his perception of nature is not based 
on the equal relationship between the subject and the object, but, rather, he exercises his 
authority: “Let him be fifty feet away, let him not even speak to you, let him not even see you, 
he permeated, he prevailed, he imposed himself. He changed everything.”251 This quotation 
directly implies that Mr Ramsay keeps supporting the division between the subject and the 
object and that he considers himself eligible to dominate objects. 
In contrast to Mr Ramsay’s strong ego,252 which sustains the anthropocentric division 
between the subject and the object, and his indifference to ordinary experience, Mrs Ramsay 
and Lily Briscoe represent “subjectivity” which engulfs the separation between “us” and the 
apparent nature and establish relationships of intimacy with objects of everyday experience. 
These two female characters illustrate Woolf’s attempt to prove that the separation between 
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subjects and objects is “fictitious.”253 From the very beginning of the novel, Mrs Ramsay is 
depicted as a woman interested in lives of other people and as related to her physical 
environment. She manipulates human relationships, she is the centre which attracts all the 
others, and she indulges in the business of “merging and flowing and creating”254 symbolized 
by her knitting. Moreover, she has a sense of “being past everything, through everything, out 
of everything,”255 which implies that she is a constitutive part of other human and non-human 
subjects and that she crosses the boundary between her own subjectivity and surrounding 
objects. As Derek Ryan points out, she adopts Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of molecular 
identity and represents a rhizomatic organism that prioritizes entanglement over separation: 
“As Mrs Ramsay becomes entangled with her surroundings, there is a diffusion of subject, 
object, and time, and a rhizomatic movement prevails.”256 In Whiteheadian terms, she 
represents a vibrant organism which is internally and externally entangled with other subjects 
and objects via the process of prehension, or in other words “feeling” of the surrounding 
subjects. As a result, Mrs Ramsay’s personality and subjective experience is modified with 
every event in which she is involved: “This personal identity is the thing which receives all 
occasions of man’s experience. It is there as a natural matrix for all transitions of life, and is 
changed and variously figured by the things that enter it; so that it differs in its character at 
different times.”257 Mrs Ramsay’s ability to change her personality in relation to the events 
and processes she is entangled with is demonstrated at the beginning of Chapter 11 of the 
section “The Window,” where she enjoys a moment of peace and quiet after she put her 
children in bed: “For now she need not think about anybody. She could be herself, by 
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herself.”258 In this moment, when she finds herself completely alone, her horizon and 
rhizomatic relations expand: “Her horizon seemed to her limitless. There were all the places 
she had not seen. . .”259 Moreover, she ruminates about the privilege to enjoy the intimacy of 
surrounding objects and expresses her regained sense of belonging to her physical 
environment:  
It was odd, she thought, how if one was alone, one leant to things, inanimate 
things; trees, streams, flowers; felt they expressed one; felt they became one; 
felt they knew one, in a sense were one; felt an irrational tenderness thus (she 
looked at that long steady light) as for oneself.260 
This quotation is preceded by Mrs Ramsay’s complete fusion with the light from the 
lighthouse, which suggests that she can naturally step out of her subjective experience and 
become the object of her perception:  
Losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, the stir; and there rose to her 
lips always some exclamation of triumph over life when things came together 
in this peace, this rest, this eternity; and pausing there she looked out to meet 
that stroke of the Lighthouse, the long steady stroke, the last of the three, which 
was her stroke, for watching them in this mood always at this hour one could 
not help attaching oneself to one thing especially of the things one saw; and 
this thing, the long steady stroke, was her stroke. Often she found herself 
sitting and looking, sitting and looking, with her work in her hands until she 
became the thing she looked at — that light for example.261 
 
258. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 69. 
259. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 69. 
260. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 70. 
261. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 70. 
73 
 
The quotation perfectly demonstrates Mrs Ramsay’s habit to establish intimate relationships 
with her surroundings, in which she undergoes “the reduction of self”262 and slips into the 
category of an object. Interestingly, this interchange of the subject and the object is also the 
basic principle of Whitehead’s already-mentioned process of prehension, during which the 
words subject and object lose their distinctive meaning and become relative terms: “Thus 
subject and object are relative terms. An occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity 
concerning an object; and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special 
activity within a subject. Such a mode of activity is termed a ‘prehension.’”263 If this 
definition is applied to the above-quoted passage, the light represents a “prehended” object 
that serves as data of Mrs Ramsay’s prehension which is integrated into her experience. As a 
result, the subject’s identity depends heavily on the objective data, and for this reason, it may 
be said that Mrs Ramsay becomes the objects with which she interacts or that her subjectivity 
springs from the objects in her surroundings. In Process and Reality Whitehead points out that 
his philosophy of organism overthrows the Kantian idea that the objective world emerges 
from the subjective, which means that the subject dominates and determines the natural world. 
Whitehead rejects this traditional elevation of the subject and emphasizes that his philosophy 
of organism describes “how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction.”264 In fact, he 
introduces a new doctrine, which is based on the idea that “the subject emerges from the 
world,”265 which also weakens the position of the subject in favour of the objective world that 
is no longer the result of the thinking mind. In contrast with Mr Ramsay, who is not capable 
of this dissolution of the self and attachment to the objective world, his wife is willing to 
approximate things in her surroundings and “become” these objects. This claim is supported 
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also in the transitioning section “Time Passes,” where we learn about Mrs Ramsay’s death, 
but her physical absence is compensated by the presence of her belongings which still carry 
her personality and ensure her “objective immortality.” Her subjectivity seems to linger in the 
things, especially clothes, that Mrs Ramsay left behind:  
But people should come themselves; they should have sent somebody down to 
see. For there were clothes in the cupboards; they had left clothes in all the 
bedrooms. What was she to do with them? They had the moth in them—Mrs. 
Ramsay’s things. Poor lady! She would never want them again. . . There was 
the old grey cloak she wore gardening (Mrs. McNab fingered it). She could see 
her, as she came up the drive with the washing, stooping over her flowers (the 
garden was a pitiful sight now, all run in riot, and rabbits scuttling at you out of 
the beds) —she could see her with one of her children by her in that grey 
cloak.266 
 The attenuated sense of human ego and interrelatedness with natural environment is 
also characteristic of Lily Briscoe, who struggles with the domination of male gaze and a 
strong sense of male ego throughout the novel. In comparison with Mr Ramsay and William 
Bankes, she is greatly interested in her environment. Unlike Mr Ramsay’s detached 
perception of the objective world, Lily can sense every minute change of mass in her 
environment and her experience of the visible world is always both physical and emotional: 
“But now, with all her senses quickened as they were, looking, straining, till the colour of the 
wall and the jackmanna beyond burnt into her eyes, she was aware of someone coming out of 
the house, coming towards her. . .”267 As Woolf suggests in the first section of the novel, Lily 
can keep “a feeler on her surroundings,”268 which she later applies to her creative process. 
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Moreover, she ruminates about the possibility to become one “with the object one adored,”269 
in her case with Mrs Ramsay, who represents the centre of stability for her:  
What device for becoming like waters poured into the jar, inextricably the 
same, one with the object one adored? Could the body achieve it, or the mind, 
subtly mingling in the intricate passages of the brain? or the heart? Could 
loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs Ramsay one? For it was not 
knowledge but unity that she desired. . .270 
This quotation demonstrates that Lily’s identity and experience of the visible world may also 
be described as “rhizomatic”271 because the artist can suppress her own self in order to create 
a more equal unity with objects in her environment, particularly with those that she loves.  
As it has been suggested, Lily’s interest in her surroundings and her inclination to 
establish relationships of intimacy with human and non-human objects also apply to her 
artistic process, during which she struggles with the setting for Mrs Ramsay’s portrait and the 
representation of masses. Deeply stricken by Mrs Ramsay’s death, in the last section of the 
novel, Lily intends to complete the “impossible” painting. She resumes her effort, revives her 
“interest in ordinary human things”272 and challenges once again her eternal enemy— “this 
other thing, this truth, this reality, which suddenly laid her hands on her.”273 As she plunges 
into a creative trance, she loses the sense of her own identity, which is dispersed in the 
environment. As she began “precariously dipping among the blues,”274 she “was losing 
consciousness of outer things, and her name and her personality.”275 Moreover, it seems that 
her hand is led almost automatically and that only when she renounces her sense of being a 
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separate subject which can control the environment as well as the creative process, she is able 
to “tunnel” her “way into her picture, into the past.”276 She starts to realize that it is 
impossible to capture Mrs Ramsay in her entirety, or even “that very jar on the nerves, the 
thing itself,”277 because one would need to represent all Mrs Ramsay’s relationships and 
shades: “One wanted fifty pairs of eyes to see with, she reflected. Fifty pairs of eyes were not 
enough to get round that one woman with, she thought.”278 During the process of tunnelling 
into the past, Lily suppresses her own personality and remembers Mrs Ramsay’s “daily 
miracles” and idiosyncrasies: “She had let the flowers fall from her basket, Lily thought, 
screwing up her eyes and standing back as if to look at her picture, which she was not 
touching, however, with all her faculties in a trance, frozen over superficially but moving 
underneath with extreme speed.”279 This quotation indicates that Lily loses her awareness of 
being a subject separated from the reality around her, becomes an integral part of her 
surroundings and abandons her anthropocentric perspective. This de-subjectification enables 
her to finish the painting and degrade her experience to the level of the ordinary:  
One must hold the scene—so—in a vice and let nothing come in and spoil it. 
One wanted, she thought, dipping her brush deliberately, to be on a level with 
ordinary experience, to feel simply that’s a chair, that’s a table, and yet at the 
same time, It’s a miracle, it’s an ecstasy. The problem might be solved after 
all.280 
After this sudden reunification with the ordinary experience, Lily senses the presence of Mrs 
Ramsay in the room, which helps her retain the vision of the woman’s personality:  
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‘Mrs Ramsay! Mrs. Ramsay!’ she cried, feeling the old horror come back—to 
want and want and not to have. Could she inflict that still? And then, quietly, as 
if she refrained, that too became part of ordinary experience, was on a level 
with the chair, with the table. Mrs. Ramsay—it was part of her goodness to 
Lily—sat there quite simply, in the chair, flicked her needles to and fro, knitted 
her reddish-brown stocking, cast her shadow on the step.281 
Although at this moment the reader would expect Lily to complete her painting of Mrs 
Ramsay, she turns towards the island, where, by that time, Mr Ramsay should have landed to 
visit the lighthouse, then back to her easel and renounces her ambition to depict Mrs 
Ramsay’s personality. Instead of portraying her in a sophisticated and holistic manner, she 
manages to complete an abstract picture devoid of any attempt to close-to-reality 
representation of the woman:  
Quickly, as if she recalled by something over there, she returned to her canvas. 
There it was—her picture. Yes, with all its greens and blues, its lies running up 
and down, its attempt at something. . . With a sudden intensity, as if she saw it 
clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was 
finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have 
had my vision.282 
The quotation suggests that Lily’s finished painting in no way resembles the image of Mrs 
Ramsay. It seems that Lily realized that a personality, a subject, cannot be extracted from its 
environment. This inability to represent Mrs Ramsay and insert her into a timeless setting 
demonstrates the novel’s key concern—the movement from the notion of human subjects, 
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who bifurcate between them and their surroundings, towards “more-than-human” subjectivity, 
which does not control the surrounding visible world but results from it.  
Instead of the emergence of a unified subject, Lily’s painting suggests that it is the 
process and a subject’s relations with his or her environment that are crucial to determine 
one’s personality. However, it is an impossible task because these connections can never be 
pinned down and reproduced. Through the focus on the painstaking creative process and 
Lily’s and Mrs Ramsay’s ability to entangle with their environment and overcome the gap 
between their sense of self and surrounding objects, Woolf explores the Whiteheadian idea 
that subject and object cannot be clearly distinguished and that a subject has no control over 
the object but rather emerges from it. For this reason, the subject cannot be fully captured 
without its relations to its environment that contributes to its individuality. Therefore, To the 
Lighthouse foregrounds the importance of physical objects, like the above-discussed short 
stories, and rejects the idea that the subject is a distinct entity, which may be abstracted from 
its physical setting. Consequently, Woolf lets human subjects lose their power over the natural 
world and suggests that their intertwinement with the physical objects in their surroundings 
reverses the traditional dualism of the human and the non-human nature. As Elsa Högberg 
proposes, Woolf focuses on the “object-like” qualities of the human subject, by which she 
anticipates the ideas of currently influential object-oriented ontology.283 The following 
chapter elaborates on this idea and proceeds one step further by focusing on Woolf’s 
treatment of physical objects and the natural world as subjects that possess certain 
animateness and “human-like” qualities, which reveals Woolf’s inclination to panpsychism. 
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Chapter 2: Panpsychist and Post-human Traces in Virginia Woolf’s Fiction 
The Promise of Panpsychism in the Reconceptualization of Matter and Nature 
Whereas the preceding chapter explored in detail Woolf’s interest in the interaction 
between subjects and objects, between the human and the nonhuman, and suggested that the 
boundary between these categories is no longer distinct, this chapter focusses on nonhuman 
and inanimate, yet experiencing subjects in Woolf’s fiction. The experience of these subjects 
is analysed in reference to panpsychism, a philosophical theory emphasizing that mental 
properties and sentience may be attributed to all constituents of reality, including physical 
objects made of traditionally solid, lifeless, and inert substance. Particular attention is paid to 
Alfred North Whitehead’s modest version of panpsychism intimated mainly in his work 
Science and the Modern World. This chapter also deals with Woolf’s concept of nature 
without clearly distinguishing between the two meanings of the word nature associated with 
the Bloomsbury Group. In his essay “Bloomsbury and Nature” Peter Adkins emphasizes that 
the group’s members, on the one hand, perceived nature in its broad sense as the natural 
“nonhuman world from which the artist or writer takes his or her subject,” and, on the other 
hand, in its narrower sense, as “the set of aesthetic ideals that have been established through 
cultural representations of the countryside.”284 Adkins contends that these two concepts of 
nature are often intermingled in the works of the Bloomsbury Group’s members, which is 
reflected in this chapter by emphasizing that Woolf uses the word “nature” to refer to both the 
physical environment, in the sense of reality, and to the aesthetic enjoyment of natural setting. 
This chapter proposes that nature in Woolf’s works may be considered alive and even 
sentient, which subverts the boundary between the human and the nonhuman. Woolf’s 
preoccupation with the description of animated nature implies that she engages with the crisis 
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of nature of the early twentieth century. The latter was caused by the scientific and industrial 
progress and emphasis on material aspects of life and reality. Therefore, the animated nature 
in Woolf’s fiction serves as the writer’s tool to make readers think about their relationship to 
nature, which has mainly been based on the discussed subject-object relationship permitting 
the maltreatment of nature. As a result, nature is exploited and dominated by the human 
subject, which is reflected in ecocritical reading of modernist fiction. Woolf’s writing 
manifests that the author subverts anthropocentrism rooted in the Western philosophical 
tradition by emphasizing that a human being is just one among many natural, and similarly 
sentient, subjects. Therefore, Woolf revives the objective of the Romantic poets to 
counterbalance the society’s focus on scientific progress, industrialisation, and material needs 
by highlighting the human entanglement with nature. Similarly, the already mentioned 
panpsychism represents an analogous counterpart to the scientific materialism prevailing in 
the Western tradition, particularly in the early 20th century science, which inherited the 
tradition of Cartesian “machines” and Newtonian mechanics. Woolf’s contemporaries 
William James, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred North Whitehead defied scientific materialism 
by reviving the mental aspects of reality and by attributing experience and sentience even to 
the most elementary particles from which reality is built. The aim of this chapter is to ascribe 
the same intention to Woolf, who rejects the notion of purely physical objects, conceived as 
stable and disconnected pieces of matter, and suggests that objects may also be seen as 
experiencing subjects. This enables Woolf to eliminate the inertness of nature constructed by 
scientific materialism. 
 In Science and the Modern World Alfred North Whitehead argues that the Western 
science had focused on the “irreducible brute matter”285 for at least three centuries and that 
this tradition should be replaced by a less materialistic approach. The philosopher condemns 
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“scientific materialism” for its worship of “senseless, valueless and purposeless”286 material 
and claims that this purely materialist ontology is no longer viable in the first half of the 20th 
century. He claims that scientific materialism degraded the status of experience to something 
“dim and fragmentary” and he attempts to rehabilitate experience as something that “sounds 
the utmost depth of reality.”287 He calls for a system of thought where nature is not based on 
the concept of static, and inert matter, but on the concept of organism.288 Such a system 
implies the focus on the idea of interconnectedness of natural events, and more importantly on 
the idea that everything in nature may be seen as an animate organism comparable to more 
complex organisms such as plants or human beings. In a similar vein, in Modes of Thought, 
Whitehead admits that to conceive “nature as composed of permanent things, namely of bits 
of matter” goes in line with our common sense thinking, however, he argues that the new 
scientific and philosophical discourse of the beginning of the 20th century must adopt a 
completely different viewpoint of nature as “a theatre for the interrelations of activities.”289 In 
The Concept of Nature, he introduces his cosmology based on the concept of nature conceived 
as “a complex of related entities,”290 which contradicts the mechanical conception of nature 
based on separate blocks of matter. It is important to return to Whitehead’s definition of 
actual entities described as “drops of experience,” as subjects of their own experience, 
determined by their feeling or “prehension” of other entities: “A feeling cannot be abstracted 
from the actual entity entertaining it. This actual entity is termed ‘subject’ of the feeling.”291 
Therefore, an actual entity is constituted by its feeling and by its unique sense of being itself: 
“An actual entity feels as it does feel in order to be the actual entity which it is.”292 As a 
 
286. Whitehead, Science, 17. 
287. Whitehead, Science, 18. 
288. Whitehead, Science, 75. 
289. Whitehead, Modes, 140. 
290. Whitehead, The Concept, 9. 
291. Whitehead, Process, 221. 
292. Whitehead, Process, 221. 
82 
 
result, his ontological system may be defined, on the one hand, as non-materialist, due to his 
attribution of experience to the smallest constituents of reality, and, on the other hand, atomic, 
owing to his belief that these constituents of reality create assemblages ranging from pieces of 
inanimate matter, lower organisms, plants, and higher animals to human beings: “The ultimate 
metaphysical truth is atomism. The creatures are atomic.”293 Whitehead elaborates his 
panpsychist theory in Religion in the Making, where he suggests that every natural event, also 
meaning every actual occasion, has a physical and a mental pole. Having a physical pole for 
an actual entity means that it can actively receive data from entities in its proximity and 
evaluate them. This is succeeded by the entity’s choice of data, which are integrated in its 
process of becoming, thus, the entity has the capacity to influence its process of 
“concrescence.” In accordance with this theory, even human beings may be defined as a 
bundle of physical and mental processes. By introducing actual entities that are both of 
physical and mental nature, Whitehead overcomes the long-established dualism of mind and 
matter, experience and lifeless substance, and initiates a new monist tradition that interweaves 
the mental and the physical aspects of being: “. . .we should conceive mental operations as 
among the factors which make up the constitution of nature.”294 Whitehead’s concept of 
reality, grounded on experiencing actual entities, may be compared to a more recent theory of 
“vibrant matter” introduced by Jane Bennett in her book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology 
of Things. The concept of vibrant matter is inspired by Spinoza’s idea of striving—an effort or 
power to maintain existence which is attributed to all things.295 Bennett emphasizes that there 
is “a vitality intrinsic to materiality,”296 because the inorganic matter is capable of agency, 
which enables to overcome the dichotomy between organic and inorganic matter. However, 
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panpsychism and vital materialism cannot be conflated, as the former places emphasis on the 
mental aspect and the sense of subjectivity of each constituent of reality, and the latter insists 
on vitality in a non-mental and non-spiritual sense, manifested as an impact or thing-power on 
the vital unity’s environment. Moreover, Bennett argues that vital materialism is entirely 
atheistic and that its ethical aim is to “distribute value to bodies as such,”297 which somehow 
implies that vital materialism attributes value to brute matter. On the contrary, panpsychism 
seems to embrace the turn away from this imminent value in physical matter deprived of its 
mental aspect. However, as Austin J. Roberts argues in his article “Pneumatterings: The New 
Materialism, Whitehead, and Theology,” new materialists are heavily inspired by 
Whitehead’s thought, although they do not openly recognize his influence in their texts. It is 
important to admit that Whitehead introduced the idea that “agency goes all the way down”298 
much earlier than new materialists, who elaborated on his concept of panexperiential, and 
internally related entities. While currently influential new materialism and other object-
oriented ontologies relying on panpsychism, panexperialism, animism, or other doctrines 
attributing agency to the rudimentary constituents of reality, face harsh criticism for 
advocating flat ontology that levels all differences between the human and nonhuman, organic 
and inorganic, living and lifeless matter,299 this criticism cannot be applied to Whitehead’s 
panpsychism. Whereas the philosopher reconciles the above-mentioned binaries, he clearly 
distinguishes between various levels of experience and, by no means, does he suggest that 
every subject is the same or that the agency of a human subject equals the agency of a 
particle. Moreover, his ontology does not exclude difference, because each actual occasion 
emerges from a different process of concrescence which guarantees that it is novel and 
 
297. Bennett, 13. 
298. Austin J. Roberts, “Pneumatterings,” 5. 
299. Benjamin Boysen, “The Embarrasement of Being Human: A Critique of New 




unique. For this reason, Whitehead’s ontology, which at the same time attributes proto-
psychic qualities to matter and acknowledges the ontological difference, is used to analyse 
Woolf’s panpsychism which also seems to celebrate difference and distinguish between 
different kinds of agency. 
Panpsychism is most famously defined by Thomas Nagel in his book Mortal 
Questions where it is described as a doctrine admitting that “the basic physical constituents of 
the universe have mental properties, whether or not they are parts of living organisms.”300 
However, by no means does this view claim that everything in the universe is endowed with 
mind or consciousness. Both mind and consciousness are anthropocentric terms and imply 
that lower animals and inanimate matter possess the same mental faculties as human beings. 
Instead, panpsychists sometimes prefer using the term “panexperientialism” because it does 
not entail the attribution of psyche, or consciousness, to material objects. In his book 
Panpsychism in the West David Skrbina argues that the best and functional definition of 
panpsychism might be that “all objects, or systems of objects, possess a singular inner 
experience of the world around them.”301 Moreover, he contends that in order to overcome 
our anthropocentric viewpoint, we must admit that mentality in objects around us cannot be 
described in terms of human consciousness, but more like “a universal quality of physical 
things, in which both inanimate mentality and human consciousness are taken as particular 
manifestations.”302 Thomas Nagel defined this quality as “what-it-is-likeness” in his famous 
essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat,” where he argues against the reductionist approach to 
consciousness and emphasizes that conscious experience is “a widespread phenomenon,”303 
because every organism must have a sense of what it is like to be that organism. In a similar 
 
300. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, 181. 
301. Skrbina, 16. 
302. Skrbina, 17. 
303. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” 436. 
85 
 
vein, panpsychists claim that inanimate objects may have some kind of proto-psychic 
experience, because they can react to the changes in their environment. For example, 
Whitehead discusses the issue of universal experience at the beginning of Modes of Thought, 
where he states that we have already advanced our thinking about experience by considering 
animals as “centres of feeling and of experience,”304 and therefore, also vegetables may be 
perceived as having some degree of experience. He then adds that also inanimate objects, the 
lowest kind of aggregation of actual occasions, may influence each other, at least on the 
physical level. The potentiality of feeling and expression thus lies also in non-living objects; 
however, it is fully developed in higher organisms. Skrbina provides a long list of 
philosophers who inclined to panpsychism across the history of Western philosophy and 
among them, he mentions Bertrand Russell, a friend of the members of the Bloomsbury 
Group and Whitehead’s student. In Outline of Philosophy, Russell suggests that a riverbed, 
too, may be capable of experiencing, or thinking, as it is able to remember its course and react 
to its physical environment:  
A watercourse which at most times is dry gradually wears a channel down a 
gully at the times when it flows, and subsequent rains follow [a similar] course. 
. . . You may say, if you like, that the river bed remembers previous occasions 
when it experienced cooling streams. . . .You would say [this] was a flight of 
fancy because you are of the opinion that rivers and river beds do not 
‘think.’305  
Russell does not mean to say that a riverbed is a thinking or sentient organism. More likely, 
he implies that even lifeless nature around us is endowed with a life of its own, maybe even 
experience according to which it “acts.” Similarly, Whitehead points out in Process and 
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Reality that also a stone might be able to provide its own autobiography, because it 
remembers its reactions to the environment. Steven Shaviro elaborates on this particular 
image in his The Universe of Things, a book on speculative realism, and suggests that 
Whitehead does not urge us to reveal what the inner life of a stone is but mainly to 
acknowledge that other than human entities in reality may have its own experience of reality: 
“I attribute feelings to stones precisely in order to get away from the pernicious dualism that 
would insist that human beings alone (or at most, human beings together with some animals) 
have feelings, while everything else does not.”306 A similar point is also made by Skrbina, 
who highlights that panpsychism is the reaction to the tendency in contemporary science to 
regard mind as “limited to humans and perhaps to higher animals” and “dependent or 
reducible to the physical substrate of the human brain.”307 A representative of this 
“materialist” and physicalist approach is Daniel Dennett, a philosopher of mind who claims 
that human consciousness, or in other words mind, is reducible to the neuro-biological 
processes of our brain. As a result, panpsychism represents a great opponent of various forms 
of physicalism and warns against negative ethical and environmental consequences related to 
the worship of brute matter. By adopting the panpsychist perspective, we admit that the 
human subject is no longer unique and the only “enminded” being in the universe, which 
leads to the recognition of the “shared quality” with fellow beings, and therefore even to the 
acceptance of compassionate and ecological values. For this reason, panpsychism seems to be 
a very relevant worldview, especially nowadays, when we find ourselves on the verge of 
ecological crisis and face all forms of hatred towards “the other.” The adoption of 
panpsychism enables us to reconsider our relationship to nature and other human and 
nonhuman beings.  
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Throughout the literary history, writers have often been influenced by the 
philosophical context in which they were creating their texts, or they have intentionally 
demonstrated a philosophical theory in their works. This section analyses Stephen Shaviro’s 
attempt to trace panpsychism in the science-fiction story “The Universe of Things” by 
Gwyneth Jones and Whitehead’s discussion of the animated nature in Romantic poetry. These 
two instances of panpsychism unveiled in literary works are briefly discussed below as 
sources of inspiration for the analysis of panpsychist traces in Virginia Woolf’s works.  
The short story “Universe of Things” deals mainly with the human encounter with 
aliens, who are endowed with a special capacity that helps them maintain a close relationship 
with other beings and things in their proximity. Consequently, their own tools are regarded as 
biological extension of themselves. One day an alien asks a human mechanic to repair his car 
and the mechanic decides to repair it by hand to show the alien how powerful and skilful 
humans are without the use of artificial technology. However, the mechanic experiences a 
moment of epiphany when his tools come alive and interact with him. Shaviro does not pay 
attention to the fantastical aspect of the story but suggests that it makes us “think about 
liveliness of objects” and about “the ways that they are related to us.”308 Moreover, he points 
out that we are afraid of admitting that there could be some vitality and agency in the 
inanimate nature:  
We are threatened by the vibrancy of matter. We need to escape the excessive 
proximity of things. We cannot bear the thought of their having an autonomous 
life, even if this life is ultimately attributable to us. We are desperate to 
reassure ourselves that, in spite of everything, objects are, after all, passive and 
inert.309  
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A similar objective to perceive inorganic nature as intrinsically alive is introduced in 
Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World where the philosopher discusses the English 
Romantic poets and their relationship to nature. The philosopher praises the poets for their 
criticism of scientific materialism, which was on the rise in the 18th and early 19th century, 
and for their emphasis on the organicity and animateness of nature. He contends that 
Wordsworth’s natural poems illustrate his idea of nature conceived as an organic whole of 
“entwined prehensive unities, each suffused with modal presence of others,”310 which implies 
that natural events in Wordsworth’s poetry are interdependent and influence each other. This 
is illustrated in a passage from The Prelude where Wordsworth points out that nature is 
capable of haunting its observers, which might be interpreted as Whitehead’s natural objects 
that enchant us with “lure for feeling.” Although Whitehead admits that the Romantics 
perceived lifeless natural objects as distinct from the animated things, he emphasizes that they 
regarded the inorganic stuff as potentiality for an interaction during which the human mind 
and the object perceived are interwoven, so that the clear-cut distinction between subjective 
experience and the objective nature is put at stake. Whitehead, of course, admits that 
Wordsworth, or any other Romantic poet, distinguished between living and lifeless things, 
however, he appreciates their intention to describe nature and human beings as intrinsically 
inseparable. Whitehead concludes the chapter by highlighting that the Romantics attribute 
value to all objects, even to those that are normally conceived as inert substance: “Both 
Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness that nature cannot be divorced from its 
aesthetic value . . .”311 This aesthetic value, or a lure fore feeling, may be regarded as the 
proto-psychic quality intrinsic to all constituents of reality. Accordingly, it may be concluded 
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that Whitehead suggests in the discussed chapter that the Romantics perceived both animate 
and inanimate objects as centres of agency or feeling. 
Considering Shaviro’s analysis of panpsychism in Gwyneth Jones’s short story “The 
Universe of Things” and Whitehead’s analysis of “active” nature in the poems of the 
Romantics, the following part of this chapter attempts to explore panpsychist traces in 
Virginia Woolf’s works. Its aim is to emphasize that Woolf also represents an author who 
criticized the senseless, valueless, purposeless material, and that she undermines the binary of 
the animate and inanimate nature in her works. In a similar way to Whitehead, she aimed to 
create a universe that would be interwoven into a single organic whole, a universe where 
every entity would be related to another entity and where the human subject no longer 
dominates, because even inanimate matter may become a sentient subject: “. . . all entities 
inhere in the world ‘in the same sense’, then we must conceive a hailstone in the same way as 
a human subject.”312 The following discussion of the inanimate nature that comes alive in 
Woolf’s fiction may be contested by claiming that all the analysed passages are written from 
human-centred perspective and that Woolf relies on anthropomorphism while she endows 
nature with experience. However, as Shaviro admits, this transference of human qualities to 
inanimate entities is the only means we can use to undermine anthropocentrism and to 
attribute the same value to nonhuman subjects: “The point is that a certain cautious 
anthropomorphism is necessary, in order to avoid anthropocentrism.”313 The best a writer can 
do is to use figurative language, metaphors, and similes to at least approximate and imagine 
the experience of other organisms. Woolf uses precisely this means to attribute experience to 
other-than-human subjects in her fiction, and for this reason, her writing is particularly 
resonating nowadays when we try to turn our gaze from humans to nature that needs to be 
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protected and restored. Moreover, Woolf’s depiction of nature is not only anthropomorphic, 





Animated and Sentient Nature in Woolf’s Fiction 
The germs of Woolf’s panpsychism may be traced back to her father’s thoughts on 
materialism expressed in his essay “What is Materialism?” where Leslie Stephen emphasizes 
that it is problematic when scientists deal solely with blocks of matter and their physical 
qualities, because then they do not know how to handle immaterial notions such as experience 
or feeling: “But a difficulty arises when the man of science begins to deal with organised and 
living matter; when he tries to unify knowledge by reasoning from the principles of physical 
science in the departments claimed by the philosopher and the psychologist.”314 Stephen 
reflects on how we can describe the relation between the brain, the piece of matter, and mind, 
our spiritual realm, and emphasizes that the two are related and intertwined. He further points 
out that materialism is very appealing to a common-sense mind that believes in the reality of 
solid “sticks and stones.”315 However, he argues that we know nothing about matter directly 
except through the workings of our consciousness, thoughts and sensations.316 He feels the 
urge to bridge the gap between the world of lifeless extended matter, studied by scientific 
materialism, and the world of experience examined by psychologist and philosophers. 
Stephen asserts that “emotions are just as real as the stone”317 and condemns materialism that 
holds matter as “an ultimate reality” and defines emotions and sensations as “mere nothings 
or phantasms.”318 He admits later in the essay that matter must have some other properties 
than those which are usually studied by scientific materialism: “If living beings arose from 
inanimate matter, that does not prove that life is a figment, but only that matter had other 
properties than those which we please to attribute to it.”319 Moreover, he emphasized that 
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through our senses we learn about conscious experience of other beings. “We weave our 
universe out of the senses,” and therefore we are indirectly connected to other centres of 
consciousness.320 These centres of consciousness are not specified, but Stephen might refer 
also to nonhuman centres of sentience because near the end of the essay, he points out that  
“we cannot give ourselves souls without giving them to our dogs, and if to ours dogs, perhaps 
to plants.”321 Stephen concludes his essay by rejection of pure spiritualism and considers 
himself to be an adherent of materialism which is non-reductionist, rejects the primacy of 
matter and attributes the same value to solid substance and “ephemeral” experience, emotions, 
and sensations. 
 Stephen influenced Woolf in many respects, although their relationship is described 
by most scholars as complicated. As we know from Woolf’s essay “Leslie Stephen,” Stephen 
did not provide the female members of the family with formal education, but he gave them 
freedom to pursue whatever hobby and profession they chose. Moreover, he encouraged 
Woolf in her passion for reading and writing and let her read anything she found in his 
library, which contained all sorts of books, ranging from philosophical treatises to historical 
records. In “A Sketch of the Past,” Woolf describes how happily Stephen discussed the 
borrowed books with his daughter. Katherine C. Hill argues in her article “Virginia Woolf and 
Leslie Stephen: History and Literary Revolution” that Stephen undoubtedly passed on her 
daughter some of his ideas related to the nature of literary art.322 The following part of this 
chapter aims to suggest that Woolf also adopted some of his philosophical views on the nature 
of reality expressed in “What is Materialism?” and that she similarly rejects both pure 
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materialism and pure spiritualism, which is inevitably influenced by her father’s atheism, and 
tends to hold more organic, holistic, and monist view of reality.  
In her well-known essay “Modern Fiction” Woolf criticizes Edwardians such as H.G. 
Wells, John Galsworthy, and Arnold Bennett for representing mainly the material aspects of 
life, “the solidity” of reality, in their fiction. Instead, she argues that modern writers should 
represent life as it really is, which means to transcribe “the incessant shower of innumerable 
atoms” that fall on “an ordinary mind on an ordinary day.”323 This focus on experience 
implies that Woolf rejected scientific materialism for reasons similar to her father’s. 
Moreover, her comparison of impressions and feelings to physical atoms indicates that the 
author attributes the same value to both physical and mental aspects of life. In addition, it 
refers to Stephen’s claim that feelings and emotions are as real as stones. However, Woolf’s 
lengthy discussion about modern writers’ focus on the mind and on the description of the 
internal may be misleading, and many scholars attempted to interpret Woolf’s writing solely 
from the idealist, spiritual, or transcendental perspective. In fact, the writer’s fiction ascribes 
the same portion of attention to the descriptions of physical and mental experience, and 
therefore, the aforementioned approaches are highly reductive. As Woolf points out in her 
essay “On Being Ill,” literature seems to give preference to the manifestations of mind: “… 
literature does its best to maintain that its concern is with the mind; that the body is a sheet of 
plain glass through which the soul looks straight and clear, and, save for one or two passions 
such as desire and greed, is null, and negligible, and non-existent.”324 On the contrary, she 
follows in her father’s footsteps and emphasizes that the body is present in every excitement 
of the mind and that it experiences a daily drama. The body and mind are inseparable for her, 
which can be demonstrated in the following simile: “. . . it [mind] cannot separate off from the 
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body like the sheath of a knife or the pod of a pea for a single instant.”325 Woolf rejects the 
traditional dualism of matter and spirit, therefore, her fiction may be best interpreted only 
from the perspective of non-dualist philosophical theories, such as panpsychism, neutral 
monism, or Whitehead’s philosophy or organism. 
While the previous chapter dealt with the interaction between human beings and 
objects in their surroundings and suggested that Woolf blurs the distinction between the 
subject and the object, this chapter explores the idea that even other-than-human organisms 
and inanimate objects may be considered sentient subjects. In relation to the novel To the 
Lighthouse, it has been analysed how mainly female characters of the novel can overcome the 
distinction between the subject and the object and how they place themselves on the same 
level as the objects in their proximity. Whereas Mrs Ramsay’s interaction with the light from 
the lighthouse resulted in her becoming the light and adopting the position of the object, in the 
middle passage “Time Passes” the light replaces Mrs Ramsay’s loving and caring gaze and 
becomes a subject. The light is described as having similar qualities to human beings and as 
affecting its environment. It is necessary to admit that the light’s experience is depicted in 
anthropomorphic terms, however, as Shaviro pointed out in his book The Universe of Things, 
cautiously used anthropomorphism may be used to disrupt anthropocentrism. In the following 
quotation the light is at the same time endowed with authority and sympathy:  
When darkness fell, the stroke of the Lighthouse, which had laid itself with such 
authority upon the carpet in the darkness, tracing its pattern, came now in the soften 
light of spring mixed with moonlight gliding gently as if it laid its caress and lingered 
stealthily and looked and came lovingly again.”326  
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In “The Lighthouse,” the final part of the novel, Lily’s canvas is described as having “an 
uncompromising white stare” that “rebukes”327 the artist. Also other objects in To the 
Lighthouse are described as “sentient,” for example the trees and the flowers that “looked 
before them, yet beholding nothing,” or the cliffs and ships that seem to prehend one another 
and communicate by their own means: “And as it happens when the weather is very fine, the 
cliffs looked as if they were conscious of the ships, and the ships looked as if they were 
conscious of the cliffs, as if they signalled to each other some secret message of their own.”328 
This passage also reveals Woolf’s fascination with things whose essence is incomprehensible 
to human beings. Moreover, it exemplifies Whitehead’s idea that each entity is aware of the 
feelings of other entities and maintains relations with them. Consequently, the 
“interconnections and individual characters”329 of these entities merge into larger 
assemblages, real physical objects, which create our universe.  
Throughout the novel, it is intimated that nature and weather are capable of their own 
agency and that they have their own life indifferent to the struggling of humans. This issue is 
foregrounded in “Time Passes,” where nature gets hold of the house and demonstrates its 
agency, for example in the following passage, where the spring is personified and described 
as having its peculiar form of agency: “The spring without a leaf to toss, bare and bright like a 
virgin fierce in her chastity, scornful in her purity, was laid out on fields wide-eyed and 
watchful and entirely careless of what was done or thought by the beholders.”330 In this 
section of the novel Woolf presents a universe from the nature’s point of view and enables 
natural elements to reign, which undermines the agency of human beings whose actions and 
death are squeezed into square brackets. The human is thus pushed aside, decentred331 and its 
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absence gives way to the triumph of nature. Although human absence and nature’s seizure of 
the house should intensify the sense of emptiness and deadness after the residents’ departure, 
in fact, it magnifies the sense of nature’s liveliness: “Flies wove a web in the sunny rooms; 
weeds that had grown close to the glass in the night tapped methodically at the window 
pane.”332 All natural and non-natural entities in the house seem to coexist and express their 
unique sense of being. A paragraph later, Woolf describes the sounds that resonated in the 
house where nobody spoke human language: “Now and again some glass tinkled in the 
cupboard as if a giant voice had shrieked so loud in its agony that tumblers stood inside a 
cupboard vibrated too.”333 When Whitehead talks about feeling, which is the subjective 
expression of each actual occasion, including the smallest bits of organic matter, he defines 
the most elementary experience as “emotional feeling felt in its [an entity’s] relevance to a 
world beyond”334 and compares it to the transmission of vibration among physical particles. 
Therefore, the sound and vibration of the glass and tumblers from the quotation may be 
interpreted as the clash or co-presence of expressed experience of inanimate objects.  
These descriptions of animateness in “Times Passes” are in stark contrast to Woolf’s 
intention to depict a house deprived of life: “The house was left; the house was deserted. It 
was left like a shell on a sandhill to fill with dry salt grains now that life had left it.”335 Mrs 
McNab, who enters the house captured by nature, represents human effort to dominate nature 
and thwart its flourishing. However, she surrenders when she comes to a conclusion that to 
prevent the house from falling into the hands of nature was “beyond the strength of one 
woman.”336 Woolf’s rhetorical question “What power could prevent the fertility, the 
 
332. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 144. 
333. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 145. 
334. Whitehead, Process, 163. 
335. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 149. 
336. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 150. 
97 
 
insensibility of nature?”337 hints at her deliberate intention to undermine the value of human 
actions in comparison to “nature that has played so many tricks upon us.”338 The word 
“insensibility” does not imply nature’s lack of conscious experience but, rather, its 
indifference to the actions of human beings. Nature’s unstoppable activity depicted by Woolf 
in “Time Passes” also refers to its creativity, the process of incessant becoming, which is 
described by Whitehead as the ultimate principle of his philosophy of organism: “Creativity is 
the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the 
‘many’ which it unifies.”339 Nature thus may be conceived as environment permitting the 
perpetual recreation and actualisation of its elements. This creativity is reflected also in the 
following quotation, where Woolf celebrates nature’s expression and creative power: 
“Tortoise-shell butterflies burst from the chrysalis and pattered their life out of the window-
pane. Poppies sowed themselves among the dahlias; the lawn waved with long-grass; giant 
artichokes towered among roses; a fringed carnation flowered among the cabbages…”340 
In Orlando Woolf brings to life the family mansion, where the main character is born, 
by endowing it with a heart that beats: “Ah, but she knew where the heart of the house still 
beat. Gently opening a door, she stood on the threshold so that (she fancied) the room could 
not see her and watched the tapestry rising and falling on the eternal faint breeze which never 
failed to move it.”341 Woolf describes the house in terms of a living human being, as the 
centre of feeling and sense experience. Orlando fancies that the rooms of her family mansion 
absorbed the mood of people who occupied them as well as her feelings and experience. 
Moreover, the rooms react to Orlando re-entering the house and express their own feelings, 
which is described in the second part of the following quotation:  
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She fancied that the rooms brightened as she came in; stirred, opened their eyes 
as if they had been dozing in her absence. She fancied, too, that, hundreds and 
thousands of times as she had seen them, they never looked the same twice, as 
if long a life as theirs had stored in them a myriad moods which changed with 
winter and summer, bright weather and dark, and her own fortunes and the 
people’s characters who visited them. Polite they were to strangers, but a little 
wary; with her, they were entirely open and at their ease. Why not indeed? 
They had known each other for close on four centuries now. They had nothing 
to conceal. She knew their sorrows and joys she knew what age each part of 
them was and its little secrets—a hidden drawer, a concealed cupboard, or 
some deficiency perhaps, such as a part made up, or added later. They, too, 
knew her in all her moods and changes.342 
This dense passage, in which Woolf personifies the rooms of Orlando’s mansion, reveals 
Woolf’s interest in the interaction between human beings and their surroundings, however, 
she puts emphasis on their equality regarding the influence on one another. In The Concept of 
Nature Whitehead defines nature as a complex of related events, which are in his later works 
referred to as actual occasions. One of the examples of an event is the lecture hall in which he 
gives his lecture, and this event is interwoven with the event of his own “bodily life.”343 The 
two events are thus disclosed one to each other and some of their traits may be integrated by 
the prehension of the co-present event. He also does not exclude that other events might 
intervene into the event of the hall and the body. When the data integrated in the process of 
prehension enter the structure of the occasion in the process of concrescence, they may be 
transmitted into larger assemblages, or societies, which are seemingly permanent in contrast 
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to events: “The ‘effects’ of an actual occasion are in its intervention in concrescent processes 
other than its own. Any entity, thus intervening it the processes transcending itself, is said to 
be functioning as an ‘object.’”344 Consequently, Orlando’s feelings may be interpreted as data 
integrated and stored in an event and then reproduced in the constant process of creation of 
societies (larger, macroscopic assemblages of actual occasion), in this case the walls of the 
rooms. This claim is supported by Woolf’s idea that the rooms change in relation to Orlando’s 
fortunes and with “the people’s characters who visited them.”345 Both the rooms and Orlando 
represent simultaneously experiencing subjects and objects prepared to be integrated into the 
nature of the other. Also, the fact that the rooms “never looked the same” brings back 
Whitehead’s definition of actual occasions or events that are never the same due to the various 
input in the process of their concrescence, or becoming, represented in Woolf’s quotation by 
emotions of the room’s occupants.  
The absorption of human feeling by inanimate objects or nature features also in 
Jacob’s Room, where the moor, which is associated with Clara’s love for Cornwall, “accepts 
all” and stores lovingly people’s emotions or literally “hoards these little treasures, like a 
nurse.”346 The sun, similarly to the lighthouse in To the Lighthouse, has eyes and directs them 
at whatever it choses: “Back came the sun dazzlingly. It fell like an eye upon the stirrups, and 
then suddenly and yet very gently rested upon the bed, upon the alarum clock, and upon the 
butterfly box stood open.”347 The following quotation illustrates Woolf’s belief in the 
principle of interconnection and liveliness of nature which is emphasized by the 
anthropomorphic term “breathing” comparable to Whitehead’s idea that all entities are 
interconnected and influence each other: “People still murmur over the last word said on the 
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staircase, or strain, all through their dreams, for the voice of alarum clock. So when the wind 
roams through a forest innumerable twigs stir; hives are brushed; insects sway on grass 
blades; the spider runs rapidly up a crease in the bark; and the whole air is tremulous with 
breathing; elastic with filaments”348 The wind launched a chain of events in nature and the 
relations between these events are demonstrated by the word “filaments.” A few lines below 
Woolf emphasizes that “webs of the forest are schemes evolved for the smooth conduct of 
business” and that “the stir in the air is the indescribable agitation of life,”349 whereby she 
acknowledges the interconnectedness and life-force attributed to all natural entities. She 
admits that all constituents of reality are endowed with a degree of vitality, “all-
encompassing, permeating force,”350 which spreads through the whole nature. Interestingly, 
the “webs of forest” that enable “the smooth conduct of business” hints at the idea that 
relations between organisms in a forest are important to ensure each organism’s survival. A 
similar reflection appears in Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World where the 
philosopher describes how existence of a single tree depends on its relations with the 
environment:  
A single tree by itself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of shifting 
circumstances. The wind stunts it: variations in temperature check its foliage: 
the rains denude its soil… But in nature the normal way in which trees flourish 
is by their association with a forest. Each tree may lose something of its 
individual perfection of growth, but they mutually assist each other in 
preserving conditions for survival. . . . A forest is a triumph of the organisation 
of mutually dependent species.351 
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In Modes of Thought Whitehead argues that “no entity can separate itself from the others, and 
from the whole” and therefore, it may be suggested that Woolf’s filaments or webs in the air 
represent metaphorically this inseparability and the concern of one organism for another. Each 
entity of the universe is indirectly connected to other entities and as Whitehead suggests, each 
entity has some sense of its own existence, and consequently, also some value:  
At the base of our existence is the sense of ‘worth.’ Now worth essentially 
presupposes that which is worthy. Here the notion of worth in not to be 
construed in a purely eulogistic sense. It is the sense of existence for its own 
sake, of existence which is its own justification, of existence with its own 
character.352  
  In her fiction Woolf appreciates the worthiness of every organism by attributing it a 
degree of experience and by suggesting that things are alive. In her short story “Ancestors,” 
she introduces a girl who was brought up to behave in a sensitive way to nature so that she 
never harms a single natural entity: “. . . to hurt a flower was to hurt the most exquisite thing 
in nature.”353 In her short story “The Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection” the main 
character decides to cut off an overgrown branch and feels regret about depriving the plant of 
its life: “As it [the rose] fell, surely some light came in too, surely one could penetrate a little 
farther into her being. Her mind then was filled with tenderness and regret. . . . To cut an 
overgrown branch saddened her because it once lived, and life was dear to her.”354 Hence, 
Woolf seems to admit that other organisms may have their own life or subjective experience, 
which is uncommunicable. However, it may be captured, at least, by anthropomorphic literary 
language. Woolf ascribes a special status to flowers in her fiction, which is explained in her 
essay “On Being Ill” where she admires flowers for their dignity and strength to stand upright 
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regardless the conditions: “Let us examine the rose. We have seen it so often flowering in 
bowls, connected it so often with beauty in its prime, that we have forgotten how it stands, 
still and steady, throughout an entire afternoon in the earth. It preserves a demeanour of 
perfect dignity and self-possession.”355 Woolf adds that flowers are “the most self-sufficient” 
of all things that human beings have made companions,” by which she recognizes their own 
autonomy and life independent of human beings. Moreover, people “live in the country to 
learn virtue from plants,”356 which means that nature is also intrinsically virtuous. Woolf also 
contrasts life in nature with human life and concludes that nature is innately alive and as an 
entity does not need to worry about its death or decay: “The dogs bark. The rooks, rising in a 
net, fall in a net upon the elm trees. The wave of life flings itself out indefatigably. It is only 
the recumbent who know what, after all, nature is at no points to conceal – that she in the end 
will conquer.”357 On the contrary, human beings constantly have to “wriggle with the hook of 
life.”358 
In The Voyage Out Woolf personifies the ship Euphrosyne on which the characters sail 
to Santa Marina: “On and on she went, by day and by night, followed her path, until one 
morning broke and showed the land. . . . She rang with cries; men jumped on her; her deck 
was thumped by feet.”359 This passage is narrated from the perspective of the ship that 
experiences her advance to the port and the actions of her passengers. The fact that Woolf 
decides to eliminate the human experience from the approach towards an unknown land 
implies that the human perspective is no longer in the centre. While Rachel Vinrace is 
walking in the exotic wilderness of her new destination, she is fascinated by the liveliness 
around her and admits that nature around her has its own life: “She laid them side by side, 
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flower to flower and stalk to stalk, caressing them for walking alone. Flowers even pebbles in 
the earth had their own life and disposition and brought back the feeling of a child to whom 
they were companions.”360 The quotation contrasts different perspectives on nature. First, the 
non-anthropocentric viewpoint emphasizing that even pebbles may have their own sense of 
existence and life, which brings back Whitehead’s idea that even a stone might write its 
autobiography. Second, the traditional anthropocentric viewpoint that human beings 
constantly project their feelings on the surrounding nature and that objects evoke memories 
from the past, for Rachel, for example, from her childhood when she used to interact with 
natural objects during her childish plays. As Rachel discovers the beauty of nature alongside 
her first love adventure, she seems to be more and more sensitive to the impulses she gets 
from her environment: “Rachel seemed to see and hear a little of everything, much as a river 
feels the twigs that fall into it and sees the sky above, but her eyes were too vague for 
Evelyn’s liking.”361 The quotation also reveals that that Woolf conceives nature as something 
capable of “feeling.” Moreover, the idea that the river feels twigs falling into its stream is 
reminiscent of the quotation from Bertrand Russell’s Outline of Philosophy where the 
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Celebration of Life, Value and Beauty in Nature 
So far, the animated nature and objects were discussed in Woolf’s early novels and in 
her masterpiece To the Lighthouse, however, this theme is also foregrounded in her other 
novels. In Mrs Dalloway she directly addresses the issue of life penetrating the whole nature. 
Both Clarissa and Septimus are hyper-sensitive characters, who seem to have a very strong 
bond with nature around them and who feel the life hidden within it. Woolf argues in the 
essay “On Being Ill” that this deeper understanding of nature and hypersensitivity may be the 
asset of mental illness and that “it is to the poets that we turn to” as our senses “domineer” 
over our intelligence in the period of poor mental health.362 During one of his fits, raving 
Septimus expressed the idea that “leaves were alive; trees were alive.”363 Interestingly, Woolf 
avoids using the conditional “as if alive” which she uses in To the Lighthouse. Moreover, 
Septimus believes in certain patterns of harmony in nature that are independent of human 
agency:  
The trees waved, brandished. We welcome, the world seemed to say; we 
accept; we create. Beauty, the world seemed to say. And as if to prove it 
(scientifically) wherever he looked, at the houses, at the railings, at the 
antelopes stretching over the palings, beauty sprang instantly. To watch a leaf 
quivering in the rush of air was exquisite joy. Up in the sky swallows 
swooping, swerving, flinging themselves in and out, round and round, yet 
always with perfect control as if elastics held them; and the flies rising and 
falling; and the sun spotting now this leaf, now that, in mockery, dazzling it 
with soft gold in pure good temper; and now and again some chime (it might 
be a motor horn) tinkling divinely on the grass stalks—all of this, calm and 
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reasonable as it was, made out of ordinary things as it was, was the truth now; 
beauty, that was the truth now. Beauty was everywhere.364 
The quotation not only demonstrates Septimus’s awareness of the liveliness in nature, but it 
also shows that this experience or feeling is predominantly of aesthetic nature. The liveliness 
of nature is emphasized in the quotation by highlighting the interconnectedness of the 
elements entering mutual “prehension,” for example by the words “stretching” or “elastics,” 
which is reminiscent of “filaments” mentioned in Jacob’s Room. Then, the aesthetic quality of 
experience or feeling is described as springing from fairly “ordinary things,” which, again, 
strikingly recalls Whitehead’s characteristic of prehension. Whitehead discusses aesthetics in 
relation to his cosmology in Adventures of Ideas where he claims that “beauty is a quality 
which finds its exemplification in actual occasions.”365 and that actual occasions can create 
beauty. An occasion in the process of concrescence merges from different parts and these 
“parts contribute to the massive feeling of the whole, and the whole contributes to the feeling 
of the parts.”366 Moreover, the beauty of an occasion is perfected when harmony is established 
among its entities. This harmony is demonstrated also in the above-mentioned quotation 
where the separate occasions in nature create one unified work of art. Whitehead claims that 
“beauty concerns the inter-relations of the various components of Reality,” which implies that 
“any system of things which in any wide sense is beautiful is to that extent justified in its 
existence.”367 As a result, it can be concluded that all things in nature, even inanimate things 
mentioned in the quoted passage, have their autonomous and irreplaceable role and 
importance as long as their enter relations with each other and create beauty. Regarding the 
interrelations of occasions that create an instance of beauty, Whitehead points out in Modes of 
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Thought that if an occasion possesses a sense of being one actuality in a world of actualities, 
then the occasion is endowed with aesthetic significance. As Shaviro highlights in The 
Universe of Things, Whitehead does not clearly distinguish between ethics and aesthetics, 
therefore, he “gives an aestheticized account of ethics.”368 This ethico-aesthetics is heavily 
grounded in the concern of one entity for another and the belief in the intrinsic value of every 
part that makes up reality: “. . . we have no right to deface the value experience which is the 
very essence of universe.”369 According to Shaviro, this is one of the key features of 
panpsychism: “When panpsychism insists on the mentality of lobsters, neutrinos, and lumps 
of granite, what it is saying in the first instance is that these entities exist pour soi and en soi. 
They are autonomous centres of value.”370 Similarly, the above-mentioned quotation from 
Mrs Dalloway shows that Woolf can also be classified as a panpsychist because the objects in 
her fiction, on the one hand, have an autonomous existence pour soi, and, on the other hand, 
relate to other objects to create an aesthetic unity.  
 Woolf acknowledges the autonomous existence and life of inanimate objects also in 
The Years where books in the library seem to be self-sufficient and enjoy their own 
experience: “As she passed she glanced in at the long windows of the library. Everything was 
shrouded and shut up. But the long room looked more than usually stately, its proportions 
seemly; and the brown books in their long rows seemed to exist silently, with dignity, by 
themselves, for themselves.”371 However, it is in The Waves and Between the Acts where 
nature and objects really come to live and manifest their interconnection with human beings. 
In relation to The Waves, Woolf writes in her diary that she wants to get rid of “all waste, 
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deadness, superfluity,”372 which she accomplishes by interviewing the characters’ lives with 
the natural cycle captured in the interludes that precede each chapter. With its focus on 
nonhuman realm, the interludes are very similar to the passage “Time Passes” in To the 
Lighthouse. Dominant characters of these passages are the sea, the sun, birds, and other 
animals. Although people are mentioned here and there in these passages, they are always 
shifted into the background. Whereas animals and other natural elements are persistently 
personified in these interludes, Woolf also captures their proper experience, for example in 
the following passage, where she describes the interaction between various animal species:  
In the garden the birds that had sung erratically and spasmodically in the dawn 
on that tree, on that bush, now sang together in chorus, shrill and sharp; now 
together, as if conscious of companionship, now alone as if to the pale blue 
sky. They swerved, all in one flight, when the black cat moved among bushes, 
when the cook threw cinders on the ash heap and started them. Fear was in 
their song, and apprehension of pain, and joy to be snatched quickly now at this 
instant. Also they sung emulously in the clear morning air, swerving high over 
the elm tree, singing together as they chased each other, escaping, pursuing, 
pecking each other as they turned high in the air.373 
On the one hand, the quotation attributes human qualities such as fear or joy to the birds, but, 
on the other hand, it illustrates Woolf’s interest in the subjective experience of birds and 
motives for their flight and singing, for example when they feel threatened by human presence 
or play with other representatives of their species.  
In his article “Ecology and Ethology in The Waves” Derek Ryan points out that in the 
interludes, Woolf attempts to capture nature’s interaction with human beings and interaction 
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between nonhuman agents before “we try to translate that affect into language.”374 He also 
points out that this explains Woolf’s recurrent use of the conjunction “as if,” which reveals 
Woolf’s refusal to apply human culture to nonhuman world depicted in the interludes. The 
conjunction implies that Woolf’s portrayal of nonhuman experience is only approximate and 
cannot translate the animal world accurately without using “the animal language.”  However, 
Ryan argues that although Woolf uses anthropomorphism, it is justified by her intention to 
“consider multiple nonhuman agencies.”375 Unfortunately, human beings have no other 
possibility than to express this agency by our tools, which means by human language. This 
“nonanthropocentric anthropomorphism”376 thus represents Woolf’s tool to decentre humans 
and explore the expression of other-than-human subjects. Whitehead discusses the notion of 
expression in Modes of Thought and extends the definition of the term beyond human beings 
by highlighting that this ability is not limited only to human beings: “Expression is the 
diffusion, in the environment, of something initially entertained in the experience of the 
expresser. No conscious determination is necessarily involved; only the impulse to diffuse.”377 
This quotation indicates that expression is a universal capacity that is not limited only to 
human beings but concerns all four kinds of social aggregations (natural entities) – inorganic 
matter, vegetable, the animal grade and the human grade. As a result, it is possible to consider 
language to be just a refined sort of expression and not as a unique means used by human 
beings. For Whitehead, and probably even for Woolf, language is not the separation line 
between nature and culture but a means how we can cross the barrier between these two 
realms.  
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Besides the natural interludes, the theme of nature that comes alive is foregrounded in 
the whole novel. At its very beginning, Woolf introduces the characters as well as nature that 
is almost described as a character living its own life: “Flower after flower is specked on the 
depths of green. The petals are harlequins. Stalks rise from the black hollows beneath. The 
flowers swim like fish made of light upon the dark, green waters.”378 Moreover, human 
characters appear to be hyper-sensitive to their surroundings and they perceive the all-
permeating nature’s life-force in their proximity. Although the world of nature and the world 
of human civilisation are contrasted in the following quotation, both seem to be buzzing with 
life:  
‘A bird flies homeward,’ said Louis. ‘Evening opens before her eyes and gives 
one quick glance among the bushes before she sleeps… Listen to the trams 
squealing and to the flashes from the electric rails. We hear the beech trees and 
beech trees raise their branches as if the bride had let her silken nightdress fall 
and come to the doorway saying, ‘Open, open.’ 
‘All seems alive,’ said Louis. ‘I cannot hear death anywhere tonight.’379 
Throughout the novel Woolf draws an analogy between the transient human life and the 
natural order, which is everlasting and indestructible. This is highlighted at the very end of the 
novel where Bernard challenges the personified Death and Woolf decides to conclude with a 
short scathing sentence: “The waves broke on the shore.”380 The sentence implies the 
continuation of the natural and indicates that human beings are just drops in the sea of natural 
cycle, which also corresponds to the basic principle of process metaphysics claiming that 
physical objects, including people, are “no more than stability-waves in a sea of process.”381 
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Consequently, death of human beings may be seen only as a part of larger ongoing process. 
The sea metaphor is extended by Woolf herself when she compares the characters to “a string 
of six little fish,”382 by which she again contrasts their smallness with grand-scale nature.  
 A world buzzing with life may also be found in Between the Acts where Woolf 
chooses a natural setting for the pageant staged in this work. The village setting and the 
animals present during the performance seem to be active participants in the play as they 
disturb the action by different noises and movements. Since the audience is so close to nature 
while watching the play, Woolf seems to blur the distinction between culture and nature by 
interweaving the animal and the human worlds:  
Look and listen. See the flowers, how they ray their redness, whiteness, 
silverness and blue. And the trees with their many-tongued much syllabling, 
their green and leaves hustle us and shuffle us, and bid us, like the starling, and 
the rooks, come together, crowd together, to chatter and make merry while the 
red cow moves forward and the black cow stands still.383 
On the one hand, Woolf emphasizes the interconnection between human beings and natural 
elements in this text, for example when Mr Swithin considers the idea that “sheep, cows, 
grass, trees, ourselves—all are one,”384 but on the other hand, she describes the animal life 
without the intervention of human agency. The following quotation captures animal agency 
inside the barn without human presence. Life leaps from every corner and crevice of the barn 
and the reader is dragged into the world of animal senses: 
The barn was empty. Mice slid in and out of holes or stood upright, nibbling. 
Swallows were busy with straw in pockets of earth in the rafters. Countless 
beetles and insects of various sorts burrowed in the dry wood. A stray bitch had 
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made the dark corner where the sacks stood lying-in ground for her puppies. 
All these eyes, expanding and narrowing, some adapted to light, others to 
darkness, looked from different angles and edges. Minute nibbling and rustling 
broke silence. Whiffs of sweetness and richness veined the air. A bluebottle 
had settled on the cake and stabbed its yellow rock with its short drill. A 
butterfly sunned itself sensuously on a sunlit yellow plate.385 
Similarly to natural interludes in The Waves or the passage “Time Passes” in To the 
Lighthouse, this passage demonstrates that life is present also when humans are absent, which 
corresponds to the author’s intention to renounce deadness in her fiction: “The idea has come 
to me that what I want now to do is to saturate every atom. I mean to eliminate all waste, 
deadness, superfluity. . .”386 
In “The Death of the Moth” Woolf also demonstrates her fascination with life that 
permeates everything in nature. While watching the moth flying from one side of the window-
pane to the other, the female observer is astonished by the life energy that makes the moth 
continue in its desperate flight: “. . . it seemed as if a fibre, very thin but pure, of the enormous 
energy of the world had been thrust into his frail and diminutive body.”387 By compressing the 
world’s animateness and desire to live into this tiny creature, Woolf recognizes that life 
energy permeates all nature from the very primitive organisms to the largest and most evolved 
ones. She compares the moth to “a tiny bead of life” around which “a thread of vital light” 
almost became visible. She brings our attention to the fact that we often forget that also 
organisms that seem to be ugly and without a sense of dignity have their own life independent 
of human beings. When the moth surrenders to death at the end of the story, the observer 
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arrives at a conclusion that although nothing can withstand death, the vital power in nature, 
which is impersonal, indifferent, and not attached to “anything in particular,”388 endures. This 
is reminiscent of the essay “On Being Ill” where Woolf emphasizes that “the wave of life 
flings itself indefatigably” and that nature always conquers.389 Another important aspect of 
this story is Woolf’s attempt to relate the moth’s experience of being itself. She points out that 
the meagre creature appears to be content with its limited possibilities and that it does its best 
to keep itself alive. She is interested in what the moth’s motive for this struggle might be. 
Similarly, Woolf imagines the rooks’ “tremendous exciting experience,” when they suddenly 
take off from the trees and land again after a while, and she seems to be astonished by the 
impulses that make animals and other organisms do what they do. This fascination with the 
motion and reactions of organisms and curiosity about animal experience, or what-is-it-
likeness to be those animals, is the main subject of Woolf’s short story “Kew Gardens” and 
novella Flush where the author takes up the perspective of an animal and tries to approximate 
its experience. In these two texts Woolf limits the use of anthropomorphism and 
acknowledges the animals’ proper mode of existence and experience, which is vastly different 
from that of human beings. 
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Beyond Anthropomorphism: Woolf’s Exploration of Other-Than-Human Experience 
In the short story “Kew Gardens” Woolf describes a day in Kew Gardens from a 
perspective of a low-grade animal, a snail, and explores the notion of “what-it-is-like” to be a 
snail. Woolf hints at the idea that animals experience the world differently than human beings 
already in Jacob’s Room where she points out that also insect has its own sense of being: “. . . 
each carries a globe of the world in his head.”390 As Derek Ryan argues in “Ecology and 
Ethology in The Waves,” this world of an animal, its experience of the environment, may be 
interpreted via Jacob von Uexküll’s concept of “umwelt” defined as “environment-world” 
where an animal develops, expresses itself and interacts with other animals.391 Moreover, to 
mediate animal experience of umwelt, and not just behaviourist observations, Uexküll uses 
anthropomorphism while examining animals and their reactions to the environment. Ryan 
suggests that Woolf uses the same technique in the interludes in The Waves while describing 
the birds’ subjectivity: “We see the movement from simply documenting an observation to 
trying to probe deeper into the Umwelt of the birds, a probing that leads to an increased 
element of anthropomorphism, but which is always negotiated tentatively.”392 In “Kew 
Gardens” Woolf does not use the first-person narration to capture the snail’s experience, as 
one might expect, but she uses the third-person voice in order to give us an objective account 
of the snail’s down-to-earth experience. The following quotation describes the snail’s position 
in the flowerbed and its experience of its surroundings from the perspective of the earthbound 
animal without the use of unnecessary anthropomorphism:  
From the oval-shaped flower-bed there rose perhaps a hundred stalks spreading 
into heart-shaped or tongue-shaped leaves half way up and unfurling at the tip 
red or blue or yellow petals marked with spots of colour raised upon the 
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surface; and from the red blue or yellow gloom of the throat emerged a straight 
bar, rough with gold dust and slightly clubbed at the end.393 
Shaviro claims in The Universe of Things in relation to the acknowledgment of lower 
animals’ and inanimate objects’ experience that “all entities have insides as well as outsides, 
or first-person experiences as well as observable, third-person properties.”394 It means that the 
only way how we can grasp the first-person experience of an entity is to evaluate its reactions 
to the environment and only then, we can assume what the first-person experience might be 
like. It is particularly pertinent for the interpretation of the above-mentioned quotation where 
Woolf pays attention to a detailed description of flowers growing in the flowerbeds, and to 
various shapes that the parts of the flowers have. Woolf thus presupposes that the animal, 
which is mentioned only later in the story, orientates itself in space by the recognition of 
colours, shapes, and light. She continues in comparing the human and animal experience 
when she points out that human movement is unlike the “zig zag” flight of white and blue 
butterflies. Then, she narrates the conversation between a man and a woman and when they 
start to disappear from the snail’s visual field, they are described as “diminished in size 
among the trees.” As Joyce E. Kelley points out in her article “Stretching Our ‘Antannae’: 
Converging Worlds of the Seen and the Unseen in ‘Kew Gardens,’” Woolf oscillates between 
“the microcosm of action happening within the oval-shaped flower bed and the macrocosm of 
people passing around it,”395 therefore, she compares the perspectives of two different animal 
species. However, the comparison and acknowledgement of the value of both perspectives is 
not the only objective of the text. Woolf also hints at the idea that the two perspectives 
intersect, and she interweaves the umwelts of humans and the snail, for example, at the end of 
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the story where a man pushes the point of his parasol into the earth, or in other words into the 
habitat of the snail: “The couple stood still on the edge of the flower bed, and together pressed 
the end of her parasol deep down into the soft earth.”396 It seems that it is the snail, whose 
private space is violated, who tells us about these passers-by. Then, the parasol is mentioned 
again when the couple are pressing it into the earth and then they pull it out to have a cup of 
tea: “. . . and he pulled the parasol out of the earth with a jerk and was impatient to find the 
place where one had tea with other people, like other people.”397 It is quite striking that Woolf 
emphasizes the word “people” as if she wanted to hint at people’s stereotypic behaviour such 
as walking or having tea, which is quite different from the snail’s routine. The emphasis on 
the word “people” also represents an abrupt change in focus directed again to the human 
realm. However, the adoption of the snail’s perspective returns, and it is intensified at the end 
of the story where Woolf mentions “all gross and heavy bodies” which “sunk down in the 
heath motionless and lay huddled upon the grass.”398 It might be suggested that if Woolf had 
meant the story to be narrated from human perspective, she would probably not have opted 
for macroscopic “gross” and “heavy” bodies. Apart from the description of the snail’s 
perception of its environment, Woolf also interprets the snail’s behaviour and shows interest 
in his reasoning: “It appeared to have a definite goal in front of it, differing in this respect 
from the singular high-stepping angular green insect who attempted to cross in front of it, and 
waited for a second with its antennae trembling as if in deliberation, and then stepped off as 
rapidly and strangely in the opposite direction.”399 Here Woolf reveals her fascination with 
the animal’s proto-conscious thinking and demonstrates that “purposes transcend mere aim at 
survival.”400 Diana L. Swanson points out in her article “Woolf’s Copernican Shift: 
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Nonhuman Nature in Virginia Woolf’s Short Fiction” that Woolf manifests in this short story 
how “other-than-human beings present in the same place as the human characters have goals 
and problems and make decisions.”401 The snail’s slow advance is interrupted by the 
appearance of other human beings. It is important to point out that Woolf does not use a direct 
and specific reference to another couple, instead, she opts for the biological term “human 
beings” which refers generically to the specific animal species and not to particular 
individuals. This reference to human beings alongside the already mentioned reference to 
people at the end of the story implies that in “Kew Gardens” humans are not the central focus 
of the story402 and that Woolf is not interested in specific subjectivity, but mainly in a general 
difference between human and nonhuman perspectives. To conclude, the short story 
exemplifies Thomas Nagel’s argument from his essay “What Is It Like to be a Bat” about 
consciousness being “a widespread phenomenon,”403 which, on the one hand, cannot be fully 
accommodated by human language, but on the other hand, we must at least try to 
approximate. Although Woolf cannot demonstrate nonhuman agency without using 
anthropomorphic language, she enables this agency to be at least “felt.”404  
In Flush Woolf moves from a low-grade to a high-grade animal realm when she 
decides to focus on the umwelt of a dog whose perspective is again contrasted with the 
perspective of humans. As Derek Ryan argues in his book Virginia Woolf and the Materiality 
of Theory, scholars have not paid much attention to this experimental novella or dismissed it 
for being too committed to anthropomorphism.405 Although the use of anthropomorphism in 
Flush is extensive, Woolf uses it in “more complex ways”406 than just to project human 
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qualities on the animal and explores the experience of the dog beyond the anthropomorphic 
perspective. She attempts to capture the dog’s experience of its environment via non-
anthropocentric means, in a similar way as she did in “Kew Gardens,” where she 
approximated the perspective of the snail by means of the play with the microscale viewpoint 
of the animal and the macroscale human perspective. Woolf seems to be intrigued by the 
animal’s subjective experience of the world and projects this interest on Elisabeth, who often 
wonders about Flush’s motives for his actions:  
Sometimes they would lie and stare at each other in blank bewilderment. Why, 
Miss Barrett wondered, did Flush tremble suddenly, and whimper and start and 
listen? She could hear nothing; she could see nothing; there was nobody in the 
room with them.407  
Elisabeth seems to be amazed by the animal’s inner life and wishes to penetrate Flush’s mind. 
In the following quotation, she is watching the dog, thinking about his self and imagines what 
it might be like to be a dog:  
She could not guess that Folly, her sister’s little King Charles, had passed the 
door; or that Catiline the Cuba bloodhound had been given a mutton-bone by a 
footman in the basement. But Flush knew; he heard; he ravaged by the 
alternate rages of lust and greed. Then with all her poet’s imagination Miss 
Barrett could not divine what Wilson’s wet umbrella meant to Flush. . .408 
This observation makes Elisabeth reflect on the idea of the self and she arrives at a conclusion 
that it is very hard to describe someone’s self only through the apparent facts that we can see: 
“Was not the little brown dog opposite himself? But what is oneself? Is it the thing people 
see? Or is it the thing one is? So Flush pondered that question too, and, unable to solve the 
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problem of reality, pressed closer to Miss Barrett and kissed her ‘expressively.’”409 It can be 
inferred that it was Woolf herself who was interested in revelation of one’s sense of self and 
in mediating the first-person experience which, however, remains unattainable through the 
means of the observation of apparent facts. Therefore, it is impossible to capture not only an 
animal’s subjective experience but also any other human being’s subjectivity. We know that 
we have our own subjective experience of the world and we assume that other human beings’ 
experience is similar, therefore, we use our own language and images to describe other 
people’s experience. This is also pointed out by Whitehead in Adventures of Ideas: “The only 
strictly personal society of which we have direct discriminative intuition is the society of our 
own personal experience.”410 Whitehead thus suggests that other than our own subjective 
experience is unknowable, from which implies that if we use human language to describe both 
another human being’s or an animal’s experience, it does not mean that we want to impose 
our anthropocentric viewpoint on them but that we simply want to approximate their 
experience.  
Similarly, Thomas Nagel points out in his essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” that “a 
specific subjective character” of a human or nonhuman being’s behaviour is “beyond our 
ability to conceive.”411 Moreover, he argues that if we tried to describe an animal’s subjective 
experience in objective terms, we would, in fact, move farther away from the animal’s inner 
experience. Instead, he suggests developing a new method that would enable us to describe 
the subjective character of experiences “in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of 
having those experiences,” which entails that we have no other means than human language to 
express any other animal’s perspective. It may be suggested that in Flush Woolf attempts to 
capture the dog’s perspective via anthropomorphism, however, she chooses a more objective 
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third-person narration implying that she only imaginatively depicts what Flush’s subjectivity 
might be like.  
Throughout the novella, Woolf tries not only to depict Flush’s specific experience but 
attempts to distinguish it from the human experience. In the following quotation, she 
describes Flush walking in the street, and she pays attention to various external stimuli that 
the dog encounters and also to the effect of these stimuli: “Petticoats swished at his head; 
trousers brushed his flanks; sometimes a wheel whizzed an inch from his nose; the wind of 
destruction roared in his ears and fanned the feathers of his paws as a van passed.”412 
Similarly, she recurrently highlights the dog’s refined sense of smell which makes him 
distinct from his mistress. The following quotation captures Flush’s unique sense of smell and 
percepts that he integrates from his environment:  
The cool globes of dew or rain broke in showers of iridescent spray about his 
nose; the earth, here hard, here soft, here hot, here cold, stung, teased and 
tickled the soft pads of his feed. Then what a variety of smells interwoven in 
subtlest combination thrilled his nostrils; strong smells of earth, sweet smells of 
flowers; nameless smells of leaf and bramble; sour smells as they crossed the 
road; pungent smells as they entered bean-fields.413  
These quotations imply that Woolf demonstrates Whitehead’s idea about humans who are 
“amateurs in sense experience”414 in comparison to the dog who is a specialist in sense 
experience. Woolf states that Flush’s sense of smell is “far beyond the range of human 
nose,”415 which she keeps mentioning at different places of the text: “The human nose is 
practically non-existent. The greatest poets in the world have smelt nothing but roses on the 
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one hand, and dung on the other. The infinite gradations that lie in between unrecorded. Yet it 
was in the world of smell that Flush mostly lived.”416 Woolf also suggests that the dog 
experiences purely human cultural concepts such as religion, architecture, or science by 
means of smell, which implies that culture, usually thought to originate from human actions, 
may be a shared space including nonhuman agents who only experience it differently: “Love 
was chiefly smell; form and colour were smell. To him religion itself was smell. To describe 
his simplest experience with the daily chop or biscuit is beyond our power.”417  
Moreover, Flush seems to be very sensitive to changes in his environment, and Woolf 
depicts his experience of these changes. The following quotation describes his reaction to the 
change in temperature in the room of his captivity in Wimpole Street: “Then the candle 
toppled over and fell. The room was dark. It grew steadily hotter and hotter; the smell; the 
heat, were unbearable, Flush’s nose burnt; his coat twitched.”418 Another example of Woolf’s 
exploration of authentic animal experience is her attribution of animal qualities to human 
beings, by which she admits that also animals impose their own perspective on human agents 
in their environment. For example, Miss Barrett’s and Mr Browning’s voices are compared to 
cooing, clucking, humming, or barking, by which Woolf acknowledges that, for the dog, 
human language is not distinct form other species’ modes of expression.   
Quite interestingly, Flush does not respond only to sensory stimuli in his environment, 
but he is also able to recognize the change in his mistress’s mood, for example when she falls 
in love with Mr Browning and Flush becomes aware of their changed relationship that is 
projected to their shared space: “He looked round him. Everything had changed. The 
bookcase, the five busts – they were no longer friendly deities presiding approvingly – they 
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were hostile, severe.”419 Flush is also able to recognize his mistress’s changed mood in the 
tone of her speech, although he cannot understand what she is talking about with Mr 
Browning: “Though he could make no sense of the little words that hurled over his head from 
two-thirty to four-thirty sometimes three times a week, he could detect with terrible accuracy 
that the tone of the words was changing.”420   
The already-quoted passage demonstrating Flush’s extraordinary sense of smell is 
followed by his runaway in search of a hare or a fox regardless the presence of a person who 
is supposed to watch out for the dog: “Off he flashed like a fish drawn in a rush through water 
further and further. He forgot his mistress; he forgot all human kind.”421 This demonstrates 
that dogs have their own free will independent of what people require them to do and that they 
decide according to their own reasoning and needs. This coincides with Whitehead’s 
classification of dogs as societies with one centre of experience, centre of agency, which 
dominates other bodily centres of activity. The same applies to man, but not to vegetables, or 
lower forms of animals, which lack this centre of “personal dominance”422 and may be 
considered as “democracies” where all centres of activity or experience are at the same level.  
Moreover, Woolf also suggests that dogs are capable of reflection on their deeds, 
therefore, they are endowed with a certain degree of morality. Analogously, Whitehead argues 
in Modes of Thought that animal behaviour is not driven merely by the pursuit of survival, but 
that certain morality is also intrinsic to higher animals: “The animal grade includes at least 
one centrality, supported by the intricacy of bodily functioning. Purposes transcending 
(however faintly) the mere aim at survival are exhibited. . . Morals can be discerned in higher 
animals; but not religion.”423 To apply this idea on Flush, it may be suggested that although 
 
419. Woolf, Flush, 38. 
420. Woolf, Flush, 40. 
421. Woolf, Flush, 11. 
422. Whitehead, Adventures, 206. 
423. Whitehead, Modes, 28. 
122 
 
the dog is capable of certain degree of morality, in contrast to his mistress, he is not able to 
reflect on abstract notions such as reality, humanity or religion. This is emphasized by Woolf 
claiming that Flush is “fresh from such problems,”424 which is a reaction to Elisabeth’s 
already-quoted reflection on reality and the concept of “oneself.” Flush’s action beyond the 
aim of survival is also demonstrated by his jealousy of Mr Browning, who usurps Miss 
Barrett’s attention. This jealously results in the dog’s attack of his enemy: “Flush sprang upon 
his enemy with unparalleled violence. His teeth once more met in Mr Browning’s trousers.”425 
After the attack Flush feels that his action was justified as he was “conscious of the rightness 
of his cause,” however, when he realizes that his mistress is immensely disappointed with 
him, he changes his mind and reconciles with the idea of Mr Browning being his mistress’s 
lover by eating the cakes that he refused to eat when they had been offered to him by Mr 
Browning:  
He would eat them now that they were stale, because they were offered by an 
enemy turned to friend, because they were symbols of hatred turned to love… 
As he swallowed down the faded flakes of that distasteful pastry—it was 
mouldy, it was fly-blown, it was sour—Flush solemnly repeated, in his own 
language, the words she had used—he swore to love Mr Browning and not bite 
him for the future.426 
This quotation not only reveals that Flush can recognize whether he commits something 
reprehensible or praiseworthy, but that Woolf is interested in the dog’s own mode of 
expression, his own language. Although Woolf, on the one hand, suggests that the animal’s 
language incompetence represents the gulf between the human and the brute, she attempts to 
deconstruct this division and emphasize the similarities between human and canine animal 
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species: “Between them lay the widest gulf that can separate one being from another. She 
spoke. He was dumb. She was woman; he was dog. Thus closely united, thus immensely 
divided, they gazed at each other.”427 
Throughout the novella Woolf explores the communication between Flush and Mrs. 
Browning and emphasizes that although they are representatives of two distinct animal 
species who cannot fully understand each other, they are still able to communicate certain 
emotions and ideas: “The fact that they could not communicate with words, and it was a fact 
that led undoubtedly to much misunderstanding. Yet did it not lead also to a peculiar 
intimacy?”428 The mentioned intimacy consists in empathy between the dog and his mistress 
which is manifested by their ability to read each other’s feelings: “Flush could not read what 
she was writing an inch or two above his head. But he knew just as well as if he could read 
every word, how strangely his mistress was agitated as she wrote. . .”429 The quotation 
indicates that Flush develops an ability to sense his mistress’s mood, which is probably a 
result of his affection for her, a typical dog trait. Jean Dubino suggests in her article “The 
Bispecies Environment, Coevolution, and Flush” that what Woolf tries to depict in Flush is 
the entanglement of the human and the nonhuman animal, the interaction between different 
animal species and how “our identity is dependent on our identity with others.”430 Whereas 
focusing on the umwelt of the dog, on its unique perception of its environment, Woolf also 
describes how the human and the nonhuman species penetrate each other’s umwelts, which 
shapes their identities and deconstruct the binary between them in favour of coevolutionary 
existence.431 Woolf demonstrates that Flush and Miss Barrett share their feelings and that the 
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agitation of the one affects the other: “Between them Flush felt more and more strongly, as 
the weeks wore on, was a bond, an uncomfortable yet thrilling tightness; so that if his pleasure 
was her pain, then his pleasure was pleasure no longer but three parts pain.”432 At a different 
place in the book, Woolf states that every movement that Miss Barrett made also “passed 
through”433 Flush and that Flush’s “flesh was veined with human passions.”434 As Dubino 
points out the entanglement between Miss Barrett and Flush results in Flush’s nature 
becoming similar to that of human species, therefore, he ends up somewhere in between 
human culture and animal nature.435 Woolf states that Flush’s character “was cultivated rather 
to the detriment of his sterner qualities”436 and that he prefers being with humans to being 
with other animal species. Moreover, the desires to possess qualities and physical dispositions 
of human species, for example to have “ten separate fingers,” “make little simple sound” or 
“blacken paper” and write poetry.437 Consequently, Flush seems to lose his unique dog traits 
and acquires human qualities due to the incessant contact with his mistress. Dubino suggests 
that Woolf anticipates contemporary theories of convergence claiming that the interaction 
between different animal species can shape and transform their individual identities.438  
However, this convergence of mutually interacting species may also be explained with 
the aid of Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism where actual occasions’ 
identities emerge from the data that they integrate, which means that their individuality is 
based on the relations with their environment. In Process and Reality Whitehead argues that 
this doctrine, when extended to macroscale organisms, implies that “the character of an 
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organism depends on that of its environment.”439 Moreover, the “character of an environment 
is the sum of the characters of the various societies of actual entities which jointly constitute 
that environment.”440 As Didier Debaise points out in his book Speculative Realism: 
Revisiting Whitehead, the contact between Whiteheadian societies—a society and its 
environment—which are aggregates of actual occasions described in terms of relative stability 
and a particular identity, may result either in the affected societies’ indifference, 
transformation or disappearance.441 Therefore, the contact between human beings, animals 
and things, which are described in Whitehead’s metaphysics as societies, may have either no 
impact, may lead to a society’s perishing, or to its transformation. The latter corresponds to 
the argument of the above-mentioned theories of convergence emphasizing “transformative 
encounters between active subjects.”442 These transformative encounters echo Whiteheadian 
“inflow into ourselves of feeling from nature”443 that ensures the continuity of human and 
nonhuman animals. This comparison is possible only due to the process-oriented definition of 
personal identity (the adjective “personal” in Whitehead’s metaphysics does not refer only to 
human beings, but also to all animals with central nervous system), which is, on the one hand, 
distinctive and “sustains a character,”444 but on the other hand, constantly changeable since it 
consists of various emerging and perishing actual occasions.  Consequently, human beings 
with whom Flush lives and interacts may be conceived as societies of actual entities that 
constitute the dog’s environment from which the dog acquires new impulses that shape his 
identity. Woolf thus explores Whiteheadian transformative effect of one society, a human 
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being, on another society, the dog, by endowing the animal with certain human qualities, 
which modifies its animal identity. However, it may be suggested that Miss Barrett’s identity 
is similarly transformed by her coexistence with Flush. At the beginning of the novella, when 
she is given Flush, she experiences a moment of intimacy with the animal during which 
Flush’s “large bright eyes shone in hers,” and she is transformed from an invalid into a 
nymph.445 The image of a nymph is significant become this mythological creature is very 
closely associated with nature rather than human culture that Miss Barrett, otherwise, seems 
to represent. Later Woolf points out that Mrs Browning “was changed, as much as Flush was 
changed” after her marriage and moving to Italy where she lived in closer relationship to 
nature. At the end of the novella, Woolf again emphasizes features of resemblance between 
Mrs Browning and Flush and hints at their intermingled identity:  
She was growing old and so was Flush. She bent down over him for a moment. 
Her face with its wide mouth and its great eyes and its heavy curls was still 
oddly like his. Broken asunder, yet made in the same mould, each perhaps, 
completed what was dormant in the other. But she was woman; he was dog.446  
The quotation demonstrates the mutual connection between Flush and Mrs Browning and 
hints at their shared traits. Moreover, it indicates that Woolf probably believed in an 
ontological bond between human beings and animals when she mentions that the dog and the 
woman are created out of the same mould. The boundaries between species are not “airtight 
boundaries” because the nature of one species “shade off into the other.”447 However, it may 
be inferred from the ending of the above-mentioned quotation that Woolf was reluctant to get 
rid of the binary between the human and the nonhuman completely, and that she also believed 
that there is a difference between the human and the nonhuman, which is the reason why she 
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cannot be criticized for exploring so-called flat ontology. Rather, in words of Whitehead, she 
argues in Flush and other works discussed in this chapter that the Rubicon between the human 
and the nonhuman, the living and the non-living matter had been crossed and that “we find 
ourselves in a buzzing world, in a democracy of fellow creatures.”448 Whereas this chapter 
focused on Woolf’s attribution of life to all existence in the universe, on her inclination to 
panpsychism, and discussed the interrelatedness between the organic and the inorganic, the 
following chapter directly deals with Woolf’s own idea of democracy of fellow creatures and 
focuses on her conception of human identity and exploration of “buzzing” interconnectedness 
of human identities. 
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Chapter 3: Woolf’s Process-Oriented Identity, Intersubjective Selves and 
Exploration of Community of Difference 
 
Whereas the previous chapters analysed the way Woolf conceives of the relation 
between the subject and the object, or the human and the nonhuman, and emphasized that the 
author deconstructs these two categories in order to explore other-than-human existence, this 
chapter focuses primarily on the concept of human identity and subjectivity in Woolf’s works. 
Although it may seem rather retrograde with regards to the previous chapter highlighting that 
Woolf attempted to weaken the strong position of the human subject, this chapter elaborates 
on the author’s idea that human subject is merely one of many other subjects which do not 
exist prior to their surroundings but originate from the natural and social environment. In this 
light, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that Woolf’s characters do not represent strong, 
self-sustained subjects, which exist independently of their surroundings, but they develop 
continuously with other subjects in their proximity. Consequently, these subjects may often be 
described only in reference to other subjects, as their identities intermingle with their 
predecessors and contemporaries. It will be suggested that this conception of identity is 
strikingly similar to the process-oriented idea of the human subject, or identity, which 
conceives of one’s identity, both mental and physical, as a complex and permanently evolving 
processes—an event. The following part of the chapter focuses on the intermingling of 
various subjects’ identities and Woolf’s exploration of intersubjectivity, which does not 
represent a mere narrative technique but reveals the author’s general view of society imagined 
as a community of interacting subjects. It will be shown that especially in her late works The 
Waves, Three Guineas, “A Sketch of the Past” and Between the Acts, Woolf focuses on the 
interconnection of human beings whose mutual bonds are also the basis of the 
acknowledgement of difference and value of each individual that contributes to the mosaics of 
“the work of art” of reality. Furthermore, it will be suggested that although Woolf is often 
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accused of being too elitist and bourgeois, because she frequently depicts struggles of upper-
middle-class characters, her late works evince certain equalizing tendencies and reveal 
Woolf’s “ontoethics,” a kind of ontological and at the same time ethical system grounded on 
interconnection, “becoming with,” and recognition of value of each part of this system. This 
ontoethics resonates especially in Woolf’s last work Between the Acts where she assembles 
vastly different characters, who are forced to acknowledge their sense of belonging to the 
community and practise solidarity, which may prevent their potential extermination. While 
this attempt to bridge gulfs between heterogeneous characters may seem very utopian and the 
interpretation of Woolf’s late works from this perspective may appear overly optimistic, it 
draws on the intimations of interconnectivity and interdependence that may be traced in 
Woolf’s earlier works. As a result, these unifying tendencies in Woolf’s fiction cannot be 
discarded only as the result of the modernist search for all kinds of “organic forms” and 
emphasis on unity but must be acknowledged as one of the aspects of Woolf’s “personal 




Human Life and Identity as an Unfolding Process 
In her short story “The Mark on the Wall” Woolf captures her idea of human life by 
describing it as a flight through the underground, whose pace and nature cannot be 
substantially influenced by its experiencer:  
Why, if one wants to compare life to anything, one must liken it to being blown 
through the Tube at fifty miles an hour – landing at the other end without a 
single hairpin in one’s hair! Shot out at feet of God entirely naked! Tumbling 
head over heels in the asphodel meadows like brown paper parcels pitched 
down a shoot in the post office! With one’s hair flying back like the tail of a 
race-horse. Yes, that seems to express the rapidity of life, the perpetual waste 
and repair; all so casual, all so haphazard. . .449 
The quotation indicates that Woolf was aware of the transience of human life and the ongoing 
effort that one must make again and again in order to survive daily struggles and also more 
serious problems. Moreover, life is something with no pre-set order, something random, and 
partly self-directing. The author offers a similar description of life in her essay “Modern 
Fiction,” where she urges modern writers to focus on capturing their characters’ mental life, 
or stream of consciousness: “Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a 
luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end.”450 This quotation indicates that life is something overwhelming, it 
cannot be ordered into separate events but must conceived as a medley of impressions and 
experience. The same idea is conveyed in To the Lighthouse where Lily Briscoe queries about 
the meaning of life and arrives at a conclusion that it is based on “miracles, illuminations, 
matches struck unexpectedly in the dark” and the eternal process of “passing and flowing.”451 
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Woolf reflects on the contradictory nature of life and identity also in her diary where she 
points out that it is at the same time “very solid,” as it is grounded on concrete bodily and 
mental experience, and “very shifting,” as it resembles a very fast passage of perpetual 
change:  
I shall pass like a cloud on the waves. Perhaps it may be that though we 
change; one flying after another, so quick, so quick, yet we are somehow 
successive, & continuous—we human beings; & show the light through. But 
what is the light? I am impressed by the transitoriness of human life to such an 
extent that I am often saying a farewell—after dining with Roger for instance; 
or reckoning how many times I shall see Nessa.452 
On the one hand, the quotation reveals Woolf’s recurrent struggle with the passage of time, 
but on the other hand, it suggests that one’s life is nothing stable and that one’s identity does 
not remain the same because it is modified in every instant by new experience and stimuli 
coming from the surrounding world. Describing human beings as “successive and 
continuous,” she does not refer merely to the fact that after we die, we are immediately 
replaced by someone else’s birth, but that our selves are reborn in every moment anew. 
Moreover, this continuity and succession also implies that one’s identity is never entirely 
separated from the others’ selves and that it is impossible to delineate one’s personality 
because it overlaps with other identities. This “collective” nature of identity is especially 
important for the analysis of Woolf’s late works discussed in the following sections of this 
chapter.  
In her essays “Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown” and “Character in Fiction,” Woolf 
discusses the way characters should be handled in modern fiction and she criticizes “the 
materialist” Arnold Bennett for creating “solid” characters who are described mainly by their 
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social and material background, and their actions. Consequently, the reader can never get the 
idea of the character’s personality. Woolf deconstructs Bennett’s notion of a character by 
means of inventing Mrs Brown, who impersonates the “shapelessness” and fluidity of modern 
characters:  
In the first place, her solidity disappears; her features crumble; the house in 
which she has lived so long (and a very substantial house it was) topples to the 
ground. She becomes a will-o’-the-wisp, a dancing light, an illumination 
gliding up the wall and out of the window, lighting now in freakish malice 
upon the nose of an archbishop. . . . She changes the shape, shifts the accent, of 
every scene in which she plays part. And it is from the ruins and splinters of 
this tumbled mansion that the Georgian writer must somehow reconstruct a 
habitable dwelling-place; it is from the gleams and flashes of this flying spirit 
that he must create solid, living, flesh-and-blood Mrs Brown.453 
 This description of the “Georgian” Mrs Brown indicates that for Woolf a character, or in 
general a human being, is ephemeral, elusive, and momentary, and that his or her personality 
changes in respect to the position in space as well as the interaction with the surroundings. 
The changing nature of a character and the idea that his or her personality may be captured 
only through significant moments of experience and external relations was also the main 
reason why Woolf struggled with biographical writing. In her essay “The New Biography” 
she suggests that a modern biographer must be able to combine truth conceived as “granite-
like solidity” and personality described as “something of a rainbow-like intangibility.”454 In 
Orlando, a fictional biography of Vita Sackville-West, the solid facts are represented by 
important events of the protagonist’s life and descriptions of the changing spirit of historical 
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periods and the intangible is manifested in Orlando’s multiplicity of selves and impossibility 
to unite these under the control of “The Captain Self,” a unitary and describable identity. The 
same tension between the tangible and the ephemeral nature of being applies to Woolf’s 
second attempt to write a biography—Roger Fry’s biography. Woolf was working on Roger 
Fry: A Biography between the years 1934 and 1940 and in her diary, she describes her 
impressionistic method of capturing not only her friend’s professional achievements, the solid 
facts, but also minute daily experience and impressions that reveal his personality:  
A question how to do Roger. Why not begin at the end with Le Mas: a whole 
day; & then work backwards: give elements in combination in action, first; & 
then trace them—give specimen days, all through his life. Le Mas: the 
mosquitoes &c. his cooking: the colour, the martins: the French novel: 
freedom— cast back to childhood.455  
Woolf describes a similar struggle to capture a person and his or her life also in 
reference to her own personality which she tries to portray in “A Sketch of the Past.” At the 
beginning she suggests that so many biographies, which she had read, failed, because they 
“leave out the person to whom things happened.”456 For this reason, she does not proceed 
from one event to another, as they happened in her life, but she starts with significant 
impressions that established the basis of her personality—the moments she spent as a child in 
St Ives. She describes the latter as moments of ecstasy experienced while lying in her nursery 
and listening to the sound of waves. She emphasizes that these moments are the key factors 
that left an imprint on her personality: “I see it—the past—as avenue lying behind; a lone 
ribbon of scenes, emotions. . . . I feel that strong emotion must leave its trace. . .”457 This 
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quotation suggests that Woolf perceived one’s past as accumulated experience and not 
necessarily collected in a linear order. This claim is supported in passages where she mentions 
that she felt as “the container of the feeling of ecstasy”458 and compares life to a “bowl that 
one fills and fills and fills”459 with experience. Later on, she elaborates on this idea of 
accumulation of the past experience and suggests that the present moment or one’s 
momentary identity is always based on, and enriched with, the past: “For the present when 
backed by the past is a thousand times deeper than the present when it presses so close that 
you can feel nothing else. . .”460 Similarly, in The Waves Louis says that he is not “a single 
and passing being”461 and that “a vast inheritance of experience is packed”462 in him. This 
may be related to Whitehead’s notion of the enduring self-identity of the soul which is based 
on the idea of succession of the occasions of experience: “The soul is nothing else than the 
succession of experience, extending from birth to the present moment. Now, at this instant, I 
am the complete person embodying all these occasions.”463 
 Consequently, it is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that Woolf’s idea of 
identity and self may be likened to the process-oriented view of identity that rejects the notion 
of the static and unitary subject because “fixity simply does not square with the character of 
our experience.”464 Process metaphysics defines a person as a megaprocess consisting of its 
mental and physical processes, where the self is “a coalescence of all of one’s diverse 
microexperience” and “a cohesive and (relatively) stable center of activity agency.”465 
Whitehead describes a person as a macro-object, in his terms a society, composed of 
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constantly emerging and perishing actual occasions. These societies are “sets of actual entities 
in the unity of relatedness constituted by their prehensions of each other”466 and they “enjoy 
adventures of change throughout time and space.”467 This indicates that for process 
philosophers one’s identity is subject to perpetual change and modification, and it depends on 
the set of actual occasions that comprise it at a given moment in time. In Deleuzian terms, 
human identity, or self, is always in the process of becoming where a subject is defined as 
“flux of successive becomings.”468 As a result, it is impossible to capture one’s identity in its 
entirety and describe it as a steady and unitary entity.469 This idea is demonstrated in Woolf’s 
novel The Waves, where Bernard mentions that he is “made and remade continually,”470 and 
Louis suggests that people “assemble different forms, make different patterns.”471 However, 
this changing and multiple nature of identity is foregrounded in Orlando not only by the many 
identities that the main character assumes throughout the novel, but also by the narrator’s 
witty reflections on the many versions of a single person:  
Then she called hesitatingly, as if the person she wanted might not be there, 
‘Orlando?’ For if there are (at a venture) seventy-six different times all ticking 
in the mind at once, how many different people are there not—Heaven help 
us—all having lodgement at one time or another in the human spirit? . . . these 
selves of which we are built up, one on top of another, as plates are piled on a 
waiter’s hand, have attachments elsewhere, sympathies, little constitutions, and 
rights of their own, call them as you will (and for many of these things there is 
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no name) so that one will only come if it is raining, another in a room with 
green curtains, another when Mrs Jones is not here, another if you can promise 
it a glass of wine and so on; for everybody can multiply from his own 
experience the different terms which his different selves have made with him 
and are too wildly ridiculous to be mentioned in print at all.472  
The quotation indicates that Woolf resisted the notion of unitary self, or a singular and 
imposing “I,” which makes only intentional decisions and presides over the entirety of its 
experience. Instead, she envisaged a more complex notion of identity based on multiplicity of 
experience, multiple centres of agency, and transforming sets of its relations, which is 
discussed in the following two sections of this chapter.  
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Multiplicity of Selves 
In A Room of One’s Own, sometimes considered Woolf’s feminist manifesto, the 
author expresses her irritation with the restrictive imposition of the unitary and mainly 
masculine “I.” This is demonstrated on the fiction of “Mr A” whose “I” imposes itself on 
everything and pushes it into the background: “I respect and admire that ʻIʼ from the bottom 
of my heart. But—here I turned a page or two, looking for something or other - the worst of it 
is that in the shadow of the letter ʻIʼ all is shapeless as mist.”473 Moreover, the unitary self 
expels heterogeneity and hinders the flow of creativity: “There seemed to be some obstacle, 
some impediment in Mr Aʼs mind which blocked the fountain of creative energy and shored it 
within narrow limits.”474 Woolf replaces this sense of unitary “I” with invocations of split-
consciousness, focusing on multiplicity of identity, or the concept of an androgynous mind. 
 Earlier in A Room of One’s Own, Woolf points out that “the mind is certainly a very 
mysterious organ,” she wonders what one means by “the unity of the mind” and concludes 
that it seems to have “no single state of being.”475 Then she continues with reflection on the 
possibility of a split consciousness, her famous definition of the androgynous mind and the 
idea that the two sexes are always present in a single identity. These attempts to overthrow 
unitary subject and its domination may be read alongside Julia Kristeva’s essay “Subject-in-
Process” and a chapter entitled “From One Identity to an Other” from her book Desire in 
Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Here the philosopher suggests that 
every linguistic theory is based on the conception of the unitary “speaking subject,” which is 
conceived as “judging, thetic consciousness.”476 Kristeva attempts to negate this notion of 
unitary self by defining “a subject-in process,” whose identity oscillates between the maternal 
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identity and semiotic drives of language and the symbolic order and unitary subject of the 
father. Kristeva provides examples of such subjects in reference to the poems of Comte de 
Lautréamont and Antonin Artaud, where the subject emerges via “representation of a 
[subject’s] different relation to natural objects, to social apparatuses, and to the body itself.”477 
This suggests that the determining factors of subjectivity are variables and that the subject 
emerges only in the instant of speaking and in relation to its relations to its own internal 
processes of experience as well as changing external setting. Moreover, Kristeva points out 
that it is primarily the artistic avant-garde who make use of the concept of the subject-in-
process in order to “attack all the stases of the unitary subject.”478 In relation to the quotation 
from Orlando, where Woolf attempts to capture the many becomings of a single being or 
identity, the author’s fiction may be read as a gradually developing attack on the unitary 
speaking subject described by Kristeva. Moreover, the quotation is complemented with a 
reflection on the key self which manages and supervises all the other selves: “This is what 
people call the true self, and it is, they say, compact of all the selves we have it in us to be; 
commanded and locked up by the Captain self, the Key self, which amalgamates and controls 
them all.”479 This definition of the “Key self” is followed by Orlando’s streams of 
consciousness and speaking for herself, during which she attempts to find her true self. As 
soon as she re-enters the gate of her family mansion, this stream of thoughts and words 
ceases, and Orlando acquires her real identity:  
So she was now darkened, stilled, and become, with the addition of this 
Orlando, what is called; rightly or wrongly, a single self, a real self. And she 
fell silent. For it is probable that when people talk aloud, the selves (of which 
 
477. Julia Kristeva, “The Subject in Process,” in The Tel Quel Reader, eds. Patrick ffrench 
and Roland-François Lack (New York: Routledge, 1998), 140. 
478. Kristeva, “The Subject,“ 137. 
479. Woolf, Orlando, 153.  
139 
 
there may be more than two thousand) are conscious of disseverment, and are 
trying to communicate, but when communication is established they fall 
silent.480 
It is important to point out that owing to the narrator’s comment that the identity is rightly or 
wrongly called a single self, it may be suggested that the narrator is ironic and sceptical about 
the concept of the static and single self, which may be deduced from the generic reference 
“they say” in the penultimate quotation, where the narrator seems to mistrust the concept of a 
single self. Furthermore, it indicates that a nonunitary and heterogeneous subject, defined as a 
multiplicity of identities and experience, comes into being only as a side effect of speech, 
because it emerges out of the ongoing process of signification where multiple selves are 
involved. In other words, Woolf, similarly to Kristeva, might have dismissed the existence of 
the “speaking subject,” or a sense of unitary self, that exists prior to its relations to language, 
or a given communication act. 
Woolf explores the multiplication of selves also in two of her essays dedicated to the 
characters reflecting on their perception of the external world. In “Street Haunting: The 
London Adventure” Woolf reveals her thoughts on identity, which she imagines as something 
multiple and subject to constant change, in contrast to the conventional idea of personality as 
a whole:  
Is the true self this which stands on the pavement in January, or that which 
bends over the balcony in June? Am I here, or am I there? Or is the true self 
neither this nor that, neither here nor there, but something so varied and 
wandering that it is only when we give the rein to its wishes and let it take its 
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way unimpeded that we are indeed ourselves? Circumstances compel unity; for 
convenience’ sake a man must be a whole.481  
The quotation illustrates that Woolf was intrigued by the concept of identity and that she may 
be classified as process-oriented thinker, who conceives of identity as of something that 
cannot be pinned down and who doubts the existence of a true self or enduring identity. 
Moreover, Woolf suggests that this idea is a mere convention that helps us pigeonhole one’s 
identity into a certain fixed category.  
The tendency to simplify and unify one’s self is also the focus of the essay “Evening 
Over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor Car” where a lady drives a motor car and contemplates 
the beauty of Sussex landscape at the sunset. The woman is “mastered” and “overcome” by 
the indescribable beauty and undergoes a sudden split of the self. The multiplied selves focus 
on different aspects of the experience and communicate with each other: “There they sat as 
the car sped along, noticing everything: a hay stack; a rust red roof; a pond; an old man 
coming home. . . But I, being somewhat different, sat aloof and melancholy.”482 The last 
words show the woman’s sadness related to her regret of the fast passage of her life. 
However, another self appears and directs her thoughts from the past towards the brighter 
future, and the woman suddenly cheers up. She starts recollecting her single self, as she 
knows that the convention is to have only one identity. However, she fails and cannot avoid 
using the pronoun “we” in place of “I”: Now we have got to collect ourselves; we have got to 
be one self. Nothing is to be seen any more, except one wedge of road and banks which our 
lights repeat incessantly. We are perfectly provided for. . . . Now I, who preside over the 
company, am going to arrange in order the trophies which we have all brought in.”483 The 
description of various selves as centres of certain affects or processes corresponds to 
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Whitehead’s already mentioned definition of a human being as a personal society. This means 
that a man is not only a series of occasions of experience, but it is a society consisting of other 
societies, or “the unity of a wider society, in which a social coordination is a dominant factor 
in the behaviour of the various parts.”484 As Whitehead specifies this in relation to human 
body, the parts of one’s body are considered to be equally important centres of experience, 
which express “themselves vividly to each other” and obtain “their feelings mainly by reason 
of such mutual expressions.”485 Therefore, a sentient being, or a self, is a complex of variety 
of experience collected by its centres of activity, which may be likened to Woolf’s notion of 
multiple selves unified by “the Key self.” Woolf concludes her above-mentioned essay by a 
sudden twist when the narrator announces the death of the individual facilitated by the 
splitting of selves:  
‘What we have made then today,’ I said, ‘is this: that beauty; death of the 
individual; and the future. Look, I will make a little figure for your satisfaction; 
here he comes. Does this little figure advancing through beauty, through death, 
to the economical, powerful and efficient future when houses will be cleansed 
by a puff of hot wind satisfy you?486 
It is very difficult to interpret what Woolf had in mind while she imagined the figure 
of the man described in the passage. Probably the modern man living in the era of economic 
progress, which forces us to restrict individual needs in order to sustain the capitalist system?  
As it has been suggested by Lorraine Sim, the essay initially draws on the tradition of 
the sublime experienced in the presence of beautiful nature, however, Woolf modifies this 
tradition by invocating and celebrating the technological progress of the first decades of the 
twentieth century, here impersonated by the speed of the motor car. Lorraine suggests that 
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Woolf explores the theories of mind and aesthetic judgement, as introduced by Kant or Hume, 
and argues that at the very end, Woolf returns to the synthesis of “presiding ‘I’ who 
synthesizes separate points of view” in favour of the unity of experience. Therefore, the writer 
aims to demonstrate that the mind always tends to “create coherent and unified 
representations of its objects.”487 Contrary to this interpretation, I would like to suggest that 
the final synthesis resulting in the image of “the modern man” is not so much concerned with 
the unity of mind but with dispersal of this unity. This claim may be justified by Woolf’s 
persistent use of the plural noun “we” and by the disappearance and death of the individual 
indicated in the above-mentioned quotation. Thus, this rejection of the individual and the 
appearance of the modern man may symbolize Woolf’s shift from unitary subject, or mind, 
towards the modern concept of multiple, heterogeneous and interconnected subjects that 
populate the author’s fiction, where “unity called ‘I’ no longer exists,”488 as well as the 
modern world where even the general scientific progress, represented by the motor bike in 
this essay, entails the urge to redefine the outdated concept of a single and separate identity.489   
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Intersubjective and Relational Selves 
In relation to the conception of her novel The Waves, Woolf claims in her diary that 
she intends to create one stream of intertwined human subjects, nonhuman objects, and other 
natural elements:  
Now the moths will I think fill out the skeleton which I dashed here: the play-
poem idea: the idea of some continuous stream, not solely of human thought, 
but of the ship, the night, all flowing together: intersected by the arrival of the 
bright moths.490 
The quotation also suggests that the novel’s characters were not to represent subjects existing 
independently of their environment, but that they were meant to be its integral parts, almost in 
the sense that they emerge from their surroundings. Moreover, the “flowing together” phrase 
foreshadows the intersubjective mode and focus on interconnectedness, which prevail in the 
novel. Woolf specifies her idea of the characters in another diary entry, where she points out 
that she wants her characters to be vague and indeterminate: “What I now think (about the 
Waves) is that I can give in a very few strokes the essentials of a person’s character. It should 
be done boldly, almost as caricature.”491 Woolf carries out this indeterminacy mainly by 
avoiding the description of flesh-and-blood characters and providing only the characters’ 
voices or soliloquies that are “shared” and complement one another. This narrative mode is 
established at the very beginning of the novel where the characters are watching a sunrise and 
the complete image is patchworked from the characters’ perspectives: 
ʻI see a ring,ʼ said Bernard, ʻhanging above me. It quivers and hangs in a loop 
of light.ʼ 
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ʻI see a slab of pale yellow,ʼ said Susan, ʻspreading away until it meets a purple 
stripe.ʼ 
ʻI hear a sound,ʼ said Rhoda, ʻcheep, chirp; cheep, chirp; going up and down.ʼ 
ʻI see a globe,ʼ said Neville, ʻhanging down in a drop against the enormous 
flanks of some hill.ʼ 
ʻI see a crimson tassel, ʼ said Jinny, ʻtwisted with gold threads.ʼ 
ʻI hear something stamping,ʼ said Louis. ʻA great beast's foot is chained. It 
stamps, and stamps, and stamps.ʼ492 
A similar instance of collective consciousness emerges in the scene where the characters 
gather in a restaurant to have dinner, and the flower in a vase on the table is described as a 
product of the collective vision of the characters: 
We have come together (from the north, from the south, from Susan’s farm, 
from Louis’s house of business) to make one thing, not enduring—for what 
endures? —but seen by many eyes simultaneously. There is a red carnation in 
that vase. A single flower as we sat waiting, but now a seven-sided flower, 
many-petalled, red, puce, purple-shaded, stiff with silver-tinted leaves—a 
whole flower to which every eye brings its own contribution.493 
However, the interconnectedness of the characters is not restricted only to their potential to 
co-create the reality around them, but it is manifested primarily on the ontological level of 
their own identities. It is mainly Bernard who provides insights into their shared selves and 
who points out that he cannot clearly define his self in opposition to the others’ identities. 
From the beginning of the novel, he manifests his ability and desire to mix with other people 
and create a community. The first instance of his fusion with the unknown crowd is when he 
 
492. Woolf, The Waves, 4. 




returns by train to London, establishes strong bonds with his co-passengers and regrets the 
necessity to take up the “burden of individual life” while leaving the train:  
I do not want the train to stop with a thud. I do not want the connection which 
has bound us together sitting opposite each other all night long to be broken. . . 
. But I do not wish to be first through the gate, to assume the burden of 
individual life. I, who have been since Monday, when she accepted me, 
charged in every nerve with a sense of identity, who could not see a toothbrush 
in a glass without saying, “My toothbrush”, now wish to unclasp my hands and 
let fall my possessions, and merely stand here in the street, taking no part, 
watching the omnibuses, without desire; without envy; with what would be 
boundless curiosity about human destiny if there were any longer an edge to 
my mind. But it has none.494 
The quotation demonstrates Bernard’s dislike of defining his identity in opposition to other 
people’s identities after he has got engaged. The character hints at the blurred boundary 
between himself and other people, and at the boundless connections he establishes with his 
surroundings. Moreover, he describes his “vibratory” identity only a paragraph later where he 
mentions that he is “trembling with strange oscillations and vibrations of sympathy”495 
directed towards random passers-by and he is “traversing the sunless territory of non-
identity.”496 Later he states that “we are forever mixing with ourselves with unknown 
quantities.”497 In relation to the transitoriness of human beings and their identities, Bernard 
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also points out that he is “aware of our ephemeral passage,”498 and therefore, he 
acknowledges “the illusory character of personhood.”499  
A similar merging with the outside also concerns Clarissa Dalloway, who fuses with 
the crowd and the street until her own identity cannot be abstracted from it:  
. . . but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, 
here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she 
was positive, of the trees at home; of the house there, ugly, rambling all to bits 
and pieces as it was; part of people she had never met; being laid out like a 
mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their branches as she 
had seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself.500 
The quotation suggests that Clarissa’s identity and subjectivity arises from the subjects and 
objects in her surroundings and does not exist independently of and prior to it. In fact, the 
identity that Woolf describes in the previous quotations has been likened to Deleuze’s concept 
of haecceity,501 which represent the Deleuzian counterpart of the terms such as “a person, 
subject, thing, or substance.”502 Haecceity is based on the relations of an element, or a human 
being, and its relations with the elements in its environment, according to which it changes at 
every instant. Deleuze exemplifies this on Clarissa Dalloway’s walks through London and 
highlights that if the character knew that she is “an event,” she would never ruminate again 
about herself being a proper subject that is either “this” or “that.”503 While walking the streets 
of London, Clarissa tends to extend her subjectivity on the human and nonhuman beings, and 
she feels “odd affinities” with “people she had never spoken to, some woman in the street, 
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some man behind a counter—even trees, or barns.”504 Similarly, in To the Lighthouse Mrs 
Ramsay is endowed with “community feeling with other people which emotion gives as if the 
walls of partition had become so thin that practically (the feeling was one of relief and 
happiness) it was all one stream, and chairs, tables. . . ”505 In The Waves Bernard confesses 
that his identity cannot be defined without his relations to other people: “To be myself (I note) 
I need the illumination of other people’s eyes, and therefore cannot be entirely sure what is 
my self.”506 Later, he expresses the same idea while pointing out that his character is 
assembled from other people’s identities: “Thus my character is in part made of the stimulus 
that other people provide, and in not mine, as yours are.”507 
In “A Simple Melody,” one of Woolf’s earlier short stories written around the year 
1925, the main character George Carslake attends a lively party, but he does not feel 
comfortable there and flees, at least in his mind, the place by plunging into his favourite 
activity—walking. He observes a beautiful and a little bit faded picture of the heath and 
imagines himself and the other attendees of the party wandering there. He repeatedly evokes 
the feeling of belonging and similarity with his company that springs from the unifying effect 
of the natural scene and contrasts it with the social scene of the party, where “everyone wants 
to shine, and to enforce his own point of view.”508 The man continues to ruminate about one’s 
uncomfortable and disagreeable connection to other people and suggests that while being 
among many people, one’s identity is “in conflict with other beings and selves.”509 However, 
the man cannot decide whether this entanglement of diverse selves brings about pleasure or 
pain, because, on the one hand, a close contact between people brushes away one’s individual 
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discreetness but, on the other hand, it also complements one personality: “People pressed 
upon each other; rubbed each other’s bloom off; or, for it told both ways, simulated and called 
out an astonishing animation, made each other glow.”510 In this respect, the story prefigures 
Bernard’s exploration of intermingling identities, which in his case also produces ambivalent 
feelings. Whereas he mostly welcomes the perpetual mixing of his personality with the 
identities of his friends and other people’s “illuminations,” at some points he seems to give in 
to despair over his inability to recover “from that endless throwing away” and 
“dissipation.”511 
Hélène Cixous mentions The Waves in her book Volleys of Humanity, where she 
rejects “authoritative” unitary subject and points out that the subject arises from various 
unconscious processes resulting in the moment of speaking and therefore, “it is always more 
than one, diverse, capable of being all those it will at one time be, a group acting together, a 
collectivity of singular beings that produce enunciation.”512 She compares this conception of 
the subject with a fictional character that is always premeditated and represents “the guarantor 
of the transmission of meaning and of the true.”513 Cixous argues that some texts could not be 
subjected to an analysis because they were not “codifiable by means of character.”514 Their 
analysis was thwarted due to the characters, who did not represent unitary subjects and 
guarantors of meaning and coherence. As a result, these texts prevent the “summarisation of 
meaning” and their characters shatter “the homogeneity of the ego of unawareness” and 
represent “off-centric” or “eccentric subjectivity.”515 Cixous defines this kind of characters as 
“subject-plus-one” and suggests that Woolf’s novel The Waves might be read via this concept 
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of multiple and amalgamated subject, because the novel’s characters constantly oscillate 
between the identity of “nobody” and “all the possible individualities.”516 In relation to 
Bernard, who represents a “subjectless” nonunitary identity and emphasizes the 
interconnection between his and the other characters’ identities, and also to Woolf’s 
polyphonic narration, which does not prioritize any of the characters, it may be suggested that 
Woolf was immensely interested in one’s identity conceived as a part of a larger whole, as 
Cixous’s subject-plus-one identity, and emphasized that the individual is always a “part of a 
larger organic entanglement.”517 
As it has already been suggested, this non-fixed, collective, and intersubjective notion 
of identity described by Bernard may also be analysed via Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the 
fold or an event, which represents a process that integrates multiplicity of stimuli and changes 
according to the newly acquired parts: “The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonies 
or submultiples such as an audible wave, a luminous wave, or even an increasingly smaller 
part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter duration.”518 These events or folds 
arise from the virtual, from singularities enriched by potentialities, which are realized in the 
actual. Therefore, these “subjects” are created from the outside and do not “exist prior to its 
orientation and instantiation in relation to its wider environment.”519 In this respect, 
subjectivity is not enduring but may be conceived as a moment and “a place within the 
ongoing movement of a wider field.”520 Every individual combines diverse elements from the 
outside, parts of other subjects, which indicates its social and intersubjective nature. This is 
the basis of rhizomatic/molecular multiplicities or identities defined by Deleuze and Guattari 
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as entities “composed of particles that do not divide without changing in nature, and distances 
that do not vary without entering another multiplicity and that constantly construct and 
dismantle themselves in the course of their communications.”521 This intermingling of various 
identities, which are described as Deleuze’s communicating multiplicities, corresponds to 
Bernard’s revelation about his own identity which is “made and remade” continually and 
“which is made of the stimulus that other people provide.”522 Deleuze and Guattari 
themselves quote The Waves as an example of a work of literature where the characters 
represent multiplicities and expand beyond its borders into the multiplicities of their friends: 
“Each is simultaneously in this multiplicity and at its edge, and crosses over into the 
others.”523 While Derek Ryan analysed Woolf’s fiction with the aid of Deleuze’s molecular or 
rhizomatic identities,524 and Rosi Braidotti pointed out that Woolf’s fiction provides a model 
of Deleuze’s  “‘plane of immanence,’ where different elements can encounter one another, 
producing those assemblages of forces,”525 there has not been an extensive analysis of 
Woolf’s focus on interconnection via Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. In The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze recognizes Whitehead as “the last Anglo-American 
philosopher before Wittgenstein’s disciples spread their misty confusion.”526 This confusion 
refers to the linguistic turn in philosophy and science, which moved the attention from 
metaphysics and ontology towards epistemology and linguistic analysis. For Deleuze, 
Whitehead represents a philosopher of the event, who built his philosophy of organism on the 
principle of “the many becomes one, and are increased by one,”527 which may be applied to 
Woolf’s concept of intersubjective identity explored in her late fiction. 
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 As it has already been discussed in the previous chapter, Whitehead’s philosophy of 
organism is based on the interrelation of natural elements or processes, whereof the smallest 
are called actual entities defined as “drops of experience, complex and independent.”528 These 
smallest particles arise from the process of concrescence, or becoming, during which a subject 
collects objective data from its environment, integrates them and reaches “objective 
immortality” when it perishes as a subject but continues to exist in other subjects that choose 
it as a part of their becoming: “The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the many which 
it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it is a novel entity, 
disjunctively among the many entities which it synthetizes. The many become one, and are 
increased by one.”529 This quotation suggests that the creative ontology, which Whitehead 
conceives in Process and Reality, is based on general relationality of the microparticles of the 
universe, which also guarantees the reality’s continuity. Interestingly, this description of 
concrescence is very similar to Woolf’s depiction of her characters’ interconnection in The 
Waves, where the identities of these characters are integrated into one entity symbolized by 
the already mentioned carnation: “There is a red carnation in that vase. A single flower as we 
sat waiting, but now a seven-sided flower, many-petalled, red, puce, purple-shaded, stiff with 
silver-tinted leaves – a whole flower to which every eye brings its own contribution.”530 The 
conflating parts of the characters’ identities are mostly hinted at by Bernard, who cannot 
separates himself from his friends: “. . . what I call ‘my life,’ it is not one life that I look back 
upon; I am not one person; I am many people; I do not altogether know who I am—Jinny, 
Susan, Rhoda or Louis: or how to distinguish my life from theirs.”531 This quotation almost 
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paraphrases Whitehead’s synthesis of the many into one and reveals the importance Woolf 
attributed to the ontological bond that connects the characters.  
Moreover, elsewhere in the novel, Bernard speaks about the overcoming of the 
individual self: “There is no division between me and them. As I talked I felt, ‘I am you.’ This 
difference we make so much of, this identity we so feverishly cherish, was overcome.”532 This 
quotation indicates that the characters have no separate identity of their own, but that they 
function only as a multiplicity where the various identities overlap and merge. Each 
character’s specific individuality is essential for the formation of the final amalgamated 
whole. In this respect, the individual identity and its facets are not lost entirely, they still exist 
and express themselves in the potential amalgam. The same applies to Whitehead’s actual 
entities which are always important per se, but also for the process of concrescence of other 
entities: “Everything that in any sense exists has two sides, namely, its individual self and its 
signification in the universe.”533  
It has been suggested by several scholars that this model of one’s identity, which is at 
the same time unique, but shared and intersected with identities of other elements in the 
environment, may be interpreted via the theory of wave-particle duality of light. While the 
light is a self-sufficient particle, it is also a wave that affects its environment, and it is only the 
matter of perspective whether we consider light a particle or a wave. Rachel Crossland 
demonstrates this on Woolf’s use of pronouns in The Waves, where Bernard constantly 
oscillates between personal and fixed “I” and collective “we.”534 However, like for 
Whitehead’s actual occasion, Crossland suggests that the two pronouns, or the two 
perspective of human identity, do not exclude each other but force the characters, as well as 
the reader, accept this dualistic model of identity: “Woolf is able to keep us aware of the other 
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side of the duality even while she is focusing on one aspect of it, as in Bernard’s ‘we are not 
single, we are one.’”535 Therefore, it can be argued that while the characters preserve their 
individual differences, they still enter a collectivity where their interconnection with each 
other is foregrounded and emphasized the mutual process of becoming of otherwise 
disconnected individuals. Furthermore, Woolf’s multiplicity of the characters in the novel has 
no centre, it is “off-centric” in Cixous’s terms, since the unifying element, represented by the 
character of Percival, is lost and cannot be retrieved when the character dies in India: “Now is 
our festival; now we are together. But without Percival there is no solidity. We are silhouettes, 
hollow phantoms moving mistily without a background.”536 
To particularize the process of becoming mentioned above, Whitehead’s process of 
concrescence is highly creative and ensures novelty in the universe due to the objective data 
that continue to exist as potentialities for other concrescending entities, which bear the trace 
of the original entity or the subject. Analogously, Woolf attributes this creativity to her 
characters, who demonstrate that they are aware of their historicity. Louis, for example, 
mentions that he is “woven in and out of the long summers and winters” and that his identity 
is plaited from diverse historical data: “My destiny has been that I remember and must weave 
together, must plait into one cable the many threads, the thin, the thick, the broken, the 
enduring of our long history, of our tumultuous and varied day.”537 Similarly, the characters, 
whose connection is invigorated by their meeting in the restaurant, re-enter the street and 
manifest their virtual mark on the upcoming becomings: “We are creators. We too have made 
something that will join the innumerable congregation of past time. We too, as we put on our 
hats and push open the door, stride not into chaos, but into a world that our own force can 
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subjugate and make part of the illumined and everlasting road.”538 The “congregation of the 
past time” and “the everlasting road” refer directly to the past, which formed a base of the 
characters’ identity and which is now modified by the data that the characters added to it. 
Consequently, each subject’s identity, emerging from the process of concrescence, is at the 
same time social, because it is connected to other entities, and historical, because each actual 
entity springs from preceding subjects or entities. The description of the process of 
concrescence of actual entities is strikingly similar to Deleuze’s concept of the subject as a 
fold, which implies that Deleuze is indebted to Whitehead in many respects:  
. . . each subject or fold is a social, physical, and historical rendering: social, in 
that it incorporates elements of the public into a singular entity; physical, in 
that it is an actual rendering of elements of the universe; historical, in that its 
formation arises from the prior and particular arrangement of previous folds, 
and problems within which it is situated.539 
Therefore, it is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that Woolf’s characters in The Waves 
may be likened to either Whitehead’s actual entities or Deleuze’s folds, since they are both 
social, in respect to their mutual connections and the fact that they are individualities created 
out of objective data, and historical, in terms of their emergence from the subjects existing 
prior to them. In this respect, it is important to point out that the novel may be seen as a 
transition in Woolf’s developing conception of her characters as she moves from the 
modernist focus on individuality and subjective consciousness towards the postmodern idea of 
fluid, multiple, and constantly changing identity defined merely by the subject’s relations and 
interaction with other subjects.  
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Referring to the overcoming of individual identity intimated by Bernard, it is 
important to emphasize that Woolf by no means suggests a kind of “flat ontology” that would 
level all the differences between the parts, which comprise subjects, and between distinct 
subjects themselves. The same does not apply to Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, where 
each entity is original as it unifies diverse data and combines them in unpredictable ways: “An 
actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ which it unifies.”540 In 
addition, Whitehead adds later that “no two identical actual entities originate from the 
identical universe,”541 which means that difference is always a part of the process of 
becoming, regardless the identical data that it synthesizes. In a similar way, Woolf’s 
characters in The Waves are interconnected by certain traits that they share, however, they 
“assemble different forms, make different patterns.”542 While each character keeps his or her 
own idiosyncrasies, their identities “converge in spite of difference.”543 The individual 
differences are exemplified by Susan’s close bond with nature, Louis’s accent, or Rhoda’s 
need to touch solid objects, and also by each character’s sense of individual identity. Whereas 
Bernard claims that his sense of individuality is so low that he “cannot be entirely sure what is 
“his self,” he asserts that Louis and Rhoda are “authentics,” who “exist more completely in 
solitude.”544 Bernard suggests that Louis’s way of expressing himself is confident and that his 
words are “pressed, condensed, enduring,”545 which is in stark contrast with Louis’s own 
perception of himself. These different extents to which the characters demonstrate their own 
sense of identity and dependence on their environment correspond to Whitehead’s societies 
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which also show various responses to the societies in their proximity. Whitehead points out 
that societies “may be more or less stabilized”546 in relation to their environment. 
Consequently, each society reacts to the changes in its environment first by indifference, 
when the society is stable enough, second by transformation, when it adopts to the new 
environment, and finally by disappearance, when it cannot persist the influence of the 
environment.547 If this interaction of a society with its environment is applied to Woolf’s 
characters in The Waves, it would suggest that Bernard is an unstable society, which is 
incapable of maintaining its sense of individuality and surrenders very easily to external 
stimuli. In contrast, Susan would be a stable society because she does not intermingle with the 
identities of her friends and preserves a close connection to her domestic environment. As a 
result, it may be concluded that the characters are at the same time interconnected, however, 
they all maintain various degrees of individuality within their assemblage of societies. Woolf 
describes the characters’ interrelated, and yet diverse nature most aptly in the following 
quotation, where each character represents a different instrument whose role is irreplaceable 
in the final symphony:  
How impossible to order them rightly; to detach one separately, or to give the 
effect of the whole—again like music. What a symphony with its concord and 
its discord, and its tunes on top and its complicated bass beneath, then grew up! 
Each played his own tune, fiddle, flute, trumpet, drum or whatever the 
instrument might be.548 
The importance of each character’s uniqueness and relevance for all the other characters, 
which corresponds to Whitehead’s idea that each individual self has “its signification in the 
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universe,”549 is one of Woolf’s recurrent motifs in her later works “A Sketch of the Past,” 
Three Guineas, and Between the Acts where intersubjectivity, as analysed in this chapter, 
acquires an ethical dimension. 
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Beyond the Ontological Interconnection: Woolf’s Ontoethics 
 While the previous section of this chapter analyses intersubjectivity via internal 
relations between Whitehead’s actual entities, this analysis might be refuted as inaccurate and 
misleading, because in Process and Reality the philosopher argues that internal relations, 
which ensure interconnectedness of various subjects, exist only between successive and not 
simultaneously existing subjects such as human beings in the case of Woolf’s discussed 
novel. Moreover, as it has been suggested at the very beginning of this chapter, in 
Whitehead’s metaphysics human beings are not classified as “actual entities,” which are 
microscopic elements of experience, but as societies or nexuses550 defined as larger groupings 
of constantly emerging and perishing actual entities, which bear a characteristic trait that 
shapes the identity of the individual. In this respect, interconnection applies to various parts of 
a single society and not to contemporary societies or human beings. However, there are 
scholars who attempt to extend Whitehead’s theory of internal relations by attributing general 
interconnectedness also to simultaneously living human beings and shift Whitehead’s 
philosophy of organism from the realm of ontology and metaphysics to the realm of ethics.  
Nancy B. Howell suggests that what feminism and process philosophy have in 
common is their emphasis on interconnectedness and that Whitehead’ s internal relations 
provide “a conceptuality for relational selfhood which arises from a multitude of 
relationships.”551 Being aware of mishandling the philosopher’s ideas, Howell insists that 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is not a closed system but something that might be 
modified in order to serve feminists and other activists, who aim to dismantle the dualisms 
rooted in the Western philosophical thought. Similarly, Joseph A. Bracken, or Jorge L. Nobo 
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tried to fill the gap in Whitehead’s metaphysics by considering contemporary actual entities, 
or societies, as parts of Whitehead’s extensive continuum, a space of potentiality where 
succeeding or concurrently existing actual entities may interact and influence each other.552 It 
is important to point out that these attempts are not entirely incompatible with Whitehead’s 
ontological system outlined in Process and Reality and therefore, intersubjectivity and 
interrelatedness of human beings in Woolf’s fiction may be analysed from the perspective of 
Whitehead’s internal relationality between actual entities. Although scholars argue that there 
is a vast difference between what Whitehead defines as actual entities and societies, the aspect 
of interconnection may be related to both categories. Moreover, it may be suggested that the 
relationality, typical of the microlevel of reality, may be attributed also to macroscopic 
societies such as human beings. While in The Concept of Nature Whitehead emphasizes that 
nature is a “complex of related entities,”553 the philosopher specifies this relatedness in 
Process and Reality where he introduces actual entities as interdependent building blocks of 
the universe. He argues that the process of concrescence or becoming, during which any 
actual entity is involved in the process of becoming of other actual entities, ensures “the 
obvious solidarity of the world.”554 Consequently, it may be suggested that, for Whitehead, 
the internal relations between concrescending actual entities indeed facilitate the 
interconnection between macro-objects in reality. Moreover, it also hints at Whitehead’s 
interest in both ontology and ethics. 
 In the same vein, the philosopher’s societies, for example physical objects and human 
beings, are never separate from their surroundings, but they always require a wider permissive 
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environment: “But there is no society in isolation. Every society must be considered with its 
background of a wider environment of actual entities, which also contribute their 
objectifications to which the members of the society must conform.”555 In this sense, 
Whitehead insists that every society “requires a social background, of which it is itself a 
part,”556 which means that a society of a single human being is always connected to other 
human beings, either directly through inheritance of certain characteristic features, or 
indirectly via connections of solidarity that permit each society’s harmless existence. As 
Valerie C. Saiving points out, if we apply Whitehead’s relationality to interpersonal 
relationship, it necessarily means that human and nonhuman beings in each society’s 
environment “contribute significantly to its individual uniqueness.”557 As a result, it may be 
proposed that Whitehead prevents the “bifurcation of nature,”558 the division of reality into 
unrelated and inert subjects and objects, by devising a kind of ontoethics, described by 
Elisabeth Grosz in her book The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism 
as “an ethics that addresses not just human life in its interhuman relations, but relations 
between the human and the entire world, both organic and inorganic.”559 
Interestingly, after experimenting with intersubjective identities and polyvocal 
narration in The Waves, Woolf seems to envisage a similar ontoethics of interconnection of 
human beings, or “ethics of interrelatedness,”560 in her late works, especially in “A Sketch of 
the Past,” Three Guineas, and Between the Acts. However, the first intimations of such theory 
may be found also in her previous works, and most explicitly in Mrs Dalloway, where 
Clarissa’s “odd affinities” with known and unknown people make her believe in “a 
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transcendental theory” according to which our inner self may attach to “this person or that, or 
even haunting certain places, after death.”561 Therefore, Woolf suggests that there may be a 
deeper bond between people apart from their spatial relations and common everyday 
interaction. The very same idea is developed further in her autobiographical essay “A Sketch 
of the Past” where Woolf also emphasizes the crucial role of social environment in the 
formation of one’s identity: “One’s life is not confined to one’s body and what one says and 
does; one is living all the time in relation to certain background rods and conceptions.”562 
These background relations are later referred to as “pattern behind the cotton wool” which 
consists in establishing intimate ontological bonds between human beings. While ruminating 
about the organic unity of the flower, which represents a perfect whole since it is “part earth; 
part flower,”563 Woolf transposes the idea of organic unity to the aesthetic appreciation of 
reality described as a work of art comprising of many interrelated parts:  
It is the rapture I get when in writing I seem to be discovering what belongs to 
what; making a scene come right; making a character come together. From this 
I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; 
that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I mean all human 
beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we 
are parts of the work of art.564 
This well-known passage, which has been analysed and discussed by Woolf scholars from 
countless perspectives, clearly indicates that Woolf reflected on philosophical issues such as 
the nature of reality or one’s relation to this reality and other human beings. While some 
scholars argue that “the cotton wool” of everyday reality and “the pattern” behind it might 
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refer to the Platonic transcendental or ideal,565 I would personally tend to agree with those 
who believe that Woolf’s fiction is entirely rooted in materiality, yet there seems to be some 
ordering principle that organizes matter on the conceptual level. Elisabeth Grosz, for example, 
calls this non-transcendental conceptual category “the incorporeal” which represents ideality 
conceived as a spatial and temporal frame of matter. Therefore, the incorporeal enables matter 
to “represent and expand itself, its load of virtuality.”566 In a similar vein, it may be suggested 
that Woolf’s “pattern behind the cotton wool” is not dissociated from the material but 
represents its integral part, which ensures relations and combinations of multiple elements of 
physical reality. Grosz draws parallels between her incorporeal and Deleuze’s plane of 
immanence and argues that it is not “Platonic order” behind the everyday but a space where 
virtual interactions between multiplicity of concepts and ideas can take place: “Rather it is the 
order where one concept can encounter another, enhance it or diminish it, and which other 
concepts must attain in order to engage in the domain of concepts.”567 Moreover, these 
encounters involve concepts “produced and developed in different times and places,”568 which 
suggests that two elements can influence each other without being simultaneously present and 
physically connected.  
Deleuze’s plane of immanence may be likened to Whitehead’s concept of extensive 
continuum, which is defined in Process and Reality as “one relational complex in which all 
potential objectifications find their niche,”569 which means that all perished actual occasions 
transformed into objective data may be integrated in the process of actualisation of other 
entities. Whitehead emphasized, like Deleuze in relation to the plane of immanence, that the 
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extensive continuum “underlies the whole world, past, present and the future.”570 Moreover, 
Whitehead adds that the continuum is a space of contact of entities which are “united by the 
various allied relationships of whole to part,”571 which corresponds to Woolf’s belief in the 
part-whole relations between members of society indicated in the quotation from “A Sketch of 
the Past.” Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s open and non-linear temporality of the extensive 
continuum and the plane of immanence is particularly important while discussing the 
interconnection of human beings in Woolf’s above-mentioned works, where even characters 
who do not know each other, or do not share the same space and temporality, affect each 
other. As it has been mentioned, Clarissa Dalloway is related to people she has never met, 
Mrs Ramsay shares a feeling of kinship with other people, Bernard’s identity is composed of 
other people’s features, and Louis’s self is made of traits that the preceding generations 
provide. Consequently, it is possible to draw an analogy between Woolf’s “pattern” and the 
two philosophical concepts and define it as a field of potentiality and interconnection where 
concepts, ideas, thoughts, and material elements encounter and shape each other.  
By dispersing hints at interrelations and unity throughout her fiction and proclaiming 
interconnectedness to be her “personal philosophy,” Woolf suggests that her focus on 
interconnection and unity does not result mainly from the aesthetic theories of her 
contemporaries, for example Roger Fry’s formalism or Clive Bell’s significant form. As 
Alexandra Harris suggests in her book Romantic Moderns, Woolf did not detach her art from 
the experienced reality and used every opportunity to disrupt “the Post-Impressionist ideal of 
immune and self-contained whole.”572 Accordingly, it may be inferred that Woolf’s 
inclination to assembling, unifying, and merging springs from her belief in general 
interrelatedness underlying elements of reality rather than aesthetic practice of a pure organic 
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form. Instead of considering Woolf’s emphasis on connection and unity a result of the 
influence of the formalist aesthetics, the last section of this chapter explores the idea that the 
unifying pattern represents the basis of Woolf’s “ontoethics.” Her ontoethical theory treats all 
constituents of reality as interconnected and therefore, there must be relations of solidarity 
and compassion between not only human beings but also human beings and natural elements 




“We Are Member of One Another”: Woolf’s Search for Solidarity and Unity Created 
Out of Multiplicity 
 
While defining his extensive continuum, Whitehead turns his attention from the realm 
of pure ontology to the field of ethics when he claims that “the extensive continuum expresses 
the solidarity of all possible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world.”573 
Furthermore, he emphasizes that each actual entity is a part of the continuum as it “pervades 
the continuum,”574 which suggests that every single actual entity is valuable because it may 
change the character of the continuum. Whitehead expresses the same idea in Modes of 
Thoughts, where he moves from microscopic actual entities to the macroscopic visible world 
and emphasizes the interconnection and worth of every human being as a part of the whole: 
“We are, each of us, one among others; and all of us are embraced in the unity of the 
whole.”575 Interestingly, this quotation is strikingly similar to Woolf’s passage from “A 
Sketch of the Past” which introduces the author’s belief in the interconnection of all human 
beings into a single work of art. Whitehead elaborates on his idea of unity and its ethical 
aspect by pointing out that each existence upholds value for itself but also for other 
individuals: “Everything that in any sense exists has two sides, namely, its individual self and 
its signification in the universe.”576 As Brian G. Henning points out, this aspect of 
Whitehead’s philosophy promotes “philosophy of organism” to the rank of “moral 
philosophy.”577 Moreover, as all existing smallest particles or macro-objects like human 
beings somehow contribute to the becoming of the whole, they should act as “agents of 
beauty,”578 so that the created whole is as beautiful and harmonious as possible.  
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The same ethical value may be attributed also to Deleuze’s plane of immanence that 
represents the dwelling of life and the virtual storage of concepts from which the actual and 
singular subjectivity arises and intermingles with all the other “events”: “For a moment a life 
erupts, it expresses its singular subjectivity, its status as event, and it shares in common with 
everything around it, living or not, the capacity to actualize its potentials, to expand as well as 
contract itself.”579 Moreover, Grosz suggests that it is this capacity of the plane of immanence 
to connect, shape and actualize singular subjectivities that helps Deleuze to elaborate “an 
ontoethology, an ontoethics” based on the interaction of conceptually related subjects and 
their milieus.  
Analogously, Woolf underlines the common and shared ground in her pacifist 
manifesto Three Guineas, where she urges the nation to fight against the threat of fascism not 
by the means of a violent response, but by realizing the fact that people are born equal and 
that it is the social order which imposes impassable divisions on them. Woolf anticipates this 
issue already in To the Lighthouse where Mrs Ramsay complains about how easily people, 
and especially children, adopt social norms and prejudices: “Strife, divisions, difference of 
opinions, prejudices twisted into the very fibre of being. . .”580 In Three Guineas, which is 
intended to be a response to a letter from an educated gentleman who asks about the possible 
ways to prevent the war, Woolf harshly criticizes the patriarchal system and its educational 
institutions which support competition between people and all kinds of aggression. Refusing 
to donate money to help rebuild a women’s college modelled on male educational institutions, 
she argues that all attempts to show one’s privileges and superiority may result in the exercise 
of aggression and hatred, and consequently lead to an outbreak of war: 
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We can say that for educated men to emphasize their superiority over other 
people, either in birth or intellect, by dressing differently, or by adding titles 
before, or letters after their names are acts that rouse competition and 
jealousy—emotions which, as we need scarcely draw upon biography to prove, 
nor ask psychology to show, have their share in encouraging a disposition 
towards war.581 
Instead of colleges that educate young patriarchal authorities, who exercise their power upon 
other people, Woolf envisages “a new, poor college” where students would be taught 
primarily “the arts of human intercourse; the art of understanding other people’s lives and 
minds.”582 Moreover, Woolf emphasizes that this new kind of college would aim to level all 
social distinctions and encourage the building of society “not parcelled out into the miserable 
distinctions of rich and poor, of clever and stupid.”583 As a result, this non-hierarchical 
organisation would enhance the interaction between all sorts of concepts and ideas originating 
in this space and support the cooperation between “all the different degrees and kinds of 
mind, body and soul merit.”584 Holly Henry points out that Woolf’s anti-violence and anti-
aggression rhetoric might have been inspired by Whitehead,585 who in Science and the 
Modern World condemns “methods of violence” and “defensive armour” and argues that 
humans should instead cultivate “adventures of thought, adventures of passionate feeling, 
adventures of aesthetic experience.”586 This is conspicuously similar to Woolf’s educational 
reform suggested above and to her idea from “Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid” that people 
can fight violence “with the mind.”587  
 
581. Woolf, Three Guineas, 26. 
582. Woolf, Three Guineas, 40.  
583. Woolf, Three Guineas, 40. 
584. Woolf, Three Guineas, 40. 
585. Henry, 68.  
586. Whitehead, Science, 206. 
587. Woolf, Selected Essays, 216.  
168 
 
After urging women to enter the professional life and disrupt the “pugnacious” 
patriarchal order without adopting its mechanism, Woolf concludes her essay by returning to 
the gentleman’s letter and the photograph of Hitler, who stands in front of ruined houses and 
dead bodies. She looks at the photograph and exhorts the reader to realize that the figure of a 
tyrant is not entirely dissociated of ourselves but that we are “ourselves that figure,”588 which 
forces us to reconsider the ways we treat other human beings. Consequently, she invokes the 
common bond that unites all human beings and “connections that lie far deeper than the fact 
on the surface”: “A common interest unites us; it is one world, one life.”589 Therefore, Woolf 
returns to the idea of unity prefigured in “A Sketch of the Past” with much greater vigour and 
insistence while maintaining the original idea about the interconnection at the ontological 
level. Although it may be suggested that throughout the essay Woolf imagines an equalitarian 
society, she ultimately argues for a society based on the recognition of difference, where 
people would enable “human spirit to overflow boundaries and make unity out of 
multiplicity.”590 
Whereas this multiplicity is only intimated in Three Guineas, it comes to the 
foreground in Between the Acts. In her diary Woolf reveals her intention to depict 
heterogeneous society, focus on community, suppress the individual “I” and replace it with 
collective and intersubjective “we” which is “composed of many different things. . . we all 
life, all art, all waifs & strays – a rambling capricious but somehow unified whole. . .”591 The 
collective “we” is achieved by Woolf’s turn to the village community which prepares its fair 
terminated by Miss La Trobe’s pageant depicting the history of England from prehistory until 
the present moment—the outbreak of WWII. The pageant is hosted by the upper-middle class 
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Oliver family in the garden of their country house Pointz Hall. Whereas Woolf’s previous 
works focussed primarily on upper-class characters, the array of characters in Between the 
Acts ranges from sellers and farmers to vagabond artists. These characters assemble to prepare 
the fair, while some of the villagers comprise the cast of the play, and the rest constitute the 
audience. As Alexandra Harris suggests, the characters are brought together to celebrate “their 
shared place,”592 their space of interconnection. At the same time this place represents the 
condensed essence of the very Englishness which is threatened by the Nazi planes flying 
above the villagers’ heads.  
It is important to point out that in Between the Acts, Woolf applies her unifying 
tendency to multiple planes. First, it operates on the textual level when she chooses to insert 
the text of the pageant into the main body of the novel without clear signalling where the 
pageant begins and ends. Although most of the versions of the novel italicize the text of the 
pageant, as introduced by Woolf’s husband when he published the work after Virginia 
Woolf’s death, Woolf’s original version fully integrated the lines of the pageant into the text 
of the novel without a clear distinction between the text of the novel and the pageant. Second, 
the novel introduces a medley of vastly different characters, whose voices often overlap or 
speak at the same time. Third, Woolf’s decision to stage the pageant outside results in an 
interesting inclusion of surrounding nature and its expressions such as animal sounds, rain or 
changing light in the scene of the play. Both the actors and the audience seem to be equally 
integrated in this natural setting. At the beginning of the performance, the audience start 
assembling, their voices merge into one humming, and the surrounding nature encircles them 
once they reach their seats: “And the trees with their many-tongued much syllabling, their 
green and leaves hustle us and shuffle us, and bid us, like the starling, and the rooks, come 
together, crowd together, to chatter and make merry while the red cow moves forward and the 
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black cow stands still.”593 Nature also intervenes in the play itself when the rain starts falling 
or when the animals’ natural noises accompany the actors’ parts.  
However, these unifying attempts are in stark contrast to Woolf’s continual emphasis 
on fragments and fragmentariness. Throughout the novel Woolf constantly oscillates between 
the sense of unity and fragmentariness which again operates on multiple planes and is 
anticipated by the gramophone’s recurrent gurgling “Unity – Dispersity” during the pageant. 
First, Miss La Trobe’s play is fragmented as it offers the story of the nation via disconnected 
scenes from various historical periods rather than a coherent story of the country’s progress 
until the present moment. Second, the novel includes characters who are not well accepted by 
the society and may be considered marginal, for example Dodge, who was bullied at school 
for his womanly behaviour and who says about himself “I’m a half-man,”594 or Miss La 
Trobe, who is not “pure English” and shares her cottage with an actress. Accordingly, the play 
serves as Miss La Trobe’s tool to assemble the fragments of society corrupted by prejudice, 
hypocrisy, and aggression, and urge the audience to unite in the fight against a greater enemy 
that endangers their existence. The urgency of Miss La Trobe’s message is intensified by 
ceaseless ticking of the gramophone and it culminates in the scene depicting the present 
moment of “ourselves sitting here on a June day in 1939.”595 During this scene, the actors 
suddenly run from behind the bushes holding pieces of cracked mirrors and glass in their hand 
and suddenly coming to a halt: “Out they leapt, jerked, skipped. Flashing, dazzling, dancing, 
jumping. Now old Bart…he was caught. Now Manresa. Here a nose…There a skirt…Then 
trousers only…Now perhaps a face…Ourselves? But that’s cruel. To snap us as we are, 
before we’ve had time to assume… And only, too, in parts…That’s what’s so distorting and 
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upsetting and utterly unfair.”596 In this way, the audience is startled by being shown their 
distorted and fragmented images in order to realize the distance and imaginary gulfs and 
crevasses that people create between them and that are now completely erased: “So that was 
her little game! To show us up, as we are, here and now. All shifted, preened, minced; hands 
were raised, legs shifted.”597 As the audience try to shy away from their unfavourable 
reflections, the images merge one into another, create an amalgam of the audience’s identities 
and shatter social divisions, and even the privileged position of the humans is dethroned: 
“What an awful shop-up! Even for the old, who, one might suppose, hadn’t any longer any 
care about their faces. . . .And Lord! The jangle and the din! The very cows joined in. 
Walloping, tail lashing, the reticence of nature was undone, and the barriers which should 
divide Man the Master from the Brute were dissolved.”598 Before the audience start 
dispersing, an anonymous loud voice comes from behind the bushes and exclaims prophetic 
truths about the state of humanity, and about the kinship that connects all people regardless 
their social status or background:  
Oh we’re all the same. Take myself now. Do I escape my own reprobation, 
simulating indignation, in the bust, among the leaves? There’s a rhyme, to 
suggest, in spite of protestation and the desire for immolation, I too have had 
some, what’s called, education…Look at ourselves, ladies and gentleman! 
Then at the wall; and ask how’s this wall, the great wall, which we call, 
perhaps miscall, civilisation, to be built by (here the mirrors flicked and 
flashed) orts, scraps and fragments like ourselves.599  
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Most probably it is Miss La Trobe herself pronouncing these words, which is foreshadowed 
earlier before the start of the play when she talks about the audience as “devil” and expresses 
her intention to “douche them with present-time reality.”600 Here Miss La Trobe addresses not 
only the village community but the whole nation and humanity, who should reconsider the 
base on which our society stands. Like in Three Guineas, Woolf emphasizes “the one life” 
that permeates all of us and urges humanity to glue together its “orts, scraps and fragments.” 
Although most of the audience are disgusted by their distorted images, old Bartholomew and 
reverend Stratfield seem to be the only ones who understand Miss La Trobe’s message. After 
the play has finished, Mr Stratfield offers his humble interpretation of the play:  
 Am I treading, like angels, where as a fool I should absent myself? To me at 
least it was indicated that we are members of one another. Each is part of the 
whole. Yes, it occurred to me, sitting among you in the audience. Did I not 
perceive Mr Hardcastle here’ (he pointed) ‛at one time a Viking? And in Lady 
Harridan—excuse me, if I get the names wrong—a Canterbury pilgrim? We act 
different parts; but are the same.601 
Interestingly, the reverend’s suggestions that people’s identities are at least partly conflated 
echoes Bernard’s claim that people “assemble different forms, make different patterns,”602 
George Carslake’s revelation from the short story “A Simple Melody,” where the man 
suggests that “we are all of us, very different superficially, but now united,”603 and Woolf’s 
own statement from “A Sketch of the Past” outlining her personal philosophy based on the 
interconnection of all human beings. Furthermore, the reverend’s emphasis on the sameness 
and importance of each individual’s contribution to the whole is very similar to Whitehead’s 
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organic conception of actual entities and societies and ultimately even human beings that are 
always interrelated: “We are, each of us, one among others; and all of us are embraced in the 
unity of the whole.”604 
Reverend’s revelation concerning the interconnectedness of individuals is anticipated 
earlier in the novel by Mrs Swithin, who contemplates human identity in relation to changing 
historical background and concludes that people are the same and they only change their 
garments: “‘I don’t believe’ she said with her odd little smile, ‘that there ever were such 
people [the Victorians]. Only you and me and William dressed differently.’”605 Therefore, the 
woman acknowledges the process-like conception of identity where past actual entities do not 
vanish but continue living in future occasions, whose nature in predetermined by the past data 
that they integrate. People’s identity does not change fundamentally, but it is modified by the 
external data that vary and change with the historical context. Moreover, Mrs Swithin also 
arrives at a revelation about the ontological bond between people and imagines “discordant 
harmony,” a heterogeneous, yet unified, work of art composed of the individuals that are all 
equally important, which is reminiscent of the passage from The Waves, where the 
interconnection of the characters is symbolized by various instruments’ parts in a single 
symphony:  
She was off, they guessed, on a circular tour of imagination—one-making. 
Sheep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves—all are one. If discordant, producing 
harmony—if not to us, to a gigantic ear attached to a gigantic head. And thus— 
she was smiling benignly—the agony of the particular sheep, cow or human 
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being is necessary; and so—she was beaming seraphically at the gilt vane in 
the distance—we reach the conclusion that all is harmony, could we hear it.606 
It may be concluded that Woolf’s recurrent evocation of unity, interconnection, and 
one-making effort are not only the result of the modernist formalist aesthetics focusing on 
balance, unity, and oneness, but that they are characteristic of Woolf’s thinking about society, 
interpersonal relationships, and social justice in her late works. Had Woolf’s one-making been 
just the result of the modernist worship of structure, unity, and coherence, she would not have 
paid so much attention to these unifying tendencies, especially in her late works, which in 
many respects undermine the modernist aesthetics. This alienation from the pure formalist 
aesthetics is manifested in The Waves, where Woolf prefigures postmodern aesthetics by 
attacking the idea of stable personhood, or more importantly in Between the Acts, where 
Woolf turns away from the formalist aesthetics and celebrates aspects of a work of art that 
Roger Fry dismissed.607 This separation from Fry’s doctrines may be seen in Woolf’s constant 
interweaving of her art and reality, and it is embodied by Miss La Trobe, who represents a 
formalist artist who wants to stick to her unity of premeditated design, however, it is 
constantly disrupted by external influences such as the weather, animals, or the audience.  
Whereas Between the Acts is not postmodern only in terms of its formal aspects, for 
example its use of metanarrative, beginning in medias res, and open-endedness, it anticipates 
the philosophical debates of the second half of the twentieth century in its focus on diversity 
and difference, which has often been neglected by simply classifying Woolf as a modernist 
and formalist artist, who responded to the upcoming war by turning to the depiction of 
Englishness represented by the rural community. Although Woolf insists so much on unity, 
ontological bond between people, and their common ground in Between the Acts, it does not 
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mean that she envisages a homogeneous society. On the contrary, her constant oscillation 
between unity and fragmentariness enables her to “make unity out of multiplicity,”608 or 
“discordant harmony.”609 In accordance with her intention to create “we” composed of 
heterogeneous and vastly different elements, Woolf no longer focuses only on privileged 
upper-class individuals like in her earlier novels, but she employs a variety of characters and 
includes also the marginal ones. In this respect, the novel is highly inclusive, which is also 
indicated by reverend Stratfield, who finishes his interpretation of the play by his internal 
thoughts on Albert, mentally ill boy who collects money at the end of the play: “The good 
man contemplated the idiot benignly. His faith had room, he indicated, for him too. He too, 
Mr Streatfield appeared to be saying, is a part of ourselves. But not a part we like to 
recognise, Mrs Springett added silently, dropping her sixpence.”610 The quotation 
demonstrates that Woolf attempted to give voice also to characters who are often ostracized 
by society for their difference, or otherness, and that even these characters may be essential 
parts of the whole piece of art called humanity. The same degree of otherness and difference 
applies also to Miss La Trobe, who is despised by most of the characters and wants to 
demonstrate the society’s ill-doings by her play, or Dodge, who is mocked for his womanly 
nature. Moreover, Woolf also lets the characters speak their proper words without trying to 
polish them and she also makes use of working-class villagers.  
As a result, the novel cannot be primarily associated with the tradition of high 
modernism focusing on white upper-class individuals and homogeneity but should rather be 
analysed as a novel celebrating Bakhtin’s hybridity and heteroglossia, the two concepts by 
which the critic opened new “hybrid” perspectives on modernist literature. Bakhtin linked 
heteroglossia, or the mixture of voices, with novels that employ a diversity of social speech 
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types, and suggested that it is facilitated also by heterogeneous design and structure of the 
work of art in question:  
Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of 
characters are merely those fundamental compositional unities with whose help 
heteroglossia can enter the novel; each of them permits a multiplicity of social 
voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships (always more or 
less dialogized).611  
Woolf meets these preconditions of heteroglossia by intermingling the third-person narrator, 
the voices of the characters, Miss La Trobe’s stage directions, internal thoughts of the 
characters, and background natural noises. Moreover, she inserts a play within the novel and 
attempts to provide a concise history of England and her literature alongside the main village 
fair plot. This heteroglossia ensures the inclusive nature of the novel’s community and is 
closely related to Woolf’s use of the carnivalesque, which enables the author to draw 
connections, establish a dialogue between the novel’s characters and overthrow the hierarchy 
of the centre and the margin, or the superior and the inferior. Bakhtin did extensive research 
into the medieval festivals while writing his book Rabelais and His World, where he analyses 
the carnivalesque in Rabelais’s fiction. He pointed out that during the medieval carnival time 
social ranks were levelled and ordinary people could treat the privileged social ranks as 
equals:  
This temporary suspension, both real and ideal, of hierarchical rank, created 
during carnival time a special type of communication impossible in everyday 
life. This led to the creation of special kinds of marketplace speech and gesture, 
frank and free, permitting no distance between those who came into contact 
 




with each other and liberating them from norms of etiquette and decency 
imposed at other times.612    
Christopher Ames argues very persuasively that Woolf experiments with the concept of 
carnivalesque in Between the Acts, and emphasizes that Woolf’s attempt to write “festive 
comedy” enables the author to “exploit the comic potential of a similar mingling of high and 
low,”613 and ultimately take advantage of the inclusive aspect of the carnivalesque. This is 
achieved by interchanging social statuses of the characters, for example when she lets an 
ordinary seller play the part of Queen Elisabeth, the use of colloquial language and linguistic 
play, for example in the form of “alliteration, assonance, rhyme and onomatopoeia,”614 which 
evoked the above-mentioned free language of the marketplace, and finally by blurring the 
distinction between the audience and the actors. For example, Woolf’s experiment with 
intermingling and one-making deprives Albert of his label of the “village idiot” rooted in the 
local community and enables him, at least temporarily, to become an integral and important 
part of the community while he performs several parts in the play and collects donations at its 
end. Eliza Clark, an ordinary tobacco seller, is transformed into queen Elizabeth and she has 
the opportunity of her lifetime to appear “eminent and dominant.”615 
After the play finishes, the audience start to disperse, and Woolf lets the people’s 
voices speak one over another as they pronounce fragmented judgments on the play that they 
have just seen. Whereas some of the audience find the play brilliant, most of them seem to be 
taken aback by the reverend’s interpretation of the play implying that “we all act all parts,”616 
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“one spirit animates the whole”617 and that “we are members one of another.”618 This 
indicates that the play was at least partly successful as far as Miss La Trobe’s intention to 
show the fragmented state of the contemporary society, and urge the audience to unite, are 
concerned.  
To conclude, it is important to point out that in Between the Acts Woolf “embraces 
plurality and difference,”619 both at the formal and thematic level, much more than in any 
other of her novels. While portraying very diverse characters who are, nevertheless, 
interconnected at the ontological level, Woolf seems to be hinting at the possible loss of 
difference and uniformization associated with the Nazi ideology that threatens the English 
nation embodied by the community assembled for the performance of Miss La Trobe’s play. 
In this respect, this interpretation of Woolf’s last novel Between the Acts counters the analysis 
of Jed Esty, who in his book A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England 
argues that the novel’s focus on local country community springs from the failure of interwar 
urban cosmopolitanism620 and that Woolf turns to the national and local to depict English 
particularism.621 According to Esty, in Between the Acts Woolf expresses her patriotism and 
revives the sense of Englishness due to the slow process of “shrinking” of the British Empire. 
However, this reading is highly reductive and neglects Woolf’s frequent irony and criticism of 
the British Empire and her dislike of ardent nationalism and patriotism foregrounded in Three 
Guineas or in her diary, where she admits that she does not like “any of the feelings war 
breeds: patriotism, communal &c, all sentimental & emotional parodies of our real 
feelings.”622 In fact, Esty’s interpretation ignores Woolf’s humanist project that originated in 
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Three Guineas, where Woolf argues for the exaltation of transnational values such as peace 
and social justice, acknowledgement of difference, and universal collaboration between 
people. In Between the Acts this humanist, and probably also post-humanist and utopian, 
project reaches its apogee while Woolf does not limit the interconnection of human being 
merely to the local English community but includes, or at least mentions, people of different 
national backgrounds, and animals alike. Nor Miss La Trobe, neither Mr and Mrs Manresa are 
of “pure English”623 origin and they represent the diversity and inclusiveness of the British 
democratic tradition. Moreover, Woolf briefly mentions Jewish refugees who were fleeing the 
continental Europe at the time, and she recognizes their right to integrate in the British nation 
and start a new life: “‘And what about the Jews? The refugees…the Jews…People like 
ourselves, beginning life again…’”624 Similarly, Miss La Trobe’s pageant promotes diversity 
not only by its mixture of various genres and periods of British literature and history, but by 
emphasizing the difference within the British Empire. It does not forget to mention its “black 
men”625 or “a pot pourri”626 associated with the Indian culture. Therefore, the artist may be 
seen as a demiurge, who is “not merely a twitcher of individual strings” but a person who 
“seethes wandering bodies and floating voices in a cauldron, and makes rise up from its 
amorphous mass a recreated world.”627 Interestingly, Woolf uses the word “cauldron” in The 
Waves, when she points out that the characters create a cauldron “of six little fish that let 
themselves be caught while a million others leap and sizzle, making the cauldron bubble like 
boiling silver.”628 This quotation indicates Woolf’s inclusiveness that does not prioritize the 
characters of The Waves but also other people that constantly interact with the characters.  
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Furthermore, as Sam Wiseman points out, Woolf intentionally fails to describe what 
“Englishness” means, and she offers a very wide and vague conception of the term, which is 
even intensified by her decision not to determine the location of Pointz Hall and depict “land 
merely, no land in particular.”629 This implies that Woolf’s project of her late works, which all 
deal with the war and socio-political conditions of the period, was conceived much broadly 
than as a mere retreat from the war to local community in the very heart of England. 
Following her exploration of intersubjectivity in The Waves, criticism of the Empire in The 
Years, her exhortation to undermine all forms of oppression and aggression, and search for 
new ways of connection in Three Guineas culminate in Between the Acts where Woolf 
imagines “a mellay; a medley” both on the structural and thematic planes. Elaborating on her 
idea of “personal philosophy” outlined in “A Sketch of the Past,” she presents miscellaneous 
characters as ontologically interconnected and shifts those on the margin to the centre and 
vice versa, which leads to the final exclusion of the centre and focus on value of each 
individual. Similarly to Whitehead, who envisages an “ontoethics” based on the 
interconnection and appreciation of each element of reality which represents “an attempt to 
forge new expressions, new hi/stories that matter,”630 Woolf’s late works also introduce the 
author’s personal speculative philosophy, which urges “her readers to see and think 
differently”631 and question the established modes of power, oppression and exclusion. 
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Chapter 4: Woolf’s Criticism of Anthropocentrism and Exploitation of 
Nature 
 
The last chapter elaborates on the previous three chapters which focused on Woolf’s 
destabilization of the subject/object dualism, undermining of the culture/nature division and 
the criticism of strong sense of one’s individuality. To draw a logical conclusion, it may be 
inferred from this brief summary of the previous chapters that Woolf, in many respects, 
anticipated the philosophical and activist discourses of the late 20th century which criticize the 
strong position of human subjects, hint as the perpetual destruction of nature resulting from 
the human appropriation of the natural world and focus on the interrelatedness of all natural 
entities. As it has been pointed out in the previous chapters, Woolf’s fiction foreshadows the 
postmodern criticism of anthropocentrism and anticipates contemporary flourishing of 
ecological and environmentally oriented thought. To elaborate on Woolf’s idea that human 
life consists not only in “personal relations” but in “our emotions toward such things as roses 
and nightingales,” this chapter explores Woolf’s characters’ interrelation with nature and the 
author’s criticism of human domination and exploitation of nature. Interestingly, this tendency 
to “belittle” the position of the human is manifested also in the works of the other 
Bloomsbury Group’s members, which may be ascribed to the influence of Roger Fry’s 
interest in the parallels between nature and aesthetics. As Peter Adkins points out, Fry was a 
close friend of Edward Carpenter, a radical socialist and activist, whose books focus on “the 
environmental cost of industrialized capitalism.”632 This possible influence on Fry’s 
reconsideration of the relationship between the human and the natural, along with the 
scientific discoveries, which undermined the human ability to fully describe all the 
complexities of natural phenomena, resulted in Fry’s aesthetic theory of Post-Impressionism, 
which claims that artists should not provide an illusion of nature, its copy or truthful 
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representation, but capture the relation established between the natural object and the artist.633 
Woolf, more than any other writer associated with the Bloomsbury Group, was concerned 
with the changing relation between human agents and their natural environment, and as it will 
be illustrated, her fiction also handles environmental issues connected with the human 
treatment and abuse of nature. Without resorting to envisagement of an abstract aesthetic 
theory of nature,634 Woolf expresses her concern with the crisis of nature, regarded as a 
consequence of modernization, and deals with the relationship between the human and the 
natural directly in her writing. As a result, she reimagines the traditional subject/object 
perspective of this issue and draws the readers’ attention back to, on the one hand, primitive 
but, on the other hand, sustainable and non-exploitative human companionship with nature.  
The natural turn in Woolf’s fiction is explored in this chapter via the characters’ sense 
of belonging to their physical environment, Woolf’s suppression of the human, and the idea of 
the world “seen without a self” imagined in natural interludes of The Waves and the transition 
passage “Time Passes” in To the Lighthouse. Moreover, the chapter discusses Woolf’s 
criticism of capitalist, imperialist, and consumerist society presented in her essays “The 
Docks of London,” “Thunder at Wembley,” or “Oxford Street Tide.” These issues are 
analysed with the aid of Whitehead’s “proto-ecological” philosophy and environmental ethics 
based on process-oriented thought, which also questions the superior position of human 
subjects and insists on their interrelation with natural elements in their environment. 
Whitehead’s metaphysics of intersubjectivity discussed in the previous chapter is particularly 
pertinent to the current discussions about the Anthropocene described as “the time when 
nonhumans are rapidly emerging from the background and intertwining with humans in the 
foreground.”635 Moreover, the human and the natural are considered interdependent in the 
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Anthropocene. Regarding the idea that every actual occasion, meaning every element in 
nature/reality, has significance for itself and for the others, Whitehead’s metaphysics may 
serve as a very useful basis for environmentalists, who search for “solidarity with 
nonhumans.”636 Interestingly, Woolf seems to creatively anticipate these debates of the 
Anthropocene’s interrelation between the human and the inhuman and she hints at the danger 
that springs from anthropocentrism. The organic unity of the community analysed in the 
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Characters as Integral Parts of Their Natural Environment 
Following the discussion from the first chapter, where it has been suggested that 
Woolf overthrows the dualism of the subject and the object in order to place all the 
constituents of reality at the same ontological plane and undermine the traditional idea of a 
subject as an active “doer” and an object conceived as a passive, brute, inert piece of matter, 
the following section elaborates on the idea that Woolf’s subjects may easily become objects 
and vice versa. This interchange leads to the reconsideration of the validity of the 
nature/culture dichotomy. It has been pointed out that every subject of experience, either the 
microscopic “actual occasion,” or macroscopic “society” requires a permissive environment 
of other entities, which are at the same time subjects of experience and objects for the 
“prehension” or feeling of other entities. It has been illustrated in relation to Mrs Ramsay, 
Clarissa Dalloway, or Bernard, that subjectivity, or individuality, springs from the objective 
reality around them and does not exist prior to them. In this way, the subjects are very closely 
connected to their environments, from which they can be separated only with a great 
difficulty. The above-listed characters from Woolf’s fiction demonstrate continuity with their 
natural environment, whose elements are described as overlapping with those of the 
characters’ bodies. Clarissa Dalloway seems to indulge in connections to her surroundings 
which are integrated in her own identity, for example when she is described as “being part of 
the trees at home; of the house there.”637 Clarissa experiences a similar connection to the 
natural world and the loss of sense of being herself while buying the flowers in Miss Pym’s 
shop, where she “breathed in the earthy garden sweet smell”638 and plunged into a moment of 
being, a moment of ecstasy. When going home on a bus on Shaftesbury Avenue, Clarissa 
reflects on her ability to be continuous with her environment and to disperse her selfhood 
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throughout her surroundings: “. . . she felt herself everywhere; not ‘here, here, here’; and she 
tapped the back of the seat; but everywhere. She waved her hand, going up Shaftesbury 
Avenue. She was all that.” Clarissa’s subjectivity unfolds in the physical world around her 
and she is an indispensable part of it. Similarly, Septimus also reveals his subjectless 
personality throughout the novel and emphasizes his interconnection with his surroundings. In 
his sudden surges of phantasmagorical visions affecting his shell-shocked mind, he seems to 
be hypersensitive to his natural environment and extremely conscious of his body being a part 
of the natural world: “And the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his own 
body. . .”639 At the moments of greatest ecstasy, he seems to go through out-of-body 
experience when his body is “macerated until the nerves fibres were left” and the only thing 
that he perceives is his connection with nature. He loses control over his body and plunges in 
unembodied experience because his body becomes “one more object in that world, bobbing 
up and down in the breeze along with the trees, feathers and birds”640: “He lay very high, on 
the back of the world. The earth thrilled beneath him. Red flowers grew through his flesh; 
their stiff leaves rustled by his head.”641 In these instances, Septimus’s wife Rezia also turns 
into “a flowering tree.”642 The quotations indicate that Septimus regards his body as 
“transcorporeal,”643 because it creates an assemblage and intermeshes with the nonhuman. 
The concept of transcorporeality introduced by Stacy Alaimo is strikingly similar to 
Whitehead’s idea of one’s body as indistinguishable from the surrounding nature, which is 
discussed later. Analogously, Clarissa also sometimes seems to be oblivious of her body, 
which becomes transparent and perceives only a pure experience of the external:  
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. . . a single figure against the appalling night, or rather, to be accurate, against 
the stare of this matter-of-fact June morning; soft with the glow of rose petals 
for some, she knew, and felt it, as she paused by the open staircase window 
which let in blinds flapping, dogs barking, let in, she thought, feeling herself 
suddenly shrivelled, aged, breastless, the grinding, blowing, flowering of the 
day, out of doors, out of the window, out of her body and brain. . .644 
Both Clarissa and Septimus represent Woolf’s characters who are very closely intertwined 
with the natural world, which is also seen as basically animate and experiential, as it has been 
suggested in the second chapter. Therefore, they may be interpreted as the writer’s means to 
criticize the separation between the human and the nonhuman world maintained by the 
science of the then period, which was marked by great advancements in industrialization, 
modernization, and globalization.645  
A similar interconnection of one’s intimate bond with nature is also the subject of 
Woolf’s short story “In the Orchard,” where the main female character is lying on a long chair 
under a tree in an orchard, and Woolf repeatedly evokes her appearance as translated into the 
language of nature:  
The opals on her finger flushed green, flushed rosy, and again flushed orange 
as the sun, oozing through the apple-trees, filled them. Then, when the breeze 
blew, her purple dress rippled like a flower attached to a stalk; the grasses 
nodded; and the white butterfly came blowing this way and that just above her 
face.646 
The harmony between the natural and the human entities, and the human similarity to natural 
phenomena described in the quotation, recurs in the story also in relation to the action and 
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noises produced by the humans and nature. The leaves of apple-trees start to tremble and 
“chime” due to the loud sound of the local church’s organ. Conversely, the sound of the organ 
is “cut into atoms by a flock of fieldfares.”647 Moreover, the woman’s body is described as 
embedded in its natural environment, analogously to the transcorporeality of Septimus’s or 
Clarissa’s bodies: “. . . then she smiled and let her body sink all its weight on to enormous 
earth which rises, she thought, to carry me on its back as if I were a leaf, or a queen. . .”648 At 
the end of the story, Woolf erases the character completely and mentions only that the female 
character’s “purple dress stretched between the two apple-trees,” and then she provides a 
lengthy description of the natural harmony and self-sufficiency that reigns in the orchard: 
“There were twenty-four apple-trees in the orchard, some slanting slightly, others growing 
straight with a rush up the trunk which spread wide into branches and formed into round red 
or yellow drops. . .”649 This detailed depiction continues until the last line of the story, where 
Woolf brackets Miranda’s sudden realisation of losing so much time in the orchard: “The 
wind changing, one bunch of apples was tossed so high that it blotted out two cows in the 
meadow (‘Oh, I shall be late for tea!’ cried Miranda), and the apples hung straight across the 
wall again.”650 Interestingly, the bracket put around the human verbal expression and 
experience might foreshadow Woolf’s deliberate placement of human events in bracket in To 
the Lighthouse, where the human is intentionally pushed aside in the central passage “Time 
Passes.” 
In The Waves Woolf also foregrounds the relation of the characters to their 
environment and it is particularly Louis and Susan who are described as directly connected to 
it. Louis identifies with his natural surroundings in the following quotation, which is repeated 
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in multiple alterations throughout the novel: “I hold a stalk in my hand. I am the stalk. My 
roots go down to the depths of the world, through earth dry with bricks, and damp earth, 
through veins of lead and silver.”651 Only a passage later he elaborates on this identification, 
when he completely merges with the greenery around him: “I am green as a yew tree in the 
shade of the hedge. My hair is made of leaves. I am rooted to the middle of the earth. My 
body is a stalk.”652 Susan is also interconnected with her natural environment around her, but 
unlike Louis, this environment is her domestic scene at her father’s farm. She indulges in the 
experience of her sense of possession and belonging, which results in the feeling that “her 
body is like the ‘body’ of the earth”653 :  
At this hour, this still early hour, I think I am the field, I am the barn. I am the 
trees; mine are the flocks of birds, and this young hare who leaps, at the last 
moment when I step almost on him. Mine is the heron that stretches its vast 
wings lazily; and the cow that creaks as it pushes one foot before another 
munching; and the wild, swooping swallow; and the red faint in the sky, and 
the green when the red fades; the silence and the bell; the call of the man 
fetching cart-horses from the fields—all are mine.654 
These quotations suggest that Woolf was extremely concerned with her characters’ 
relation to nature and that this close connection is realized mainly via the experience of their 
bodies which represent places of contact with the physical world. Therefore, the body is not 
just a mere physical case for the soul, but rather the wheel of lived experience655 that mediates 
the characters’ entanglement with objects in nature. Moreover, this identification with the 
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natural elements anticipates Woolf’s proto-environmental thinking revealed in the essay “The 
Docks of London” and “Thunder at Wembley” discussed later in this chapter. 
As a philosopher, who rejected the scientific materialism that sustains the inertness of 
physical objects and the division between the human and the natural/psychical world, 
Whitehead emphasizes throughout his work that the human subject, or any other experiential 
subject, is inseparably linked to his or her environment, and that there is no distinct line 
between the two. As it has already been suggested in the first chapter regarding the erasure of 
the subject/object dichotomy in Whitehead’s metaphysical system, all subjects in reality are 
endowed with the capacity to “experience” the world around them, and this surroundings 
substantially contributes to their emergence as individual subjects. In Modes of Thought 
Whitehead elaborates on the idea and refers directly to the human body, which he considers to 
be an integral part of its environment:  
We think of ourselves as so intimately entwined in our bodily life that a man is 
a complex unity—body and mind. But the body is part of the external world, 
continuous with it. In fact, it is just as much part of nature as anything else—a 
river, or a mountain, or a cloud. Also, if we are fussily exact, we cannot define 
where a body begins and where external nature ends.656 
This quotation indicates that Whitehead believed in inseparability of one’s body from their 
environment in a very similar way to Woolf in the above-mentioned quotations. The quotation 
unveils that the body is of equal importance like all the other natural entities, and that the 
human tendency to put our body on airs is no longer justified. To give an example of this 
entwinement, Whitehead mentions a molecule that is a part of nature, enters our body, gets 
absorbed, and we cannot say at which points the molecule leaves our body, or whether it stays 
in it permanently. For this reason, Whitehead argues that “the body is very vaguely 
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distinguishable from external world” and consequently, it must be regarded only as “one 
among other natural objects.657 In this respect, Clare Palmer suggests that Whitehead’s idea of 
human subjects continuous with the environment is analogous to the notion of “extended self” 
of deep or “transpersonal” ecology. This concept is introduced in Warwick Fox’s book 
Towards a Transpersonal Ecology and it is based on the “dissolution of boundaries” between 
the individual and his or her environment,658 which results in one’s awareness of nature’s 
fragility and respectful behaviour towards it.  
In line with the description of the notion of extended subject, Woolf’s characters, 
whose identities intermix with other human and nonhuman subjects, may be likened to deep 
ecology’s subjects, who erase the distinction between “us,” our body, and nature. This 
indistinct line between the body and its environment is encapsulated in Bernard’s quotation 
from The Waves, where he insists on the fact that our body is constantly enriched by 
molecules or data coming from the outside: “We are forever mixing ourselves with unknown 
entities.”659 This intermingling of the human and the natural molecules in also hinted at in To 
the Lighthouse, where in the last section Cam is sailing on a boat with her father to the 
Lighthouse and she experiences an extremely close connection to her natural environment 
while she plunges her hand into the water:  
Her hand cut a trail in the sea, as her mind made the green swirls and streaks 
into patterns, and numbed and shrouded, wandered in imagination in that 
underworld of waters. . . . Then the eddy slackened round her hand. The rush of 
the water ceased; the world became full of little creaking and squeaking 
 
657. Whitehead, Modes, 144.   
658. Clare Palmer, “Identity, Community and the Natural Environmnet: Some Perspectives 
from Process Thinking,” Worldviews 2, no. 3 (1998): 263–264, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43809665. 
659. Woolf, The Waves, 66. 
191 
 
sounds. One heard the waves breaking and flapping against the side of the boat 
as if they were anchored in harbour. Everything became very close to one.660 
The quotation suggests how an intimate contact with the natural phenomena, here Cam’s 
connection with water, intensifies one’s mental and experiential faculties, and makes one 
strengthen his or her sense of belonging and interconnection with the environment. In fact, 
Cam experiences the moment when a person becomes “part of the nature of things,”661 which 
is foreshadowed by Lily earlier in the novel while she artist is watching Mr Ramsay’s boat 
that vanishes is the distance. 
While the previous chapter analysed this interconnection only in terms of social 
relationships, it is important to point out here that this entanglement equally includes the 
animate and inanimate nature, which is illustrated in the above-quoted passages. 
Consequently, it may be suggested that Woolf’s characters’ entanglement with natural 
elements anticipates contemporary ecological and ecocritical debates, which circle around the 
interrelation of the human and the natural. In these debates, the human is no longer the centre, 
but it is only one element among the many. Furthermore, Woolf’s attempt to unite and 
interconnect the human and the natural may be seen as analogous to Whitehead’s effort to 
bring the natural and the human back together via undermining the post-Newtonian scientific 
materialism, which separated and drew the human and the natural world further apart. In 
Science and the Modern World, Whitehead argues that a viable perspective is not that of a 
subjectivist, who “makes this world depend on us,”662 but of an objectivist, for whom “we 
seem to be ourselves elements of this world in the same sense as are the other things which 
we perceive.”663 Whitehead sharply criticizes the “assumption of the bare valuelessness of 
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mere matter,” which resulted in “the limited moral outlook” of the modern western world. 
Whitehead attributes this change in morality to industrialisation, which gave rise to two main 
problems of the modern world—“the ignoration of the true relation of each organism to its 
environment” and “the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of the environment.”664 
Whitehead’s metaphysics, based on equally important and interrelated actual occasions, 
“steers Western philosophy away from its inveterate anthropocentrism,”665 and precisely for 
this reason, it is often used by ecologically oriented theorists and thinkers, who attempt to 
decentre the human. In addition to the “ontoethics” discussed in the previous chapter, 
Whitehead’s conflation of ontology and ethics seems to acquire one more dimension and 
develop into something which we nowadays know as environmental ethics. This ethico-
environmental aspect of Whitehead’s cosmology is based on the idea that value is attributed 
to every constituent of reality, because it serves as a potentiality for the process of becoming 
of other entities. In this respect, Whitehead’s process thought foregrounds the intrinsic value 
in nature666 and debases humanity to “merely one of the world’s processes.667 Since 
contemporary environmental thinkers focus on the interrelation of the human and the natural, 
which results in the nexus, a complex of interrelated entities, Whitehead’s cosmology 
provides “an instrument of considerable power which can help us understand how this nexus 
which is nature is related to human subjectivity and how value emerges in both.”668  
  
 
664. Whitehead, Science, 89.  
665. Shaviro, 8. 
666. John B. Bennett, “Ecology and Philosophy: Whitehead´s Contribution,” Journal of 
Thought 10, no. 1 (1975): 28, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42588463.  
667. Arran Gare, “Environmental Ethics and Process Philosophy,” Trumpeter 8, no. 1 (1991): 
36, https://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/file/34926641-c9bf-4dc4-a8d4-
66d69c4acfee/1/PDF%20%28Published%20version%29.pdf.  
668. John B. Bennett, 29. 
193 
 
Woolf’s Implicit and Explicit Criticism of Anthropocentrism 
Regarding the overemphasizing of human value and focusing mainly on the human 
perspective, Woolf criticizes the “inveterate anthropocentrism” in her essay “Flying Over 
London,” where, on the one hand, she exalts the plane as a ground-breaking human invention 
but, on the other hand, compares the “smallness” of the human realm with the vastness of the 
non-anthropocentric sky: “Habit has fixed the earth immovably in the centre of their 
imagination like a hard ball; everything is made to the scale of houses and streets.”669 
Contrary to this down to earth perspective, when taking off the ground, man “becomes 
conscious of being a little mammal, hot-blooded, hard boned” and experiences the “vanishing 
and melting” and impermanence of the vast world above the Earth. However, Woolf 
ironically adds that we cannot get rid of our anthropocentric perspective and we involuntarily 
imagine the skies as terrestrial space:  
Yet, though we flew through territories with never a hedge of stick to divide 
them, nameless, unowned, so inveterately anthropocentric is the mind that 
instinctively the aeroplane becomes a boat and we are sailing towards a 
harbour and there we shall be received by hands that lift themselves from 
swaying garments; welcoming, accepting.670 
Being aware of our natural tendency to apply the human perspective also to nonhuman 
entities, Woolf attempts to imagine what it is like to get rid of the human superiority when she 
describes the point in the sky from which human beings cannot be seen and only the marks, 
which they left behind, may be visible: “Here was a garden; here a football field. But no 
human being was yet visible; England looked like a ship that sails unmanned. Perhaps the 
race was dead. . .”671 Gillian Beers analyses the parallel between Woolf’s recurrent 
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description of flying in her late fiction and the image of England as an insular separate nation, 
and she points out that the invention of planes led to the nation’s reconsideration of its 
impenetrable and autonomous position, which resulted in significant “social and national 
changes.”672 As it may be inferred from the quoted passage, Woolf was conscious of this 
shifting perspective of the nation/island and she depicts the autonomous “impermeable island” 
as a “temporary form within the view of geological time”673 not only in this essay but also in 
Between the Acts, where the “Englishness” is sustained and, at the same time, questioned as 
an untenable concept. After the potential erasure of the English nation, Woolf continues by 
suggesting the possible extinction of the whole human race when the crew of the plane is 
approaching death. Whereas human traces disappear, gulls become the privileged race: 
“Across them there passed in single file a flight of gulls, livid white against the leaden 
background, holding on their way with the authority of owners, having rights, and means of 
communication unknown to us, an alien, a privileged race.”674 Interestingly, Woolf plays with 
this changed position of the human, this human “re-scaling,”675 also in Between the Acts, 
where she constantly undermines the opposition of the human and the animal, which reaches 
its peak during the “mirror scene” where “the barriers which should divide Man the Master 
from the Brute were dissolved.”676  
Having faced possible extinction, the crew approaches a wet cloud that consumes 
them and attacks them with a shower of hails, which is described as the moment of inevitable 
death, but it is interrupted by surpassing the level of clouds and flying in the space of stillness, 
quietness, and whiteness. From there the plane starts descending towards the Earth and the 
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outlines of the human world reappear. However, the significance and size of the human 
action, as well as the animal one, are again diminished:  
Though the dot was the size of a bluebottle and its movement minute, reason 
insisted that it was a horse and it was galloping, but all speed and size were so 
reduced that the speed of the horse seemed very, very slow, and its size minute. 
Now however, there were often movements in the streets, as of sliding and 
stooping; and then gradually the vast creases of the stuff beneath began 
moving, and one saw in the creases millions of insects moving. In another 
second they became men, men of business, in the heart of the white city 
buildings.677 
This passage illustrates how Woolf aptly captures the changing perspective of the human, 
seen from the sky as a minute and insignificant creature comparable to a kind of insect, which 
we often treat as something ugly and valueless. Furthermore, Woolf masterly shifts 
perspective between macroscale objects like the Earth, clouds, and the sky, and the microscale 
organisms such as human beings and other animals. This suggests that Woolf knew how small 
the position of the human is in comparison to the natural phenomena and the geological 
powers, by which she may be recognized as one of the first authors who reflected on 
contemporary ecological and environmental issues. As it will be discussed later in relation to 
“Time Passes” and natural interludes from The Waves, this human scale, opposed to 
geological physical and time scale, represents one of the recurrent features in Woolf’s fiction.  
However, Woolf perhaps ironically returns to the anthropocentric perspective while 
the members of the crew begin to discern separate human beings, and she claims that “one 
had to change perpetually air values into land values” with all its divisions of “social 
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grades.”678 The end of the story turns toward a social critique of upper-class society that 
occupies the quarters around Oxford Street, where “nobody noticed us at all, but went on 
jostling each other with some furious desire absorbing them,”679 and the superficiality of the 
signs of human civilisation such as shop names, flags, or a unified architectural style of the 
city: “And then it was odd how one became resentful of all the flags and surfaces and of the 
innumerable windows symmetrical as avenues, symmetrical as forest groves, and wished for 
some opening, and to push indoors and be rid of surfaces.”680 Woolf’s comparison of 
symmetrical streets to forest groves again shows the writer’s interest in juxtaposing the human 
and the natural and searching for the parallels between these two realms perceived as separate 
due to the science and philosophy, which practiced what Whitehead calls “the bifurcation of 
nature.” Moreover, the passage refers back to Woolf’s essays “Modern Fiction” and 
“Character in Fiction,” where the author urges the novelist to neglect the superficial 
descriptions of matter and delve deeper into the matter’s structure and connections between 
the parts of the structure as suggested in “A Sketch of the Past” discussed in the previous 
chapter. Woolf emphasizes this interconnection beneath the surface also in the discussed 
essay, when she, as one of the crew members, tries to plunge beneath the symmetry of the 
street and describes an inner space of a woman’s room, which pretends to be distinct and 
different, yet it is only one part of the seeming uniformity: “. . . there appeared a room, 
incredibly small, of course, and ridiculous in its attempt to be separate and itself.”681 Woolf 
then proceeds with a description of the room, which reveals the person’s presence and 
personality, and concludes the essays by stating that the experience of flying, which forces us 
 
678. Woolf, Selected Essays, 210. 
679. Woolf, Selected Essays, 211. 
680. Woolf, Selected Essays, 211. 




to reconsider our position and relation to the rest of the universe, significantly modifies our 
perspective of the world, and therefore, provides a certain epiphany:  
Everything changes its values seen from the air. Personality was outside the 
body, abstract. And one wished to be able to animate the heart, the legs, the 
arms with it, to do which it would be necessary to be there, so as to collect; so 
as to give up this arduous game, as one flies through the air, of assembling 
things that lie in the surface.682 
This ending of the story reveals that while one experiences a complete alienation from the 
human and the material earthbound superficiality and experiences what it is like to perceive 
the Earth from non-anthropocentric abstract perspective, one is consequently able to 
reappreciate the physical experience of what it means to be human in a more profound way. 
This newly acquired perspective would not be characterised by the celebration of the 
superficial signs of the human success, but by the realisation of our position of only one 
among many animate agencies of this universe.  Moreover, this universe would be woven out 
of the relations of its inhabitants that lie beneath the surface.  
A change from anthropocentric to relational and non-anthropocentric perspective is 
also the key theme of Woolf’s essay “The Sun and the Fish,” where Woolf describes the 
experience of an eclipse that suddenly makes us reconsider our importance in comparison to 
the natural and geological powers. Moreover, the observation of the eclipse also represents an 
experience of death and possible extinction of human life in a very similar way to the 
experience of flying “above the human level” in “Flying Over London.” By recurrent 
imagining of the possible extinction of the humans and the destructive power of human 
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agency, Woolf anticipates the “scenarios of extinction” and the states of being taken aback by 
natural process as introduced in the discourse of the Anthropocene theories.683 
At the very beginning of the “The Sun and the Fish” Woolf describes people’s 
willingness to travel long distances and assemble with “a purpose in common” —observation 
of the eclipse, which unifies the people who face this more-than-human, natural, and 
geological, phenomenon. Woolf emphasizes that the people are not connected only for 
“human” reasons, but precisely because they are aware of the significance of the natural 
phenomenon: “We were no longer in the same relation to people, houses and trees; we were 
related to the whole world. We had come, not to lodge in the bedroom of an Inn; we were to 
come for a few hours of disembodied intercourse with the sky.”684 This disembodied 
intercourse with the natural phenomenon recalls Septimus’s and Clarissa’s “transcorporeal” 
experience of their interrelation with nature, where the body becomes almost transparent and 
dissolves in its surroundings. Moreover, Woolf emphasizes that what lies behind this relation 
to the natural entities is the bond with other people as it has already been outlined in “A 
Sketch of the Past.” In this way, Woolf suggests that one’s connection to other people and the 
feeling of community with them is always mediated by the intimate relation to natural 
environment from which subjectivity arises. As Woolf proceeds in this argument, she argues 
that the encounter with the nonhuman natural force results in giving up individual identity and 
realization of the individual’s insignificance vis-à-vis the natural phenomenon: “Rather, 
perhaps, we had put off the little badges and signs of individuality. We were strung out 
against the sky in outline and had the look of statues standing prominent on the ridge of the 
world.”685 The end of the quotation refers to the possible extinction of the human race and 
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hints at the significance of the natural world, which is even intensified by Woolf’s comparison 
of the observers to “men and women of the primeval world” who “come to salute the 
dawn.”686  
When the view of the sun is completely blocked, Woolf starts describing the world 
without colour and life and captures also the people’s shock by this sudden exposure to the 
loss of light and splendour: “This was the end. The flesh and blood of the world was dead and 
only the skeleton was left. It hung beneath us, frail; brown; dead; withered.”687 After this 
experience of the Earth’s death the sun starts to reappear, the world becomes more alive again 
and the observers feel a sense of relief while watching the Earth’s recovery: “But steadily and 
surely our relief broadened and our confidence established itself as the great paint brush 
washed the woods, dark on the valley, and massed the hills blue above them.”688 However, 
Woolf emphasizes that even though the Earth came to life again, one will always remember 
that it can be extinguished very easily and that we cannot take the existence of life for 
granted: “But still the memory endured that the earth we stand on is made of colour; colour 
can be blown out; and then we stand on a dead leaf; and we who tread the earth securely now 
have seen it dead.”689 The quotation indicates that Woolf takes the eclipse as a starting point 
for her reflection on the possible crisis, perhaps an ecological crisis, of our planet, whose 
potential destruction was first reflected in the modernist literature which implicitly dealt with 
“the destructive consequences of modernity.”690  
After the experience of the eclipse, hinting at a possible death of not only human life, 
Woolf abruptly changes the theme of the story and shifts her attention to the description of 
observation in a zoological garden, which is, in contract to the experience of eclipse, full of 
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pure life, movements, and colours. The narrator first observes two lizards and then fish tanks, 
where colourful fish swim in various direction without a purpose or a goal that tends to be 
associated with every human action:  
There the inhabitants perform for ever evolutions whose intricacy, because it 
has no reason, seems the more sublime. . . . The most majestic of human 
evolutions seems feeble and fluctuating compared with the fishes’. Each of 
these worlds too, which measures perhaps four feet by five is as perfect in its 
order as in its method.691 
This quotation ushers in Woolf’s return to the non-anthropocentric perspective while she 
compares the complexity of the fish life and its order with that of the humans and undermines 
the significance of human evolution. Furthermore, Woolf proceeds to celebrate the variety in 
nature and highlights the role of each natural event, which directly or indirectly influences the 
course of nature:  
The rise of a bubble, negligible elsewhere, is here an event of the highest 
importance. The silver drop bores its way of a spiral staircase through the water 
to burst against the sheet of glass which seems laid flat across the top. Nothing 
exists needlessly. The fish themselves seem to have been shaped deliberately 
and slipped into the world only to be themselves.692 
Woolf’s focus on the workings of nature without the influence of human action reveals the 
author’s belief in nature’s self-sufficiency, analysed in the following section of this chapter, 
and her belief in the innate worth of each living and non-living entity. This attribution of 
value is strikingly similar to Whitehead’s association of worth with all existence: “We have 
no right to deface the value experience which is the very essence of the universe. Existence, in 
 
691. Woolf, Selected Essays, 192.  
692. Woolf, Selected Essays, 192. 
201 
 
its own nature, is the upholding of the value intensity.”693 The value of the nonhuman 
organism is encapsulated in Woolf’s comparison of the fish’s “perfect existence”694 with the 
mediocre appearance of human race: “More care has been spent upon half a dozen fish than 
upon all the races of humankind. Under out tweed and silk is nothing but a monotony of pink 
nakedness.”695  
To conclude, it may be suggested that although the short story is divided into two parts 
dealing with two completely different kinds of experience, the first of observing the eclipse 
and the second of fish, these two incongruous themes converge in Woolf’s attempt to warn 
against the potential destruction of life on our planet and against the tendency to elevate 
human existence’s value above the existence of other animal species. The story foregrounds 
the “smallness” of the human, which is contrasted with the vastness and seeming permanence 
of natural phenomena. The following section of this chapter explores Woolf’s experiment 
with the complete erasure of anthropocentric perspective and her anticipation of 
posthumanism in “Times Passes” and natural interludes in The Waves. 
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The Non-Anthropocentric “World Seen Without a Self” and Posthuman Turn 
While in the above-discussed essays Woolf juxtaposes the human and the natural 
world, in the passage “Time Passes” and in the natural interludes of The Waves she decides to 
erase the human trace almost completely and anticipates contemporary turn to “posthuman” 
fiction which undoes anthropocentrism. Instead of the human experience and agency, Woolf 
places nature into the centre of these passages and explores its, on the one hand, destructive, 
and, on the other hand, preserving power. Regarding the intimations of extinction of humans 
discussed above, these passages may also be read as apocalyptic narratives “of the end of 
time”696 currently associated with the theories of the Anthropocene. However, while these 
narratives focus primarily on the destructive effect of human action on natural elements, 
Woolf’s passages are surprisingly full of animated life and rather than displaying the decay 
and final destruction of nature and human race, they foreground nature’s regenerative powers 
and indestructibility. 
In “Time Passes” Woolf intentionally leaves out the human experience and elements 
and undermines the central human position in the novel’s narrative. This is achieved by 
decentring and elimination of the human by several means, which are discussed in the 
following paragraphs.  
First, she suppresses all the hints at human existence and uses the images of absence 
and silence to emphasize the void created after the human inhabitants had left the place. 
Woolf refers to “Time Passes” in her diary as to an “impersonal passage” that “interests me 
[Woolf] very much”697 and breaks the unity of the novel’s design. While the first part of the 
novel focuses primarily on Mrs Ramsay and the relationships that she “knits” around her, and 
the third part of the novel focuses on Mr Ramsay, his ambition to complete the trip to the 
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lighthouse, and Lily’s determination to finish her painting of Mrs Ramsay, the middle passage 
provides a relief form these human ambitions and interpersonal relationships and describes 
Bernard’s “world seen without a self.”698 After finishing the first part of the novel, Woolf 
talks about “Times Passes” as “the most difficult abstract piece of writing,” and she provides 
its outline as follows: “I have to give an empty house, no people’s characters, the passage of 
time, all eyeless & features with nothing to cling to. . .”699 This description of Woolf’s 
experimental project reveals that the passage’s effect is meant to be harsh, impersonal, and 
inconsolable, and that the only subjectivity appearing in the passage is the empty house and 
the character of time, which fully demonstrates its agency. The “no people’s characters” 
intention is clearly stated at the beginning of the passage, where Woolf highlights that “there 
was scarcely anything left of body or mind by which one could say ‘This is he’ or ‘This is 
she.’”700 This passage directly recalls the first part of the novel, where references to the mind 
and the body, or the subject and the object, abound. Moreover, the last part of the quotation 
suggests that in “Time Passes” Woolf obliterates the gender roles, which are crucial in the 
first and the third part of the novel, in favour of genderless subjectivity of the traditionally 
inanimate matter which comes alive in the passage. The absence of human subjectivity is 
repeatedly evoked by Woolf’s focus on silence, stillness, and the images of the void:  
Nothing it seemed could break that image, corrupt that innocence, or disturb 
the swaying mantle of silence which, week after week, in the empty room, 
wove into itself the falling cries of birds, ships hooting, the drone and hum of 
the fields, a dog’s bark, a man’s shout, and folded them round the house in 
silence.701 
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On the one hand, this passage demonstrates the emptiness of the house devoid of human 
experience, but, on the other hand, foreshadows the theme of the passage—nature’s capacity 
to survive, create and act independently of human agency. The human trace in the passage is 
preserved only in the residues of things used by the house’s inhabitants: “What people had 
shed and left—a pair of shoes, a shooting cap, some faded skirts and coats in wardrobes—
those alone kept the human shape and in the emptiness indicated how once they were filled 
and animated.”702 Another reminder of human existence is Mrs McNab, the Ramsay family’s 
cleaner, who is sent to restore the house from the workings of nature:  
Then again peace descended; and the shadow wavered; light bent to its own 
image in adoration on the bedroom wall; when Mrs. McNab, tearing the veil of 
silence with hands that stood in the wash-tub, grinding it with boots that had 
crunched the shingle, came as directed to open all windows, and dust the 
bedrooms.703 
Woolf’s second means to undermine the importance of human subjectivity and 
existence in “Times Passes” is the already discussed panpsychism, aliveness of inanimate 
matter, and agency distributed throughout nature. While panpsychism itself is a reaction to 
scientific theories that bifurcate between the animate human existence and inert lifeless matter 
of the visible world, Woolf uses its main premises not only to distribute mentality in the 
whole universe, but mainly to demonstrate that nature can act independently of human 
intention and hint at the indifference of nature to human actions. Woolf’s use of nonhuman 
agency has been described in detail in the second chapter, so here, it is mentioned mainly 
because its close association with the writer’s third means to weaken the central position of 
the human—the depiction of nature where the human is just one temporary element, contrary 
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to the everlasting natural processes and geological forces. Although some scholars tend to 
read the destructive processes and gradual decay in “Time Passes” and natural interludes in 
The Waves as a metaphor of human violence exercised on nature,704 I would like to suggest 
that Woolf’s depiction of destructive processes manifest the power of nature and its long-term 
capacity to create, change, and regenerate.  
As Leanna Lostoski suggests, the passage introduces nonhuman temporality or what 
Jane Bennett calls a “long view of time.”705 This longer timespan is concerned primarily with 
the time of natural and geological processes, where the human temporality is merely a minute 
part of the whole. This extended posthuman temporality is intimated at the very beginning of 
the passage where Woolf speaks about the contrast of a single night’s time and the succession 
of nights: “But what after all is one night? A short space, especially when the darkness dims 
so soon, and so soon a bird signs, a cock crows, or a faint green quickens, like a turning leaf, 
in the hollow of the wave. Night, however, succeeds to night.”706 This ongoing succession of 
time is evoked repeatedly: “Night after night, summer and winter, the torment of storms, the 
arrow-like stillness of fine weather, held their court without interference.”707 In a parenthetical 
comment, Woolf mentions that “night and day, month and year ran shapelessly together,”708 
and she compares the single act of a board’s springing to the geological force of a crumbling 
rock: “Once only a board sprang on the landing; once in the middle of the night with a roar, 
with a rapture, as after centuries of quiescence, a rock rends itself from the mountain and 
hurtles crashing into the valley. . .”709 The geological and more-than-human time is 
introduced not only in the central passage, but also at the very beginning of the novel, where 
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Lily and William Bankes are watching dunes, which are described as something that will 
survive much longer than its observers:  
“. . . both of them looked at the dunes far away, and instead of merriment felt 
come over some sadness – because the thing was completed partly, and partly 
because distant views seem to outlast by a million years (Lily thought) the 
gazer and to be communicating already with the sky which beholds an earth 
entirely at rest.710 
This quotation from the beginning of the novel anticipates the comparison in size and value 
between the human and the natural in “Time Passes” and also hints at Woolf’s recurrent idea 
that nature is indifferent or “insensible” towards organisms that inhabit it.  
While the house is subjected to a constant apocalyptic destruction and decay, 
metaphorized by waves likened to “amorphous bulks of leviathans,”711 the house “left like a 
shell on a sandhill to fill with dry salt grains”712 or being invaded by “rats in all the attics,”713 
Woolf emphasizes that this natural activity does not take into account its impact on the 
humans, as it is something “alien to the processes of domestic life.”714 Turning away from the 
initial destructive and apocalyptic vision of the house, a product of human action which had 
“gone to rack and ruin,”715 Woolf suddenly describes the natural forces imposed on the house 
as fertile and life-creating: “Tortoise-shell butterflies burst from the chrysalis and pattered 
their life out on the window pane. Poppies sowed themselves among the dahlias; the lawn 
waved with long grass . . . which made the whole room green in summer.”716 In this way, the 
house changes from lifeless substance into a space of immense creation and fertility, however, 
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nature’s creativity pays no attention to the consequences of its action on human creations as 
indicated by the rhetorical question “What power could now prevent the fertility, the 
insensibility of nature?”717  
As a result, it cannot be argued that the passage represents the narratives of extinction 
and effacement characteristic for the theories of the Anthropocene, because the outlook of the 
destruction converts into metaphors of production, fertility, and constant renewal.718 Whereas 
at the beginning of the passage nature seems to mourn the absence of the human existence and 
this absence is reflected in the state of the house, there comes a sudden shift and the narrative 
starts to celebrate life enabled by the absence of human action. Therefore, nature’s 
“insensibility” mentioned in the rhetorical question does not refer to nature’s capacity to 
mercilessly destroy the products of human actions, but ironically hints at the fact that nature is 
endowed with intrinsic creativity, which is most of the time suppressed by humans and which 
can fully develop only in the absence of the human agency. Furthermore, the insensibility of 
nature again refers to the irrelevance of value of human existence719 in contrast with the 
processes and power of nature. This is implied in the passage where Woolf describes the 
upcoming spring as “entirely careless of what was done or thought by the beholders.”720 In 
addition to the previous quotation about nature’s insensibility, the following quotation 
suggests that natural processes cannot be disrupted by human action: “. . .nothing now 
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withstood them; nothing said no to them. Let the wind blow; let the poppy seed itself and the 
carnation mate with the cabbage.”721 
Although Woolf depicts nature as primarily creative, alive, and independent of human 
action, she suggests that human behaviour may significantly restrict the productivity and 
fertility of nature. This anthropocentric attempt to control nature and its processes is 
embodied by Mrs McNab, the family’s cleaner, who is supposed to fight the natural forces 
and disturbs the nonhuman world722: “Slowly and painfully, with broom and pail, mopping, 
scouring, Mrs. McNab, Mrs. Bast stayed the corruption and the rot; rescued from the pool of 
Time that was fast closing over them now a basin, now a cupboard. . .”723 Her action is 
depicted as a triumph over nature and its conquest during which “some rusty laborious birth 
seemed to be taking place.”724 However, this temporary domination over nature is depicted as 
something beyond the human power as indicated by Mrs McNab’s thoughts: “It was beyond 
one person’s strength to get it straight now.”725 Later the woman repeats her lament: “It was 
too much for one woman, too much, too much.”726 While the woman’s complaints may be 
ascribed to her advanced age, they are more likely to be interpreted as Woolf’s emphasis on 
human hopelessness vis-à-vis the power of nature to destroy and create. This impression is 
intensified near the end of “Time Passes,” where Woolf triumphantly announces the end of 
the cleaners’ restorative action: “. . . keys were turned all over the house; the front door was 
banged; it was finished.”727 This celebration of human work and subjugation of nature is 
undermined right in the upcoming sentence, which introduced “the half-heard melody, that 
intermittent music which ear half catches but lets fall; a bark, a bleat; irregular, intermittent, 
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yet somehow related; the hum of insect, the tremor of cut grass”728 which regains its intensity 
after being drowned out by human action. This natural hum indicates that human action with a 
temporary effect cannot compete with nature’s capacity to endure and regenerate, which 
implies that Woolf intentionally wants nature to have the last word.   
This survival of nature threatened by Mrs McNab’s attempt to restore the house’s 
ordered and inhabited-like appearance is followed by a sentence in square brackets, which are 
here and there dispersed throughout the whole passage: “[Lily Briscoe had her bag carried up 
to the house late one evening in September. Mr. Carmichael came by the same train.].”729 This 
last note in the brackets heralds the return of human occupants of the house, but the fact that 
this event is squeezed into very concise and objective note in brackets refers back to the 
original idea that human existence is suppressed in the whole passage. Consequently, it may 
be inferred that the use of square brackets represents the last means to undermine 
anthropocentrism in the section “Time Passes.”   
The first two bracketed references appear directly after the introduction of the empty 
house and the description of the destructive forces of nature. The passage starts by the 
characters arguing whether the light should be extinguished or left on before the family go to 
bed and the first bracketed sentence states that Mr. Carmichael is the last one who stays up 
and blows out his candle after midnight. In this way, the sentence ushers in the atmosphere of 
darkness and emptiness, which pervades the first part of the passage and indicates that the 
human element will be pushed aside. This impression is confirmed in the second bracketed 
sentence that gives the reader a very objective information about Mrs Ramsay’s death without 
any emotional pathos. This harsh objectivity and brevity of the comments is in stark contrast 
to the first part of the novel, where the central focus is the character of Mrs Ramsay, her 
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thoughts, emotions, and actions. The following two notes in brackets inform the reader about 
Prue’s marriage and her unfortunate death due to illness connected with childbirth. However, 
this death is overshadowed by the aliveness of the preceding and succeeding passages which 
introduce “bees humming,” “gnats dancing”730 and a loving caress of the light from the 
lighthouse that falls on the “empty” rooms. As Gillian Beer suggests, the novel is not only the 
author’s means to cope with the death of her parents but also with the loss of “confidence in 
human centrality.”731 Therefore, the square brackets in “Time Passes” may be considered as 
one of the crucial features which reflect this uncertainty and shifted perspective in the novel. 
The following two bracketed remarks are concerned with the war and inform us about 
Andrew’s death on a battlefield in France and the revived interest in poetry. Like other 
“human events,” the war is depicted as a secondary event of minor importance, and the 
mention of Andrew’s death is squeezed into the description of “this silence this 
indifference”732 of the empty house and depiction of the beauty of a sunset experienced at the 
beach. Moreover, the harshness of the comment again reminds the reader of nature’s 
indifference towards human misfortunes. However, it at the same time “accentuates the 
brutality of the event,”733 which is also intensified by the sharpness of the nuclear sentence “A 
shell exploded.”734 To conclude, it may be suggested that the square brackets used in “Time 
Passes” serve as one of Woolf’s techniques to decentre the human experience, shift the 
readers’ attention to the material and the natural, and undermine the importance of human 
achievement and loss in contrast to the larger-scale processes of nature. 
Natural elements and the animal world are foregrounded also in the interludes that 
precede each chapter in The Waves. These interludes describe the movement of the sun in the 
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sky from the early morning to the sunset as well as the changing colours of the sea, the beach, 
and the life of animals appearing on the scene. Nature and animals are the main characters of 
these passages and human traces are almost entirely cut out. These passages are indefinite in 
terms of their temporal and spatial frame, except for one hint at “English fields,” which 
indicates that Woolf describes the English coast. However, the landscape reminds the reader 
of any wild coastal area. The absence of both human subjective perception of time and the 
remainder of monumental time, time which is associated with the figures of authority and 
power,735 and the focus on natural time and possibly “geological timespan” pushes Woolf’s 
exploration of the nonhuman, or posthuman, one step further. In relation to The Waves, Woolf 
writes in her diary that she intends to “saturate every atom” and “eliminate all waste, 
deadness, superfluity,”736 which suggests that the reality that she wants to depict should be 
“alive” in all respects. Moreover, while sketching the first scenes and significant images of 
the novel, she talks about “the continuous stream” of human thought and the physical 
environment, which is “intersected by the arrival of the bright moth.”737 Interestingly, the 
animal overshadows the human subjectivity and foreshadows the “nonhuman turn” of the 
novel. This turn towards the natural is emphasized in the following sketched scene, where 
Woolf reveals her interest in the history of the earth by describing a man and a woman who 
are having dinner and talking about various things: “The contrast might be something of this 
sort: she might talk, or think, about the age of the earth: the death of humanity: then moths 
keep on coming.”738 Later in her diary she mentions that the narrative of the novel must be 
embedded in “the unreal world” of “the phantom waves” and she uncovers her wish to let 
nature be heard throughout the novel: “Could one get the waves to be heard all through? Or 
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the farmyard noises? Some odd irrelevant noises.”739 Woolf concludes this diary entry by 
realization that the reflection on the novel’s design and conception makes her think of the 
greenness and aliveness of nature: “Everything becomes green & vivified in me when I begin 
to think of the Moths.”740 
In line with this intention to place the natural environment into the foreground, moths 
and other natural elements in the interludes are often depicted in much clearer and solid terms 
than the products of human work. The first interlude not only describes the beginning of a 
day, when the sun is still hidden behind the horizon, but also introduces a fairy-like house of 
Elvedon, about which the characters make up fantasies. Woolf describes vividly and in detail 
birds chirping and the sun, which starts touching the house’s walls, however, everything 
inside the house remains “dim and unsubstantial.”741 The same contrast between the natural 
and the human is developed in the second interlude, where the main characters are “the dew 
dancing on the tips of flowers,” whereas the sun with its beams of sharp light “laid broader 
blades upon the house.”742 However, the things illuminated by the beams of light remain 
indefinite and fluid rather than solid in comparison to distinct sound of the waves: 
“Everything became softly amorphous, as if the china of the plate flowed and the steel of the 
knife were liquid. Meanwhile the concussion of the waves breaking fell with muffled thuds, 
like logs falling, on the shore.”743 In the interlude describing a late evening, red curtains of the 
house’s windows are repeatedly blows in and out by the wind, the light in the house is 
obscured and the solidity of the human-made objects is questioned once more: “All for a 
moment wavered and bent in uncertainty and ambiguity, as if a great moth sailing through the 
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room had shadowed the immense solidity of chairs and tables with floating wings.”744 In 
reference to Woolf’s diary entry, where the human thought is interrupted or “intersected” by 
the arrival of moths, the passage metaphorically describes the power of nature to obscure and 
sideline human existence. While the natural elements are always described as alive and active, 
the human-made objects are passive recipients of nature’s effects:  
The evening sun, whose beat had gone out of it and whose burning spot of 
intensity had been diffused, made chairs and tables mellower and inlaid them 
with lozenges of brown and yellow. Lined with shadows their weight seemed 
more ponderous, as if colour, tilted, had run to one side. Here lay knife, fork, 
and glass, but lengthened, swollen, and made portentous. Rimmed in a gold 
circle the looking-glass held the scene immobile as if everlasting in its eye.745 
This passivity on the part of human objects in the interludes represents another of Woolf’s 
techniques to overthrow the traditional idea of humans as active agents who use and shape the 
natural environment according to their needs. Furthermore, the absence of the human from the 
interludes is the main tool employed by Woolf to evoke “death of humanity,” the novel’s 
theme suggested in her diary. 
The posthuman atmosphere of the interludes also springs from their indefinite 
temporal frame and references to nonhuman time and natural cycle. In the first interlude, 
which describes the sea “indistinguishable from the sky” and the blurred division between the 
horizon of the earth and the sky, Woolf alludes to the first book of Genesis, where God 
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creates the distinction between heaven and earth746 and the sea and the sky.747 This suggests 
that Woolf might refer not only to the beginning of a single day but the birth of life on Earth. 
Similarly, the last interlude focuses on the slow extinguishment of light and the arrival of 
eternal night, which may signalize the end of civilization.  Interestingly, the darkness equally 
swallows up both human and natural elements:  
Darkness washed down streets, eddying round single figures, engulfing them; 
blotting out couples clasped under the showery darkness of elm trees in full 
summer foliage. Darkness rolled its waves along grassy rides and over the 
wrinkled skin of the turf, enveloping the solitary thorn tree and the empty snail 
shell at its foot.748 
It may be inferred from the quotation that the last interlude introduces an apocalyptic view of 
both human civilisation and the Earth. Elsa Högberg suggests that the interludes might “depict 
one day, from sunrise to sunset, or a geological time span stretching from the beginning of life 
on Earth to, say, an imagined future when the sun sets on the British Empire.”749 Therefore, 
the individual lives of the novel’s characters may be regarded as mere grains of life in the vast 
geological time of the planet and its nature described in the interludes. Furthermore, 
especially the last parallel between the setting sun and the intimation of the British Empire’s 
decline, which has been analysed in Jane Marcus’s essay “Britannia Rules The Waves,”750 is 
important, because it proposes that Woolf was often critical of the Empire and aware of its 
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mercantile policy which not only exploits colonies and their natural recourses, but also tends 
to view natural objects as mere commodities with commercial value. In this light, the 
apocalyptic nature of the last interludes may represent Woolf’s warning against ecological 
crisis and potential decline of our civilization resulting from the overconsumption of natural 
sources and consumerism. Woolf connects the latter with the imperialist establishment in her 





Woolf’s Criticism of the Exploitation of Nature and her Proto-Environmental Thinking 
In her essay “Thunder in Wembley” Woolf describes the human effort to turn the 
quarter of Wembley in London into a showcase of the British Empire at the occasion of the 
British Empire Exhibition organised between the years 1924-25. At the very beginning Woolf 
states that “it is nature that is the ruin of Wembley” despite all the attempts of the exhibition’s 
organizers to tame nature’s activity: “They might have eradicated the grass and felled the 
chestnut trees; even so the thrushes would got in, and there would always have been the 
sky.”751 Then Woolf ironically proceeds to describe the poorer area of the quarter and points 
out ironically that “nature asserts herself where one would least look to find her—in 
clergymen, school children, girls, young men, invalids in bath-chairs,”752 therefore, in people 
who come to admire the luxuries and inventions produced by the nation’s craftsmen. 
However, Woolf mocks these people whose sense of pride and dignity springs from the 
achievements of the Empire: “How, will all this dignity of their own, can they bring 
themselves to believe in that?”753 Interestingly, Woolf adds that this last comment is 
pronounced by the thrush that appears earlier in the essay and that represents nature’s voice. 
Whereas the organizers of the exhibition substantially changed the character of the place, they 
allowed some trees to remain at their place and Woolf describes the life that dwells between 
their branches: “You look up, and discover a whole chestnut tree with its blossoms standing; 
you look down, and see ordinary grass, scattered with petals, harbouring insects, sprinkled 
with stray wild flowers.”754 This natural beauty is then juxtaposed by the scene of the 
exhibition, the products of human effort and focus on lower-class people, who, like nature, 
spoil the overall splendid impression of the Empire: “All this the Duke of Devonshire should 
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have prevented.”755 The last part of the essay is concerned with the “problem of the sky” 
which is the only element that the organizers could not influence before the beginning of the 
exhibition. The sky “suffers all these domes and palaces to melt into its breast; receives them 
with such sombre and tender discretion,”756 and it is personified by Woolf as it decides to 
show its potency and capability of thwarting the boasting of the Empire:  
But even as we watch and admire what we would fain credit to the forethought 
of Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke, a rushing sound is heard. Is it the 
wind or is it the British Empire Exhibition? . . . The sky is livid, lurid, 
sulphurine. It is in violent commotion. . . Colonies are perishing and dispersing 
in spray of inconceivable beauty and terror which some malignant power 
illuminates.757 
Woolf uses the storm, the tool of the sky, to demonstrate that nature can affect and damage 
everything that is created by human action, which again demonstrates her effort to highlight 
the “smallness” of the human as opposed to the vastness and significance of the natural 
phenomena. Moreover, the fact that she connects human action with the Empire shows her 
criticism of the political layout based on the increasing exploitation of natural resources and 
destruction of natural environment. Although her reference to colonies must be read as the 
description of the individual pavilions dedicated to individual British colonies, it may also 
hint at Woolf’s personal concern about the perishing Empire and the colonies that regain 
independence.758  
Woolf advocates nature and counters destructive human action in the last section of 
the essay by evoking images of crumbling human products: “Pagodas are dissolving in dust. 
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Ferro-concrete is fallible.”759 This idea of nature’s vengeance on humanity is confirmed by 
Woolf’s apocalyptic vision that is foreshadowed in her essay “The Sun and the Fish,” but 
fully acknowledged in this essay: “Humanity is rushing to destruction, but humanity is 
accepting its doom.”760 The essay “Thunder at Wembley” ends with the image of lightning 
spread across the sky and its comparison to the roots of trees. These might refer to the trees 
that were cut to provide room for the pavilions, and therefore, the whole essay might describe 
nature’s reprisal for destruction of the fallen trees: “Cracks like the white roots of trees spread 
themselves across the firmament. The Empire is perishing; the bands are playing; the 
Exhibition is in ruins. For that is what comes of letting in the sky.”761 Like the overall tone of 
the essay, even this last passage is highly ironical and the phrase “for letting in the sky” refers 
to the organizers’ failure to control everything including the weather and other natural 
phenomena. As a result, the storm that interrupts the display of the Empire may be considered 
a punishment for the constant human effort to subjugate nature. Furthermore, Woolf 
associates this failure with the failure of the Empire itself and hints at this political construct’s 
fragile nature.  
Interestingly, Woolf’s focus on trees as living organisms that often must give way to 
human action is a recurrent theme in several of her works. In “The Mark on the Wall” Woolf 
outlines an image of afterlife and argues that when we lie buried in the ground, there is no 
difference between our body and the surrounding nature of which we become an integral part: 
“As for saying which are trees, and which are men and women, or whether there are such 
things, that one won’t be in condition to do for fifty years or so. There will be nothing but 
spaces of light and dark, intersected by thick stalls, and rather higher up perhaps, rose-shaped 
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blots of an indistinct colour. . .”762 This indicates that man is only one part of the natural cycle 
and may become the part of soil from which other organisms are nourished. Later on in the 
essay Woolf returns to the image of a tree and argues that “Wood is a pleasant thing to think 
about.”763 Then she provides a lengthy description of a tree’s life and the life of the 
surrounding organisms that depend on it: “The song of birds must sound very loud and 
strange in June; and how cold the feet of insects must feel upon it, as they make laborious 
progresses up the creases of the bark. . .”764 The description ends with the tree’s merging with 
the ground from which the tree originally arose: “One by one the fibres snap beneath the 
immense cold pressure of the earth, then the last storm comes and, falling the highest 
branches drive deep into the ground again.”765 However, Woolf insists that the life of a tree 
continues even after its decay because it is either transformed into something else, or it 
continues in the happy human thought that it produces: “Even so, life isn’t done with; there 
are a million patient, watchful lives still for a tree, all over the world, in bedrooms, in ships, 
on the pavement, lining rooms, where men and women sit after tea, smoking cigarettes. It is 
full of peaceful thoughts, happy thoughts, this tree.766 Interestingly, Whitehead provides a 
similar image of a tree that stands in a forest and his survival “depends upon the association of 
various species”767 which help the tree preserve the ideal conditions for his growth. Like 
Woolf, Whitehead also ends this passage with the image of the soil where “microbes 
necessary for its fertility” ensure the existence of subsequent life. 
While here Woolf emphasizes the immortality of a single tree and its importance for 
other organisms, in Mrs Dalloway Septimus is capable of perceiving nature very intensely and 
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directly warns humanity against cutting trees, which is only one of the ways how humans 
destroy life: “Men must not cut trees. There is a God. (He noted such revelations on the backs 
of envelopes.) Change the world. No one kills from hatred. Make it known (he wrote it 
down).”768 The character continues in his ecological rumination later in the novel, where in 
one of his hallucinations he turns directly to policy makers and urges them to realize that trees 
are alive, therefore, they deserve to be included in the concept of “universal love”: 
The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet; first, that trees are alive; next, 
there is no crime; next, love, universal love, he muttered, gasping, trembling, 
painfully drawing out these profound truths which needed, so deep were they, 
so difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but the world was entirely changed 
by them for ever.769 
The passage indicates that the aliveness of trees and protection of nature represents an 
important issue for Woolf, which is even intensified by her reference to “profound truths.” A 
similar aversion to the destruction of greenery appears in already mentioned short story “The 
Lady in the Looking-Glass: A Reflection,” where the woman protagonist regrets having to cut 
an overgrown branch and depriving it of life: “To cut an overgrown branch saddened her 
because it had once lived, and life was dear to her.”770 Furthermore, in her short story “The 
Shooting Party” Woolf describes a hunt in which a lot of animals are slaughtered, and she 
punishes her characters for enjoying this barbaric hobby, which suggests that she was also 
criticizing human behaviour towards animals. While men are shooting the animals, women 
are waiting for them inside, conversing and celebrating, waiting for the hunted meat, and 
looking forward to the feast. When the prey in brought into the house, Woolf captures very 
naturalistically the dead carcasses being flung into the larder:  
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The birds were dead now, their claws gripped tight, though they gripped 
nothing. The leathery eyelids were creased greyly over their eyes. Mrs Masters, 
the housekeeper, Wing the gamekeeper, took bunches of dead birds by the neck 
and flung them down on the slate door of the game larder. The slate floor 
became smeared and spotted with blood. The pheasants looked smaller now, as 
if their bodies had shrunk together.771 
Later Woolf describes the women’s luncheon consisting of roast meat in a similar way and 
emphasizes the act of carving a knife and slicing the bodies of the dead animals: “Miss 
Antonia drew the carving knife across the pheasant’s breast firmly. She cut two slices and laid 
them on a plate. Deftly the footman whipped it from her, and old Miss Rashleigh raised her 
knife.”772 After that, the two women remember a hunt, during which a person was shot, and 
their feast is suddenly interrupted by a slate falling down a chimney and the arrival of men 
and dogs. which start fighting a spaniel. The squire starts to wave his tawse and hits Miss 
Rashleigh by accident. The woman stumbles and falls against a mantelpiece where the shield 
above the fireplace is loosened and “buries” her. The scene ends with the apocalyptic image 
of the wind attacking the house, the constant noise of the shooting, and the fall of a tree 
followed by the damage of the king’s framed picture: “The wind lashed the panes of glass; 
shots volleyed the Park and a tree fell. And then King Edward in the silver frame slid, toppled 
and fell too.”773 Like in the essay “Thunder at Wembley,” people are shown the power of 
nature that takes revenge for the human action which destroys its flora and fauna.  
In reference to Septimus’s suggestion that our protective behaviour towards nature 
might change the world entirely, it is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that in all the 
above-mentioned short stories and essays, Woolf shows her proto-ecological thinking based 
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on the notion of “universal love” introduced by Septimus and on the criticism of all forms of 
killing and destroying. By showing human mishandling of nature and by underlying the 
characters’ interconnection with nature illustrated in the previous sections of this chapter, 
Woolf suggests that the harmful behaviour towards nature stems from the denial that the 
humans’ “very being is constituted by relations that ultimately connect them to everything in 
the universe.”774  
As it has already been demonstrated, women in Woolf’s fiction are more likely to 
acknowledge the intrinsic connection with other human beings and surrounding nature, which 
is further developed in Woolf’s pacifist manifesto Three Guineas, where she mentions that 
men are the ones responsible for death and destruction: “Scarcely a human being in the course 
of history has fallen to a woman’s rifle; the vast majority of birds and beasts have been killed 
by you [men], not by us [women]. . .”775 In the rest of the essay, Woolf argues that this need 
to kill springs from the educational system which produces aggressive, competitive, 
authoritative men who then serve as the representatives of the Empire. Instead of this 
education based on the exercise of power, Woolf outlines her idea of education that would not 
teach “the arts of dominating other people; not the arts of ruling, of killing, or acquiring land 
and capital,”776 but, rather, preach Septimus’s “universal love,” encourage connections 
between all living organisms and “discover what new combinations make good wholes in 
human life.”777 Therefore, the aim of new educational institutions is to “combine” and teach 
“the art of understanding other people’s lives and minds,” which echoes Whitehead’s idea that 
the existence of a single tree depends on the organisms in its environment: “Every organism 
requires an environment of friends, partly to shield it from violent changes, and partly to 
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supply it with its wants.”778 Moreover, Whitehead suggests that those organisms that are 
endowed with some kind of “defensive armour,” force, and larger size do not live more 
successful life than smaller and seemingly insignificant organisms. He argues that the use of 
force and physical and mental superiority “bars coöperations,”779 which may be related to 
Woolf’s criticism of male exercise of power that thwarts understanding and cooperation 
between individuals mentioned in Three Guineas. As a result, Septimus’s “universal love” is a 
concept that would prevent the killing of men, cutting down trees, and destruction of other 
organisms. 
The need to change the world by the profound truths of love, cooperation, and 
solidarity suggested by Septimus in Mrs Dalloway, or directly by Woolf in Three Guineas, is 
also the main subject of the essay “The Docks of London.” The essay begins with a detailed 
description of the Port of London and the constant movement of arriving and outgoing ships. 
Then, the focus shifts from the ships towards the warehouses and crumbling buildings of the 
docks of London, which offer “the most dismal prospect of the world” with their “air of 
decrepitude” and “desolation.”780 However, the lifelessness of the place is immediately 
contrasted with the description of nature that once dominated the surroundings of the docks:  
When, suddenly, after acres and acres of this desolation one floats past an old 
stone house standing in a real field, with real trees growing in clumps, the sight 
is disconcerting. Can it be possible that there is earth, that there once were 
fields and crops beneath this desolation and disorder? Trees and fields seem to 
survive incongruously like a sample of another civilization among the wall- 
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paper factories and soap factories that have stamped out old lawns and 
terraces.781 
The passage demonstrates Woolf’s concern about the human destructive power that can erase 
the beauty of nature existing for several centuries. She contrasts the simple enjoyment of 
nature’s beauty with a modern urge to exploit and transform nature:  
Now pleasure has gone and labour has come; and it stands derelict like some 
beauty in her midnight finery looking out over mud flats and candle works, 
while malodorous mounds of earth, upon which trucks are perpetually tipping 
fresh heaps, have entirely consumed the fields where, a hundred years ago, 
lovers wandered and picked violets.782 
This passage also illustrates that Woolf was concerned about the way humanity processes 
rubbish and disposes it on large waste dumps, which destroy otherwise fertile parts of land. 
Woolf continues in this description of man-made waste and emphasizes that the dumps are 
getting larger and larger every year:  
Barges heaped with old buckets, razor blades, fish tails, newspapers and 
ashes—whatever we have on our plates and throw into our dustbins—are 
discharging their cargoes upon the most desolate land in the world. The long 
mounds have been fuming and smoking and harbouring innumerable rats and 
growing a rank coarse grass and giving off a gritty, acrid air for fifty years. The 
dumps get higher and higher, and thicker and thicker, their sides more 
precipitous with tin cans, their pinnacles more angular with ashes year by 
year.783 
 
781. Woolf, Selected Essays, 194. 
782. Woolf, Selected Essays, 194. 
783. Woolf, Selected Essays, 194-195. 
225 
 
After that Woolf turns her attention towards the ships that arrive from other parts of England, 
and overseas, and explores the goods that are brought “from the plains, from the forest, from 
the pastures of the whole world.”784 This indicates that the merchandise that is sorted out, 
“sampled and recorded,” is the product of the exploitation of not only English nature but 
nature of its colonies and other countries of the world. This impression is even intensified 
when a dock worker lists the things that he sometimes finds in a single sack of cinnamon – “a 
snake, a scorpion, a beetle, a lump of amber, the diseased tooth of an elephant, a basin of 
quicksilver.”785 Therefore, Woolf shows that the inorganic matter or living creatures are often 
accidentally brought from its country of origin only because of human need for cinnamon. 
Moreover, Woolf continues in emphasizing that even these curiosities, accidentally brought to 
England, receive their mercantile value which is the reigning principle of the docks:  
But with this one concession to curiosity, the temper of the docks is severely 
utilitarian. Oddities, beauties, rarities may occur, but if so, they are instantly 
tested for their mercantile value. Laid on the floor among the circles of 
elephant tusks in a heap or larger and browner tusks than the rest.786 
Woolf then explains the diverse uses of ivory and points out ironically that while we turn it 
into temporary utile products, the material and the animal it comes from may be much older 
than a civilized country: “Thus if you buy an umbrella or a looking-glass not of the finest 
quality, it is likely that you are buying the tusk of a brute that roamed through Asian forests 
before England was an island.”787 The quotation reveals Woolf’s criticism of human subjects, 
who think that they have right to kill, use and transform the forms of life that are much older 
than humanity. Woolf continues in the same tone and celebrates ironically the human skill to 
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turn all the materials into products of use and value: “One tusk makes a billiard ball, another 
serves for a shoe-horn—every commodity in the world has been examined and graded 
according to its use and value. Trade is ingenious and indefatigable beyond the bounds of 
imagination.”788 At this point it seems that Woolf criticizes the consumerist society, which 
attributes value to things and living creatures merely on the basis of their versatile use, 
however, apart from the utility, Woolf suggests that “beauty begins to steal in” the 
warehouses, in the design of the machinery, in the cool vaults, where wine is meant to mature, 
and that “use produces beauty as a by-product.”789 Moreover, she points out that this beauty 
exists independently of human action and its observer, and that it originates from the 
combination of diverse elements such as smell, colours, and shapes:  
A yellow cat precedes us; otherwise the vaults are empty of human life. Here 
side by side the objects of your worship lie swollen with sweet liquor, spouting 
red wine if tapped. A winy sweetness fills the vaults like incense. Here and 
there a gas jet flares, not indeed to give light, or because of the beauty of the 
green and grey arches which it calls up in endless procession, down avenue 
after avenue, but simply because so much heat is required to mellow the 
wine.790 
The passage illustrates Woolf’s ambiguous feeling towards modern production and 
consumerism which at the same time destroy nature, as indicated in the previous quotations, 
and produce a certain kind of beauty, like in the last quotation. For this reason, her description 
of the docks may be regarded at once as critical and celebratory, and due to the use of irony 
and dualistic perspective employed persistently throughout her works, it is hard to give 
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preference to one over the other. John Flanagan points out that Jane Marcus, for example, 
interprets Woolf’s use of irony in The Waves as the “means by which Woolf distances herself 
from the imperialist project.”791 In a similar vein, I would suggest that Woolf’s ambiguous— 
partly celebratory and partly ironical—tone in “The Docks of London” embellishes the 
author’s criticism of the imperial capitalism.792 This claim is supported even by the fact that 
both The Waves, published in 1931, and the discussed essay, published in Good Housekeeping 
in 1931, were written in the late stage of Woolf’s writing career, in which the author focussed 
on covert criticism of the Empire.  
Woolf’s focus on the use and value of goods reveals the writer’s concern about 
modern capitalist society, which, as Whitehead points out, due to advancements in science 
and political economy “directed attention to things as opposed to values.” Whitehead 
elaborates on this idea and suggests that “ultimate values were excluded” and he provides 
examples such as religious faith or the value of human life and labour: “A creed of 
competitive business morality was evolved, in some respects curiously high; but entirely 
devoid of consideration of human life. The workmen were conceived as mere hands, drawn 
from the pool of labour.”793 In the same way, Woolf’s warning against replacement of beauty 
with use and commodity value and her discussion of exploitation of natural resources 
associates the writer with the contemporary debates of the Anthropocene/Capitalocene, 
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especially with its attempt to regard “humans as a species, who are often alienated from the 
effects of their labors.”794 
As we know from Susan Squier’s essay “‘The London Scene’: Gender and Class in 
Virginia Woolf’s London,” Woolf’s original intention in “The Docks of London” was 
precisely to criticize the “consuming middle class” society, which exploited the labour of 
working class and the natural resources. The first drafts of Woolf’s essay contained several 
passages where Woolf mentions “unremitting labour full of sweat & agony & squalor & 
horror” contrasted with the “million different luxuries & necessities” enjoyed by the middle 
class. Therefore, the original version of the text was supposed to illustrate “the price in human 
suffering paid by the working classes to produce the necessities and luxuries which middle- 
and upper-class England consumes.”795 Moreover, the original version of the passage 
describing production and handling of waste contained a reference to silt being transported 
and dropped into the sea, the image of men throwing away their rubbish contrasted with the 
image of women cleaning the mess after them, intersected by the sailing out of the liner 
towards India. According to Squire, had not the passages of social criticism been removed; 
the essay’s conclusion would be much more ironical and critical than the celebratory tone of 
the human progress and ability of the published text: 
The only thing, one comes to feel, that can change the routine of the docks is a 
change in ourselves. Suppose, for instance, that we gave up drinking claret, or 
took to using rubber instead of wool for our blankets, the whole machinery of 
production and distribution would rock and reel and seek about to adapt itself 
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afresh. It is we—our tastes, our fashions, our needs—that make the cranes dip 
and swing, that call the ships from the sea. Our body is their master.796  
Squier suggests that Woolf identifies with the consumer middle class, which rules the docks 
and the country’s economy by their needs, and also that this identification and suppression of 
her original passages of social criticism was a reasonable decision to “avoid friction with the 
magazine’s audience.”797 I would like to argue that although Woolf changes the pronoun to 
“we,” she mockingly pretends to identify not only with the consumer middle class, but with 
the whole concept of man regarded as the master of nature. Consequently, Woolf’s later 
suggestion that “one feels an important, a complex, a necessary animal”798 while watching 
their achievements may be read as an ironical comment on the human self-proclaimed 
supremacy. This reading is justified not only by Woolf’s original intention to criticize the 
consumerist society, but also by the very ending of the published version of the essay, where 
Woolf does not elaborate on the success of capitalist consumer society but returns her 
attention towards the natural elements exploited by human action: “Flocks upon flocks of 
Australian sheep have submitted to the shears because we demand woollen overcoats in 
winter. As for the umbrella that we swing idly to and fro, a mammoth who roared through the 
swamps fifty thousand years ago has yielded up its tusk to make the handle.”799 This passage 
directly refers to the involuntary sacrifice that animals make in order to satisfy human needs. 
Moreover, the image of a person merrily swinging his or her umbrella contrasted with the 
slaughtering of mammoths, or the image of a person wrapped comfortably in a woollen coat 
juxtaposed with the scene of sheep shearing seem to be highly ironical and critical. The very 
last lines of the essay describe the incessant movement of goods import, sorting out, and 
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transportation of products all over England while other ships depart for colonies to seek for 
more merchandise. This ending highlights the indifference of consumers towards the suffering 
of animals and the price that nature pays for satisfying their needs, and indicates that this 
misuse of nature and its resources is likely to continue until we have realised that the only 
way to change this system, “the routine of the docks,” represents “the change in ourselves” 
mentioned earlier in the essay. Therefore, this “change in ourselves” refers to the necessity of 
admitting the detrimental impact of human action and to the urgency of adoption of 
Septimus’s universal love principle, which treats people, animals, and other natural elements 
as equals because they are all equally “alive.” 
Interestingly, ecofeminists Dona Haraway,800 Isabelle Stengers, and Viviane 
Despret801 take inspiration in Woolf’s ability to “venture off the beaten track to meet 
unexpected, non-natal kin,”802 her urge to pose questions and envisage “the idea of a world 
that could be habitable.”803 While discussing the Anthropocene in her book Staying with the 
Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Haraway refers to Woolf while talking about the 
realization that humans are responsible for the conditions of life of other species, bodies, and 
things.804 All three ecofeminists allude to Woolf’s passage from Three Guineas where the 
author responds to the question about women’s tools to prevent the war as follows: “Think we 
must. . . Let us never cease from thinking what is this ‘civilisation’ in which we find 
ourselves? What are these ceremonies and why should we take part in them?”805 In this 
response, Woolf emphasizes that it is important for women to question the beaten tracks of 
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our society and not to accept them without considering their consequences. In her article “The 
Anthropocene (and) (in) the Humanities: Possibilities for Literary Studies” Melina Pereira 
Savi suggests that the man’s question about women’s possibilities to prevent the war may be 
transposed to the context of ecology and reformulates it as follows: “How can we improve 
this situation we have put ourselves in, where climate change threatens to end with 
innumerous lives on Earth, including our own?”806 Therefore, Woolf’s injection “Think we 
must” and its continuation do not necessarily refer mainly to women, who must question 
patriarchy, but these words, in general, make us reflect on our habits and detrimental 
behaviour, which would result in gradual “change in ourselves,” and consequently “the 
change in society” longed for by Septimus. In this light, the pronoun “we” from the final 
passage of Woolf´s essay “Docks of London” does not imply the author’s identification with 
middle class and her celebration of consumerism, but reveals that Woolf was aware of her 
complicity in human mistreatment of nature. To read this essay as the celebration of the 
economic growth of the Empire and consumerism of the country’s middle class, which is 
based on the exploitation of natural resources and ill-treatment of animals, would contradict 
Woolf’s celebration of the connection between human beings and nature. As a result, 
Septimus’s argument that “trees are alive,” Louis’s exclamation in The Waves that “All seems 
alive,”807 Clarissa Dalloway being a part “of the trees at home; of the house,”808 or the 
suggestion from Between the Acts that “Sheep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves—all are one”809 
would come to nothing. Nevertheless, Woolf’s decision to suppress the critical passages in the 
short story complicates, and partly undermines, the argument made in this section. 
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At the beginning of her essayistic memoir “A Sketch of the Past,” Virginia Woolf 
talks about the major influences on her personality and work. She mentions that the family’s 
summer stays in St Ives, Cornwall, were “perennial, invaluable”810 and that “if life has a base 
that it stands upon,”811 for her, it is undoubtedly the moments when she was lying in her St. 
Ives’ nursery and listening to the rhythmic sound of waves, which led to moments of ecstasy 
and intensive experience Woolf calls “moments of being.” Woolf argues that these moments 
are important for her aesthetic perception of reality as a writer and that she thinks the 
moments are accompanied with “a revelation of some order” and “a token of some real thing 
behind appearances.”812 In her writing, Woolf attempts to penetrate beneath the surface of 
appearances and fragments, and she retrieves the solidity and reality of things by putting them 
into words and giving them a sense of wholeness: “It is a rupture I get when in writing I seem 
to be discovering what belongs to what; making a scene come right; making a character come 
together.”813 The wholeness and unity that are repeatedly evoked in the essay, and also in 
many of Woolf’s works, as it has been pointed out in this dissertation, is the basis of Woolf’s 
“personal philosophy” which is primarily defined as an ontological interconnection of all 
human beings:  
From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant 
idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I mean 
all human beings—are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of 
art; that we are parts of the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the 
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truth about this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, 
there is no Beethoven; and certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are 
the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself.814 
First, it is important to focus on Woolf’s notion of the word “philosophy” which does not 
refer to a system of philosophical enquiry and concepts but encapsulates her perspective of 
reality and the basis of her artistic vision. In other words, it may be summarized as her own 
system of beliefs and ideas which helps her give some frame to miscellaneous and often 
contradictory impressions and experience. As Benjamin Hagen points out, Woolf rejected 
abstract philosophy dissociated from real life, of which we can find evidence in her letter 
concerning Herbert Read’s review of Roger Fry’s lectures, where Woolf asks the question 
“what is the value of a philosophy which has no power over life?”815  A similar definition of 
philosophy is provided also by Bernard in The Waves, where the character defines his 
philosophy as something constantly evolving, incoherent, and connected to the everyday 
experience: “My philosophy, always accumulating, welling up moment by moment, runs like 
quicksilver a dozen ways at once.”816  
Returning to the description of Woolf’s philosophy in “A Sketch of the Past,” it also 
reveals Woolf’s rejection of the transcendental, or divine, disconnected from the world we 
perceive, and the author’s atheism probably inspired by Leslie Stephen. In this respect, 
Woolf’s philosophy might be described as a very down-to-earth, atheistic, and “materialistic,” 
however, “the pattern behind the cotton wool” and the connection at the ontological level 
indicate that Woolf acknowledges that there is some organizing principle behind the physical 
world, although it is not the result of the work of a divine being. For example, Mark Hussey 
argues that there is certain “yearning for transcendence of the world of time and death” and a 
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quasi-religious sense of “something more to life,”817 and J. Ashley Foster suggests that 
Woolf’s “luminous halo,” which often refers to the spiritual aspect of reality, “is not 
transcendent but immanent in the material.”818 In this respect, Woolf’s philosophy is not 
dualistic but more likely a monist one, as it interweaves the spiritual and material aspects of 
existence, for example in the essay “On Being Ill,” where she likens the inseparable 
cooperation between the body and mental experience to “the sheath of a knife or the pod of a 
pea.”819 This reveals that Woolf was interested in the fundamental questions of philosophy, 
and particularly in the question of the substance of reality and the relation of our experience 
with this reality. Woolf pays special attention to these issues in her early essay “Modern 
Fiction,” where she urges writers to find new techniques to capture “reality, this essential 
thing,”820 outlines new possibilities to construct characters and reconsiders the traditional 
notion of a plot. Woolf demonstrates this attempt to reconceptualize reality in fiction in her 
early short stories “The Mark on the Wall,” where she asks a question about the knowledge of 
the external world and provides several definitions of the mark, which enables her to come to 
a conclusion that there is no “standard thing, the real thing.”821 The question of the nature of 
reality is foregrounded especially in the novel To the Lighthouse, where it is primarily Mr 
Ramsay who conducts a research into “subject and object and the nature of reality.”822 
However, all the other characters attempt to conceptualize their own notion of reality and 
position in which they stand in relation to other elements of reality, whether it be Lily, who 
tries to capture the personality of Mrs Ramsay, or Mrs Ramsay, who places herself in the 
centre of the interpersonal relations. 
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Furthermore, Woolf’s above-mentioned rejection of the existence of creators such as 
Shakespeare or Beethoven intimates another aspect of Woolf’s philosophy, namely her idea 
that our universe and culture might be self-creative or even collectively produced, which is a 
direct consequence of her aversion to a dominating subject or “strong ego”823 that stands in 
opposition to the subjects/objects in its environment. The quotation from “A Sketch of the 
Past” suggests that the author, a subject, manifests themselves only in the produced work of 
art, an object, and cannot be extracted from it. As a result, Woolf’s idea that “we are the thing 
itself” is repeatedly manifested in her fiction by a gradual deconstruction of the subject/object 
binary, for example in To the Lighthouse, where Mrs Ramsay “became the thing she looked 
at,”824 or in The Waves, where Susan becomes naturals objects in her environment, for 
example a stalk or a tree.  
These hints at Woolf’s interest in questions such as the nature of our being, the 
fundamental substance of reality, the relation between the subject and the object, and the 
interpersonal connection of human beings illustrate that Woolf’s fiction may be read as 
philosophical, or “philosophically literary.”825 Woolf reveals her interest in philosophy also in 
her essays and reviews, for example in “The Cosmos,” a review of Thomas James Cobden-
Sanderson’s journals, where Woolf describes the artist’s interest in the meaning of the word 
cosmos and the harmony between objects of the naturals word. Woolf highlights the man’s 
focus on the everyday objects, behind which some profound truths and symbols are hidden: 
“Nothing exists in itself but only as a means to something else. The solid objects of daily life 
become rimmed with high purposes, significant, symbolic.”826 It is interesting that this 
relation of objects and something “transcendental” behind them is also explored in Woolf’s 
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own prose, for example in “Solid Objects” or To the Lighthouse. Moreover, Woolf mentions 
Cobden-Sanderson’s intimate connections with naturals elements – the fact that he was “more 
related to the hills and streams”827 than people around him. This idea is also foregrounded in 
Woolf’s fiction, where human characters are often interwoven with the surrounding 
environment.  
Woolf herself disliked prose whose main topic was interpersonal relationships because 
this kind of writing neglected the fact that “a large and important part of life consists in our 
emotion toward such things as roses and nightingales, the dawn, the sunset. . .”828 In her 
review of L. P. Jacks’s works, which appears under the title “Philosophy in Fiction” in 
Woolf’s collected essays, Woolf reveals her interest in philosophical fiction and argues that it 
is, at the same time, intellectually demanding and brings new perspectives. She claims that 
Lawrence Pearsall Jacks, English educator, philosopher, and Unitarian minister, was 
“something besides a novelist”829 because his writing is enriched with the knowledge of 
philosophy and religious speculation, which is for her the quality “which we wish that more 
novelists shared with him.”830 Moreover, Woolf states that this philosophical mode of Jacks’s 
fiction enables the author to articulate “a different method of approach and a different 
direction,”831 by which she means that the author offers new perspectives on writing and 
reading and shows his readers a little different version of reality, however intellectually 
challenging it might be. It may be deduced from these various reflections of Woolf on 
philosophy and literature that the author was intrigued by philosophical enquiry, which is 
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mirrored in the fact that her writing poses more questions than provides answers. Whereas it 
may be said that her writing is philosophical, it does not provide a clear, unified, and 
unambiguous system of beliefs and ideas, but, rather, explores in literary language the general 
changes in society, philosophy, and science of her time. Therefore, Woolf attempted to 
convey the same ideas aesthetically in her writing as her contemporary philosophers, 
biologists, and physicists.  
While Woolf’s philosophy has been analysed and put in dialogue with numerous 
philosophers, this thesis suggests that if it is to be approximated to anything, it is very close to 
the cosmology of Alfred North Whitehead, whose large scope includes and analyses the same 
ideas as Woolf’s personal philosophy outlined above. Whitehead himself claims in his 
dialogues that art is the means to handle our experience and gives it some kind of structure: 
“‘Art,’ said Whitehead, coming to our rescue, ‘is the imposing of a pattern on experience, and 
our aesthetic enjoyment is recognition of the pattern.”832 Interestingly, this task of art is often 
the subject of Woolf’s fiction, which is foreshadowed in the essay “Modern Fiction,” where 
Woolf argues that writers should “record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in order in 
which they fall” and “trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, 
which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness.”833 Moreover, Woolf’s recurrent 
mention of the pattern is also important because it appears in her fiction not only in reference 
to the structure of our experience but also to the interconnection of human beings in “A 
Sketch of the Past.” In this light, the four chapters of this thesis, devoted to various aspects of 
Woolf’s aesthetic treatment of reality, may be regarded as an attempt to trace this pattern that 
organizes Woolf’s experience of the visible world. Furthermore, Whitehead claims in Science 
and The Modern World that “it is in literature that the concrete outlook of humanity receives 
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its expression” and that literature reveals “the inward thoughts of a generation.”834 The 
philosopher illustrates this on the example of Romantic poetry that rebelled against the 
scientific materialism and mechanistic perspective of nature in favour of the organic view of 
nature. In a similar way, the analysis of Woolf’s fiction in this thesis uncovers the writer’s 
generation’s ideas about the universe. Moreover, Woolf’s constant return to the philosophical 
questions about the nature of experience, reality, nature, and the relation between the humans 
and these entities, may be regarded as a contribution to the tradition of male-dominated 
philosophy. In her short story “A Society” Woolf ironically discusses the roles of men and 
women in society and their contribution to its general welfare. The female characters of the 
story are sent to institutions and trades dominated by men to find out what the greatest 
achievement of masculinity are and the women return with reports that eulogize men’s 
success:  
Here one after another of our messengers rose and delivered their reports. The 
marvels of civilisation far exceeded our expectations, and as we learn for the 
first time how man flies in the air, talks across space, penetrates to the heart of 
an atom, and embraces the universe in his speculations a murmur of admiration 
burst from our lips.835 
Knowing that Woolf was highly critical of the fact that women were not allowed to participate 
in the ground-breaking discoveries and advancements of civilisation, this thesis aimed to 
demonstrate that Woolf envisages her writing as her own means to penetrate to the depths of 
reality, to discover the “atoms” of experience and “embrace the universe” in her artistic way, 
which may be regarded as an equal contribution to the men’s philosophical enquires of her 
time. Particularly, the thesis analysed that her “literary philosophy” is strikingly similar to 
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Whitehead’s philosophy or organism, which proved to be a fruitful and enlightening tool 
while analysing Woolf’s writing. Although the thesis was intended to discuss primarily 
Virginia Woolf’s writing and the way it is may be captured via Whitehead’s concepts, it 
finally turned out to be equally informative of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism and its 
potential for literary analysis. Moreover, while focusing on the issues such as panpsychism 
and the deconstruction of the human/nonhuman binary, the thesis demonstrated that 
Whitehead’s organic metaphysical system is in many ways timeless, since it is still relevant in 
the context of contemporary critical theory. This relevance, of course, springs from the fact 
that many contemporary ecocritics or new materialists, who are also mentioned in this thesis, 
were more or less directly influenced by Whitehead or Deleuze, whose thought is heavily 
indebted to the prominent process philosopher. The following conclusion summarizes the 
main reasons why Woolf may be, with no reservations, labelled as a process speculative 




Woolf as a Speculative Process Philosopher 
Process philosophy is a school of philosophical thought that dates back to antiquity, to 
philosophers such as Heraclitus and his famous phrase “panta rhei,” which emphasizes the 
fact that the universe is in a constant flux and process of change. His philosophy of flow was a 
direct reaction to philosophers such as Parmenides, who believed in the static nature of the 
universe. Similarly, the twentieth century process philosophers, with Whitehead in the lead, 
refused the notion of static and solid substance, which dominated natural science of that time, 
and attempted to approach the universe as an organism comprised of microparticles of 
experience that combine in creative configurations and larger societies of the visible world. 
Due to the constant process of becoming and perishing of these particles, which Whitehead 
calls “actual entities,” this ontology undermines the traditional notion of stable and changeless 
matter and permits the accommodation of experience as integral part of the visible world, 
whereby it subverts the Cartesian mind-body dualism. Whitehead personally rejected this 
dualism represented, on the one hand, by the late 19th century British idealism of F.H. 
Bradley, which was “too much divorced from the scientific outlook,”836 and, on the other 
hand, scientific materialism of mechanical philosophy and physics based on “irreducible brute 
matter.”837 Whitehead oversteps this dualism by envisaging a theory of speculative non-
reductionist monism, which acknowledges the existence of material reality but imagines this 
reality as composed of atoms described as “drops of experience.”838  
Virginia Woolf solves the same dilemma in the first two decades of the 20th century, 
when she objects to the materialist turn in the fiction of her contemporaries, who focus too 
much on external details and leave out a character’s experience completely. Contrary to 
writers such as Arnold Bennett, John Galsworthy, or H.G. Wells, she urges modern writers to 
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focus on the internal life of a character and transcription of their experience. It has been 
pointed out that her idea of atoms of experience outlined in “Modern Fiction” is strikingly 
similar to Whitehead’s definition of actual entities. Moreover, it has been demonstrated in her 
essay “On Being Ill” that Woolf may also be called a monist who attributes the same 
significance to the material and mental aspects of reality and insists on the interrelation of 
these kinds of experience. Consequently, the first two chapters analysed Woolf’s and 
Whitehead’s engagement with the idea that the notions of subject and object are only relative 
and interchangeable terms. While Whitehead solves this problem on the microlevel of actual 
entities, which are at the same time subjects of their own experience of the environment and 
objects to be experienced by their environment, Woolf applies this idea to macroscale objects, 
including human beings and material objects such as houses or trees. It has been illustrated 
that the characters in her short stories “The Mark on the Wall” and “Solid Objects” often enter 
intimate relationships with objects in their environment, these objects lose their solidity and 
become part of the perceiving subject during the process of “prehension.” Conversely, the 
subject, for example Mrs Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, prehends an object and “becomes” 
that object, which erases the distance between the two entities by merging into one entity. 
This approaching of the human subject towards a nonhuman object anticipated the discussion 
of the following chapters, where Woolf is represented as a thinker who undermines 
anthropocentrism rooted both in Western science and literature.  
This natural interchange between the roles of a subject and an object and simultaneous 
adoption of both roles are also enabled by Woolf’s and Whitehead’s reconfiguration of the 
term “things” which are no longer static blocks of matter but multiple organic entities that 
“enjoy adventures of change throughout time and space”839 like John’s lump of glass in “Solid 
Objects,” which “loses its actual form and recomposes itself a little differently in an ideal 
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shape which haunts the brain when we least expect it.”840 This quotation also illustrates that 
Woolf’s fiction is not filled with fixed unchangeable things but processes that emerge and 
develop in relation to their environment. This nature of Woolf’s view of reality is 
foreshadowed already in her essay on Montaigne, where she acknowledges that “movement 
and change are the essence of our being” and that “rigidity is death.”841 Therefore, it may be 
concluded that both Woolf and Whitehead rejected materialism rooted either in science, art, or 
literature of their time and attempted to reconsider the everyday reality, which is no longer 
divided into active subjects and passive objects but entities that possess properties of both of 
these categories.  
Their refocus on experience as an integral part of materiality and intention to link the 
subject and the object may be also seen as a parallel to the aesthetics of Post-Impressionism. 
In his essay “The Post-Impressionists” Fry talks about the difference between Impressionists 
and Post-Impressionists, and he argues that what the Post-Impressionists oppose is the 
Impressionists’ urge to depict the exact impression or appearance of an object. On the one 
hand, this approach to painting produces pictures which capture the exact appearance of 
matter, but, on the other hand, fail to express “emotional significance which lies in things.”842 
Therefore, whereas for Fry the Impressionist paintings capture dead material nature of one’s 
impression, to which we as subject-observers cannot relate, the Post-Impressionist paintings 
emit an emotion, which Whitehead called “lure for feeling,”843 and cease to be objects 
separate from perceiving subjects because they intermingle with the experience of the 
perceiving subject. Woolf, for example, finds this ability of a painting to blur the distinction 
between the subject and the object in Vanessa Bell’s paintings which “give us an emotion” 
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and illustrate that her sister was an artist “to whom the visible world has given a shock of 
emotion.”844  
It has been demonstrated in the first chapter of this thesis that Woolf’s characters, for 
example John in “Solid Objects,” or Lily and Mrs Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, also 
experience a shock caused by their encounter with everyday objects, which usually results in a 
strong surge of emotion and giving up of the strong subject position. While Fry discusses the 
Impressionist painting, he rejects their depiction of an impression of a thing as it appears to a 
perceiving mind, because it completely leaves out the basic characteristics of a thing, for 
example “the ‘treeness’ of a tree.”845 This objection demonstrates that Fry, in fact, accuses the 
Impressionists of bifurcating nature and the visible world in the same way as Whitehead’s 
contemporary scientists. For Fry, the Impressionists distinguished between the things 
themselves and the impression of them, which is mediated by our mind and changing external 
conditions. Analogously, Whitehead claimed that “the theory of psychic additions” bifurcated 
the visible world into “the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause 
of awareness.”846 Instead, Whitehead suggested that what one sees is the final and real fact in 
nature, an object to be studied by natural science that includes all the properties perceived by 
an observer. In “Solid Objects” Woolf studies the piece of material collected by John in the 
same way as natural scientists of her time, and she highlights all the diverse qualities the 
objects possess and does not indicate that these qualities are only added by a perceiving mind 
or result from John’s solipsism. Throughout the story, Woolf emphasizes the solidity and 
“realness” of the objects that have emotional impact on the minds in their surroundings.  
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The second chapter of this thesis elaborated on the first chapter and used Whitehead’s 
idea of an actual entity described as a subject of its experience. Since it can influence its 
process of becoming and affect the objects in its environment, it has a certain degree of 
“sentience.” Therefore, no piece of material can be regarded as purely inert and lifeless. The 
attribution of psychic properties and experience to physical material is often labelled as 
panpsychism, of which Whitehead is often considered to be a representative. In this respect, 
Whitehead anticipates the theories of currently popular new materialism and Jane Bennett’s 
idea of vibrant matter, which liberates material objects from their passivity and endows them 
with agency. It has also been pointed out that several new materialists, for example Karen 
Barad, were influenced either directly by Whitehead, or indirectly via Deleuze. Consequently, 
Whitehead’s idea of active nature, which he himself demonstrates on the example of British 
Romantics in a chapter of his book Science and the Modern World, was used to analyse 
Woolf’s anthropomorphic descriptions of “enminded” and active objects in her fiction. After 
the general introduction to panpsychism, the chapter focused on objects in the novel To the 
Lighthouse, mainly the central passage “Time Passes,” where inanimate entities such as ships, 
cliffs, and the lighthouse seem to be conscious of their environment and interact with human 
and nonhuman objects/subjects in their environment. For example, the lighthouse “laid its 
caress”847 and Lily’s canvas “rebukes” the artist with its “uncompromising white stare,”848 
which shows that the human experience is often decentred in the novel and the inanimate 
world acquires proto-psychic properties and agency. The same sentient materiality was 
tracked in Woolf’s other novels, for example in Orlando, where the protagonist’s mansion is 
personified, or in Jacob’s Room where Woolf endows the moor with sentience and 
 
847. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 145.  
848. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 171.  
245 
 
emphasizes “breathing”849 and action of natural phenomena independent of the behaviour of 
humans.  
The following part of the chapter then explored the emphasis that Woolf lays on life 
and agency as a universal quality distributed in nature, which is illustrated in some of her 
short stories, and most significantly in her posthumously published “The Death of the Moth.” 
Therefore, the first half of the chapter elaborates on Derek Ryan’s discussion of animal 
consciousness in relation to Jacob von Uexküll’s concept of “umwelt,”850 in other words a 
perceptual world in which an organism exists and acts as a subject, and extends the idea of 
sentient organisms beyond the animate organisms to the realm of the inanimate material 
world. This notion of universally distributed experience in nature indicates that Woolf was 
aware of anthropocentrism and materialism of the modern period, which entails that her 
recurrent anthropomorphic descriptions of matter represent her own response to the central 
position of the human subject not only in literature but also in modern science, which 
supported the human action in general, regardless its impact on the environment. In this 
respect, both Whitehead and Woolf opposed anthropocentrism and the celebration of the 
scientific and material progress of their time, and continued in the footsteps of the 
Romantics,851 who could still see the Wordsworthian “splendour in the grass” and were 
conscious of the intimate relation between the humans and the surrounding world. Moreover, 
they both anticipated the theories of new materialism that acknowledge the “vibrancy” of 
matter, alongside which Woolf’s fiction has already been read. However, these accounts did 
not emphasize enough the fact that material objects are not only centres of agency but also of 
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experience. Therefore, Whitehead’s and Woolf’s inclination towards panpsychism, their 
attribution of experience to inanimate nature, acquires an ethical aspect by recognising that 
even material things and nonhuman animals are “autonomous centres of value.”852  
As in the case of the blurred boundary between the subject and the object discussed in 
the first chapter, which was related to the techniques of the Post-Impressionist painting, even 
Woolf’s and Whitehead’s emphasis on experience dispersed throughout nature may be put in 
dialogue with the Post-Impressionist conception of nature. It has been pointed out in the 
second chapter of this thesis that the Bloomsbury Group members understood “nature” in two 
ways—first, as a source of aesthetic emotion, and second, as the material world—which often 
cannot be clearly distinguished from each other.853 In this respect, the chapter focused 
primarily on the larger definition of nature as the material world, however, it also dealt with 
emotion and experience that are either directly present in nature or produced by perceiving it. 
As demonstrated on Whitehead’s reconfiguration of the concept of matter as a megaprocess 
consisting of constantly changing clusters of experiential particles, the concept of nature, in 
the sense of the material world, was being redefined at the beginning of the 20th century by 
diverse advancements in philosophy and science. Therefore, it is not surprising that this 
reconceptualization was also reflected in the visual art of that time.  
When Fry accuses the Impressionists of producing a mere imitation of nature, he 
emphasizes that what is captured in their images is a passive, or inert, nature dependent on the 
human observer, or in his own words “a passive attitude towards the appearances of 
things.”854 Fry suggests that a painting should also capture the emotion that an object evokes 
by its “significant form.” Although a Post-Impressionist painting often represents “still lives,” 
it does not depict passive objects, but active sources of emotion or experience, and therefore, 
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sources of nonhuman agency.855 As a result, Post-Impressionist paintings are often deprived 
of human presence or indicate that human subjects are made from the same texture as material 
objects. For example, Vanessa Bell’s paintings never contain fully framed and perfectioned 
human figures, but often silent people without a face or partially blurred face, who are 
“aesthetically on an equality with the China por or the chrysanthemum.”856 Hence, this Post-
Impressionist attraction to the nonhuman world and nonhuman agency may be likened to both 
Whitehead’s philosophical focus on nature as a source of feeling and experience, based on 
experiencing actual entities, and Woolf’s descriptions of animate nature that push human 
agency aside. Moreover, the Post-Impressionists were interested in an object’s relations with 
other objects and the relations of the colours, forms, and shapes, or in Woolf’s words “the 
pattern” behind the cotton wool of everydayness, which cannot be experienced by human 
perception. Woolf herself encapsulated this interest in the pattern beyond the objects of 
visible world in the following quotation from her diary where she talks about her perception 
of Cézanne’s painting of apples: “There are six apples in the Cézanne picture. What can 6 
apples not be? I began to wonder. There’s their relationship to each other, & their colour, & 
their solidity.”857 It has been demonstrated that the objects in Woolf’s fiction are often 
depicted by the interaction with other objects, for example in To the Lighthouse where the 
cliffs are aware of the ships and even seem to communicate with each other, or in Jacob’s 
Room where “the whole air is tremulous with breathing; elastic with filaments.”858 It has been 
pointed out in the second chapter of this thesis that Woolf’s descriptions of the animate and 
intrinsically interrelated nature may be interpreted via Whitehead’s innovative concept of 
nature based on universal relationality of subjective actual entities, or societies. Therefore, it 
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is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that there was a general tendency in the first decades 
of the 20th century to forge new conceptions of nature, which would oppose the 19th century 
ideas of passive and materialist nature. These new conceptions differed only in respect to the 
means that were used to negate the aforementioned idea of materialistic nature. For Post-
Impressionists painters, it was their paintings of “emotional” objects and attenuated human 
element, for Whitehead, it was a philosophical enquiry into nature described as a relational 
organism, and finally for Woolf, it was the exploration of panpsychism, the idea of 
“enminded” nature, which enabled her to get rid of material “waste, deadness, superfluity.”859 
The third chapter focused mainly on Woolf’s and Whitehead’s reconceptualization of 
personal identity and illustrated that Woolf’s characters do not represent stable identities, but 
changing unities made of both physical and mental processes. Furthermore, these entities are 
very closely related to other “personal societies” in their surroundings. The first part of the 
chapter illustrated that Woolf was searching for a definition of human life and personal 
identity throughout her fiction, diaries, and essays, for example in “The Mark of the Wall,” 
where she compares life to a ride in the Tube, therefore, to something fast and changing, and 
emphasizes that life or identity is formed in every single instant. In her diary, she argues that 
“we change,” which means that she acknowledges she processual view of personal identity 
that opposes the idea of the static and unitary subject dominating the Western philosophical 
tradition. Instead, process philosophers argue that “fixity simply does not square with the 
character of our experience,”860 hence, it is more apt to define a person as a society of actual 
entities which emerge and perish. Unique traits of these entities are passed on the newly 
emerged actual entities, which ensures the relative stability of one’s identity. However, like 
material objects, even these societies “enjoy adventures of change throughout time and 
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space”861 as their configurations reorder, comprise new actual entities with different traits, or 
interact with entities belonging to the surrounding societies. In this way, a processual identity 
is always in the making, in the process of “becoming.” It has been demonstrated that Woolf 
often evokes the images of unstable, nonunitary, and changing identity in her fiction, for 
example in her essay “Street Haunting: The London Adventure,” where she acknowledges 
that the unity of identity is only a convention, or in “Evening Over Sussex: Reflections in a 
Motor Car,” where Woolf captures the many selves one can possess. The changing nature of 
one’s identity is best illustrated in The Waves, where Bernard admits that he is “made and 
remade continually”862 and Louis suggests that people “assemble different forms, make 
different patterns.”863 This description of identity provided by these two characters is 
strikingly similar to Whitehead’s societies comprised of concrescending and perishing actual 
entities, therefore, Woolf’s idea of identity may be labelled as processual. Moreover, it has 
been pointed out that since Whitehead introduced both his microscopic actual entity and 
macroscopic society as primarily relational units, they may serve as means to analyse Woolf’s 
exploration of intersubjective identity in The Waves and subsequent works. The characters of 
The Waves are interrelated and cannot separate their identity from the others’ identities to 
such an extent that an individual identity is “overcome.”864 Furthermore, Woolf emphasizes 
that a character’s traits contribute to the formation of another character’s identity, which is 
incapsulated in Bernard’s claim that he needs “the illumination of other people’s eyes”865 to 
form his own identity. As a result, it may be concluded that Woolf rejected the “dim” 
bifurcation of reality into “The Whole,” “That Other,” and “This-My-Self”866 that Whitehead 
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criticizes in his Modes of Thought. Whether the philosopher elaborates on his concept of 
actual entities or societies, he always emphasizes that “everything that in any sense exists has 
two sides, namely, its individual self and its signification in the universe.”867 This statement is 
based on Whitehead’s idea that each actual entity is a subject but also an object, which offers 
itself as a component of a process of becoming of other entities. This entails that each actual 
entity, or a society, is a holder of value. Since Whitehead argues that “everything has some 
value for itself, for others and for the whole,” his ontology acquires an ethical aspect, 
therefore, his philosophy of organism based on interconnection and value of all parts of the 
organism may be labelled as “ontoethics.”  
This aspect of Whitehead’s metaphysics inspired feminist process philosophers and 
other feminist thinkers such as Isabelle Stengers and Donna Haraway, whose works devise a 
more habitable universe, where various animal species and organic and inorganic elements 
interact in a profitable and harmless way. John B. Cobb, on the one hand, points out that 
process philosophy “has been almost exclusively masculine in style and tone,” but, on the 
other hand, refers to Mary Daly, who talks about Whitehead as about “an androgynous mind” 
in her book Beyond God the Father. Cobb argues that although Whitehead does not reject 
polarities in his metaphysical system as strictly as Woolf in her feminist essay A Room of 
One’s Own,868 his thinking attacked “one-sidedness” and demonstrated the need to transcend 
certain historically rooted dualisms, or bifurcations. Similarly, in her book The Female 
Eunuch, Germaine Greer refers to Whitehead as to someone who envisaged a holistic 
universe and did not emphasize the polarity between sexes.869 Cobb argues that there should 
be more elaboration on the link between feminism and process thought because feminists can 
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find “some of process features of conceptuality uniquely helpful.”870 Taken this into 
consideration, the second part of the third chapter described how Woolf’s feminism and 
Whitehead’s holistic ontoethics complement each other and concluded that Woolf might be 
recognized as a philosopher who sees holistic unity and value behind all existence. 
Conversely, Whitehead’s process thinking advances some ideas of Woolf’s feminism, or any 
feminism, which advocates relationality and inclusivity.  
It has been demonstrated that Woolf outlines a similar ontoethics in her late works “A 
Sketch of the Past,” Three Guineas, and Between the Acts where she acknowledges the 
interconnection of human beings in “a work of art,”871 or “one life.”872 It is interesting that in 
her late works Woolf starts to resort to the “the ethics of interrelatedness,”873 particularly in 
“A Sketch of the Past,” where she formulates her idea of relational “personal philosophy.” On 
the one hand, it is undoubtedly a reaction to the rising aggression in the pre-war Europe and 
Woolf’s own fear of the German invasion of the British Isles, which would probably lead to 
her and Leonard’s death, but, on the other hand, Woolf’s turn towards intersubjectivity, 
community, and inclusivity may be considered a part of her social feminism. While imagining 
her novel The Waves, Woolf intended to include characters of very diverse social and class 
backgrounds, however, she could not replicate the speech of working class and gave up her 
original decision. In Three Guineas Woolf commits to the criticism of patriarchal society 
perpetuated by its elitist educational system and devises an egalitarian type of women college 
that would strengthen the bonds between people and support cooperation. In Between the Acts 
Woolf elaborates on her appeal to socially divided and hypocritical English society, and, by 
the means of Miss La Trobe’s play, makes the characters face the state of pre-war society 
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symbolized by fragments of bodies reflected in mirrors and glass held by the actors. It has 
been demonstrated that throughout the text Woolf evokes the images of unity and lets her 
characters reflect on their affinity with human and nonhuman beings in their environment, 
which is best captured in Mrs Swithin’s claim that “Sheep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves—all 
are one”874 and the reverend’s attempt to interpret the pageant: “To me at least it was 
indicated that we are members of one another. Each is part of the whole.”875 It has been 
pointed out that this summary is strikingly similar to Whitehead’s idea from Modes of 
Thought about the value attributed to each existing entity, particularly to the following 
statement about interrelation of human beings: “We are, each of us, one among others; and all 
of us are embraced in the unity of the whole.”876 Consequently, this aspect of Whitehead’s 
fusion of ontology and ethics was further discussed as a means to analyse Woolf’s social 
feminist project of Three Guineas and Between the Acts, which is based on the idea of 
inclusive community and recognition of value of its individuals. While this aspect of Woolf’s 
late fiction has already been discussed from various points of view, it has never been 
associated with Whitehead. This demonstrates that although Whitehead represents a 
“masculine” analytical philosopher, he may have anticipated the propagators of the second 
and third-wave feminism, who worked hard to recognize not only the experience and value of 
every woman, but also marginal individuals such as homosexuals or people of colour. In this 
way, the chapter proves that Whitehead’s thought, which anticipates postmodern ethics, may 
well be discussed in relation to the current fight against all forms of discrimination and 
leaders, who divide, rather than unite, their respective communities. For the same reason, 
Woolf’s late fiction also seems to speak to us in a very direct and timeless way.  
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The last chapter of this thesis elaborates on the preceding ones in the way it again 
elaborates on Whitehead’s concept of relationality. It no longer uses it to discuss interpersonal 
relationships but to analyse Woolf’s relation of human beings to their natural environment. 
The main idea of the chapter was to highlight that while modernism is traditionally conceived 
as human-centred movement that foregrounds human beings as unique individuals, this 
hegemony of the human has been reconsidered in recent years and modernism started to be 
associated with the criticism of anthropocentrism. Scholars such as Gillian Beer, Derek Ryan, 
or Diana L. Swanson explored Virginia Woolf’s interest in the natural world and focussed on 
the less anthropocentric perspective that some of Woolf’s fiction provide. While the 
aforementioned scholars explored this tendency in Woolf’s fiction via Deleuze’s idea of 
rhizomatic being and creation of non-hierarchical relationships,877 Darwin’s evolution theory, 
which destabilized the centrality of the humans, and Freud’s exploration of primeval 
instincts,878 or argue about Woolf’s Copernican shift that decentred the human and attributed 
agency and intentionality879 to nonhuman beings, the last chapter of this thesis elaborated on 
these accounts of Woolf’s handling of the human/nonhuman relations by the lens of 
Whitehead’s solution to this binary division. The chapter draws heavily on the second chapter, 
which analysed the nonhuman agency and proto-conscious natural word in Woolf’s fiction in 
detail, and focuses primarily on Woolf’s dethronement of the human and her proto-
environmentalism.  
In Process and Reality Whitehead outlined a cosmological system where the human 
stuff is made of the same molecules and atoms, or more precisely actual entities, as the 
nonhuman material world. In this way, Whitehead salvages the western philosophy from its 
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anthropocentrism, perpetuated by the theories of solipsism, which he himself criticizes in his 
book Modes of Thought, emphasizing that humans “are merely one species in the throng of 
existences.”880 Whitehead bases this claim on his ontological system of actual entities, which 
are subjects of their own process of becoming, and at the same time, objects for the becoming 
of other entities. In this way, Whitehead’s complex “societies” are created from the external 
data and these complex processes cannot be strictly separated from other entities in their 
environment because they, in fact, arise from objective data in their surroundings. 
Consequently, the philosopher claims in the above-mentioned books that one’s body is always 
continuous with processes in its environment: “But the body is part of the external world, 
continuous with it. In fact, it is just as much part of nature as anything else – a river, or a 
mountain, or a cloud. Also, if we are fussily exact, we cannot define where a body begins and 
where external nature ends.”881  
This indistinct line between one’s body and the external world results precisely from 
Whitehead’s idea that the subject does not stand in opposition to the objective world but 
emerges from the objective data, which also seems to be relevant for Woolf’s conception of 
subjectivity and its relation to the external world. Her criticism of “inveterately 
anthropocentric”882 mind in her essay “Flying over London” is practically transposed into her 
fiction via the characters’ intimate connection with their natural environment, which is 
foregrounded especially in The Waves, where Louis claims that he is “rooted to the middle of 
the earth” and that his “body is a stalk”883 or where Susan acknowledges her rootedness in the 
environment in her statement “I think I am the field, I am the barn.”884 Moreover, these 
quotations also hint at the integration of a subject within their environment, which is intimated 
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already in Mrs Dalloway, where Clarissa is “being part of the trees at home; of the house 
there,” or in To the Lighthouse, where Mrs Ramsay has “a sense of being past everything, 
through everything, out of everything”885 and Lily renounces her subjectivity in order to “be 
on a level with ordinary experience, to feel simply that’s a chair, that’s a table.”886 This 
subjectivity emerged from and dispersed throughout the natural world is strikingly similar to 
the notion of deep ecology’s “transpersonal”887 subject, to which process-oriented view of 
identity is sometimes connected. This subject erases the boundary between an individual and 
their environment, which echoes Whitehead’s idea that “the body is very vaguely 
distinguishable from external world.”888 Similarly, Woolf’s characters’ close connection with 
nature hints at Woolf’s criticism of the artificial human/nonhuman binary. This idea 
penetrates most of Woolf’s fiction and may be traced also in Post-Impressionist paintings of 
Woolf’s time, which reflected on the position of the human destabilized by the then science, 
captured the return to primitive nature and used the pastoral imagery.889 This indicates that 
modernism was a movement which was deeply engaged with the crisis of nature, which 
resulted from the advancements in urbanisation, industrialisation, machinery, and other 
technical fields. Whitehead claims that this progress led to the complete dissociation of mind, 
value, and beauty from the material world, and that this materialism resulted in “the lack of 
reverence in the treatment of natural or artistic beauty.”890 Consequently, Whitehead warns 
the modern man against “the ignoration of the true relation of each organism to its 
environment” and “ignoring the worth of the environment,” which seems to be analogous to 
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Woolf’s own attempt to undermine materialism and to place the humans back to their natural 
environment.  
As a result, Woolf’s focus on the intimate interrelation of the humans with their 
natural environment enables the author to advance her “proto-ecological” project in some of 
her essays, where she directly addresses the question of human exploitation of nature and 
criticizes the human self-proclaimed right to dominate the natural environment, which might 
be traced already in Mrs Dalloway, where Septimus prophetically exclaims “Men must not 
cut trees.”891 The penultimate section of the final chapter explores Woolf’s departure from 
anthropocentrism, analyses her attempts to describe “a world seen without a self,” and 
highlights Woolf’s experimentation with the posthuman aesthetics. This has been 
demonstrated mainly on Woolf’s posthuman natural interludes in The Waves and the non-
anthropocentric passage “Time Passes” in To the Lighthouse, which indicates that the 
discussion elaborates on panpsychism traced in these passages in the second chapter. Contrary 
to the latter, it has been highlighted that Woolf was concerned with human action that often 
prevents nature’s productivity and self-sustainability. The criticism of the exploitation of 
nature and human agency imposed on natural elements has been explored in detail in the last 
section of the fourth chapter concerned with Woolf’s “London Scene” essays.  
It has been suggested that the essay “The Docks of London” depicts very minutely the 
consumerist model of society, and also what is at stake when the capitalist society chooses to 
prioritize their needs over the well-being of less developed countries or animal species. 
Furthermore, the section highlighted that Woolf anticipated the ecological crisis, in the form 
of waste handling or harmful treatment of animals, discussed nowadays in relation to the 
Anthropocene. For this reason, Woolf might be considered an environmentally aware writer, 
however, it has also been pointed out that it is often hard to distinguish whether she was 
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anticipating our time’s environmentalism or praising the human species for their progress in 
all spheres of life. This discrepancy may be ascribed to the irony Woolf uses quite masterfully 
to either disguise her own opinions, distance herself from the views that run counter the 
mainstream ideology, or just to leave the final interpretation up to her readers, who are never 
offered absolute truths but must create their own ones. To return to the Whiteheadian analysis 
of Woolf’s fiction and the philosopher’s own turn from anthropocentrism, it has been 
indicated that Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is often considered to be a more 
appropriate ontology for the Anthropocene because it foregrounds the interrelatedness and 
subjectivity of every element of the universe.892 Therefore, to link Woolf and Whitehead 
means to demonstrate that both the writer and the philosopher were ahead of their time in 
their attempts to subvert the bifurcation of nature, which distinguishes between the human 
subjects, who can exercise their power on other elements in nature, and the nonhuman objects, 
which were at that time considered passive, worthless, and created mainly to be used or 
consumed by the humans.  
To draw a conclusion from the points raised throughout this thesis and its contribution 
to the academic communities that study either Woolf’s and Whitehead’s oeuvres, it is 
important to emphasize that both Woolf and Whitehead reacted to the scientific, literary, and 
socio-cultural discourse of their time by the means they were the most familiar with—fiction 
writing and philosophical enquiry. The turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and the first half of 
the 20th century brought significant changes in all spheres of human lives, and these changes 
were necessarily reflected in the works of the period’s thinkers. It has been pointed out that 
Woolf rebelled against the Victorian literature and the Edwardians, who were “materialists” 
denying their characters’ souls and experience. In “Modern Fiction” Woolf suggested that a 
modern writer should “transcribe” one’s experience and she likened impressions to “atoms,” 
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by which she revealed her knowledge of New Physics, including astrophysics, represented by 
Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, James Jeans, Arthur Eddington, and last but not least Alfred 
North Whitehead, whose works Woolf might have known via Bertrand Russell or Ottoline 
Morell.893 Whitehead was dissatisfied with materialism and focus on empirical knowledge of 
the then science, which could not account for psychological aspects of reality. For this reason, 
he turned towards metaphysics, which was unpopular at that time, and attempted to correct 
the faults of philosophical thought of the period. Consequently, from his early book The 
Concept of Nature to the latter treatises, Whitehead was developing not only metaphysical, 
but cosmological system, which would describe the very structure of our universe and 
relations between its various elements.  
 Virginia Woolf, whose father Leslie Stephen in his essays also demanded the 
inclusion of experience in the theory of materiality, tried to react to the “materialist mode” of 
her period by her writing, and, like Whitehead, devised a “literary philosophy,” which 
anticipates the postmodern abandonment of binary thinking. Especially in the latter works, 
she approached “her philosophy” more imaginatively in order to draft a creative ontology of a 
more viable, just, and inclusive world. In fact, she ventured to take the Whiteheadian 
“imaginative leap” and outlined a new universe in her fiction, where matter is also experience, 
the subject is at the same time an object, and the individual is always somehow connected to 
other individuals like molecules and atoms studied by physics. Furthermore, these 
molecules/individuals are at once self-sufficient and interrelated with other molecules. 
Finally, it is very important to point out that this thesis, in no way, suggests that Woolf 
directly borrowed ideas from Whitehead and applied his concepts to her works, but it shows 
that both the writer and the philosopher felt the urge to react to analogous scientific and 
 
893. Holly Henry suggests in her book Virginia Woolf and the Discourse of Science: The 
Aesthetics of Astronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), on page 68, that the 
Woolfs met Whitehead in Morrell’s Garsington House.  
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literary conventions of their period. As a result, the thesis focuses on Whitehead and Woolf to 
the same extent and it cannot does not exclude the idea that it might well have been the 
budding modernist prose that inspired the philosopher in envisaging a new philosophical 
system. In Science and The Modern World Whitehead suggests that the Romantic poets were 
the first thinkers who realized that a new philosophy of nature, which would reject scientific 
materialism and mechanism of science, needs to explain notions such as change, value, 
organism, or interfusion. Consequently, these notions created a crucial part of not only 
Whitehead’s concept of nature, but also quantum theory.  
As Catriona Livingstone points out, the relationship between science and literature 
does not always need to represent an “unidirectional model of influence,”894 which makes of 
literature a field where scientific concepts are applied or exemplified. Instead, since both 
literature and science are the products of the same discourse, they represent open fields, as 
suggested by Gillian Beer, which complement each other and borrow from one another. 
Livingstone suggests that a new model of influence might be likened to a “feedback loop,” 
which means that a scientific concept is borrowed by literature, used in a slightly different 
way, and consequently, it returns to the scientific field as enriched because it may be applied 
to different notions than the original concept. Interestingly, Whitehead himself mentions at 
the beginning of Process and Reality that every invention, or defined concept, needs to be 
tested in other field than where it is introduced: “The success of the imaginative experiment is 
always to be tested by the applicability of its results beyond the restricted locus from which it 
originated.”895 Consequently, when this experiment is proven applicable to other disciplines, 
it is endowed with further features and potentialities. Livingstone exemplifies this on the 
 
894. Catriona Livingstone, “Experimental Identities: Quantum Physics in Popular Science 
Writing and Virginia Woolf’s The Waves,” Journal of Literature and Science 11, no. 1 
(2018): 75, http://www.literatureandscience.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/LIVINGSTONE-final.pdf. 
895. Whitehead, Process, 5.  
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modernist exploration of multiple and fluid identity, which might have been inspired by 
quantum physics’ subatomic particles that are, on the one hand, self-sufficient particles, and, 
on the other hand, emit waves of influence.896 Therefore, the modernists, and particularly 
Woolf, transposed the wave-particle duality to the discussions about human identity, by which 
they widened the field of the concept’s possible applications. 
 In the same way, this thesis analysed the parallels between scientific and 
philosophical work of Alfred North Whitehead and Woolf’s own “imaginative leap”897 into 
philosophy that she takes in her writing without stating that there has been a direct influence 
of Whitehead on Woolf. This would undoubtedly lead to reductive reading of Woolf, and 
considering the dates of publication of Whitehead’s most influential books discussed in this 
thesis, it must be concluded that Woolf’s most known novels and short fiction were created at 
the same time, or even prior to Whitehead’s works. For example, the third chapter of this 
thesis drew parallels between Woolf’s concept of interrelated identity and ethics based on 
value of each member of society in The Waves, published in 1931, Three Guineas, published 
in 1938, and Between the Acts, published in 1941, and Whitehead’s thoughts on 
interconnection of events and value of each actual occasion discussed in Modes of Thought, 
published in 1938. Similarly, Woolf’s short fiction discussed in the first two chapters had 
been created earlier than Whitehead’s works that discuss the concepts which may be applied 
to the short stories. What if it was the modernist fiction, and particularly Woolf’s version of it, 
which inspired Whitehead to describe and analyse the issues raised in this thesis in his 
 
896. Livingstone, 73. 
897. Whitehead, Process, 4. While introducing his metaphysical enquiry and its method at the 
beginning of Process and Reality, Whitehead states that his book falls under the category of 
speculative philosophy and he condemns all philosophy and science that is based primarily on 
Baconian method of induction and abandons all attempts at imaginative thinking. The 
philosopher claims that “deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress” and that 
instead of induction and precise measurements, scientists and philosophers should make use 
of language, a tool “appealing for imaginative leap.” (page 4) 
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philosophical treatises? Nevertheless, this thesis enriches the list of possible uses of 
Whitehead’s theories, applies them to literature and demonstrates that the modernist thinkers 
were involved in the same project, only via different means of their respective disciplines. 
Moreover, both Whitehead and Woolf, as it has been illustrated, anticipate postmodern ideas, 
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This doctoral thesis focuses on the analogies between Virginia Woolf’s “personal philosophy” 
and Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, or in his own words “philosophy of 
organism.” The thesis does not claim that Whitehead’s thought directly influenced Woolf’s 
fiction, rather, it makes use of a zeitgeist model. The two contemporaries shared the rejection 
of long-established dualisms, particularly the Cartesian mind-body dualism, the binaries of 
subject and object, animate and inanimate matter, the human and the nonhuman, and last but 
not least the individual and the community. Interested in the philosophical enquiry into the 
problem of reality and the visible world, Woolf redefines the notion of “things” in her fiction 
and adopts the processist view that objects may be defined as clusters of events, which are not 
separate from the perceiving subject but interrelated with it. Moreover, Woolf illustrates her 
interest in the natural world in most of her works and often suggests that what we normally 
think to be inert and lifeless matter, may, in fact, also have some proto-conscious, or proto-
experiential, qualities like Whitehead’s “actual occasions.” The second part of the thesis 
focuses on Woolf’s attempt to overcome one’s individual identity in favour of adopting a 
more inclusive and collective “we” in her late fiction, which is strikingly similar to 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism suggesting that all existence in the universe is 
potentially interconnected in the process of concrescence, therefore, each entity has some 
value for itself and for the others. In a similar vein, Woolf embraces a moral philosophy in her 
late oeuvre, where she highlights the value of each individual because the value of the whole 
derives from the collective creativity of its parts. Moreover, Woolf and Whitehead both 
criticized anthropocentrism and destructive human action vis-à-vis the nonhuman 
environment, which is analysed in the last chapter of this thesis. 
Key words: Virginia Woolf, Alfred North Whitehead, process philosophy, human and 




Tato disertační práce zkoumá analogie mezi „osobní filozofií“ Virginie Woolfové a 
procesuální filosofií Alfreda North Whiteheada, který sám o svém metafyzickém systému 
mluvil jako o „organické filosofii.“ Práce nemá za cíl dokázat přímý vliv Whiteheadova 
myšlení na dílo V. Woolfové, ale spíše poukázat na to, že tito současníci byli součástí 
stejného vědecko-společenského diskurzu a vymezovali se proti dlouho zakořeněným 
dualismům. Mezi tyto patří hlavně karteziánský dualismus těla a mysli, subjektu a objektu, 
živého a neživého, lidského a nelidského, a v neposlední řadě individuální a kolektivní 
identity. Woolfová se zajímala o filosofické poznání reality a hmotného světa a podobně jako 
procesuální filosofie odmítá pojem „věc“, který nově definuje spíše jako shluk neustále se 
proměňujících procesů. Tyto procesy jsou navíc velmi úzce spojeny se subjekty, tedy 
vědomými pozorovateli, ve svém okolí. Woolfová dále odmítá představu neživé hmoty a ve 
svém díle naznačuje, že i zdánlivé inertní molekuly hmotného světa mohou mít nějakou 
elementární schopnost cítit či vnímat své okolí, což platí i o Whiteheadových „aktuálních 
událostech/entitách.“ Druhá část této disertace se věnuje odklonu od individuální identity ve 
prospěch kolektivní identity a komunity v pozdní tvorbě Woolfové. Toto pojetí kolektivní 
identity je opět analyzováno pomocí Whiteheadovy organické filosofie, která zdůrazňuje 
vzájemné spojení všech entit tohoto světa a též hodnotu každé části, ať už miniaturní 
molekuly či makroobjektu, která ovlivňuje proces „stávání se“ výsledného celku. Jak pozdní 
tvorba V. Wooolfové, tak Whiteheadova filosofie tedy vykazují jistý etický přesah založený 
na ontologickém propojení všech entit. Woolfová i Whitehead navíc ve svých dílech 
poukazují na potřebu vzdát se antropocentrického vidění světa, které umožňuje neetické 
chování k jiným než lidským individuím a životnímu prostředí.  
Klíčová slova: Virginia Woolfová, Alfred North Whitehead, procesuální filosofie, spojení 
lidského a nelidského, panpsychismus, identita, antropocentrismus, komunita, etika 
